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Abstract
Since the 1920s, participatory approaches to urban upgrading in developing nations have demon-
strated that involving the urban poor in the physical, social, and economic development of their
settlements could improve their living conditions. These housing policies and projects have since
been central to urban poverty reduction. Yet, while participatory upgrading is still used on a lim-
ited scale, it has failed to become a mainstream component of urban development.
This dissertation analyzes some reasons for that failure by investigating the trajectory of an urban
poverty reduction program that had much potential for success in Cambodia, but whose results
yet surprisingly fell short of expectations. It connects the results to a critical analysis of interna-
tional experience with policies and programs for urban poverty reduction.
It explores the issue in two steps: First it analyzes the historical evolution of the policies and
practices of urban poverty reduction in developing nations. This highlights the apparently weak
link between lessons from experience, international policy recommendations, and the programs
actually implemented by governments. Second, it presents a narrative analysis of how a partici-
patory urban poverty reduction policy originated, was implemented, and evolved in Phnom Penh
from 1996 to 2004. That story provides a micro-level understanding of the shape and constraints
of the evolution of policies and practices, complementing the macro-historical analysis.
The findings illustrate that three main issues have prevented international and local agencies
from promoting urban development assistance, using lessons learned from concrete experience
over time, and thus kept them from adopting a more continuous use of proven practices. First, a
conflict of frames between agencies over the meaning of development as human-centered versus
growth-led, and of the meaning of participation as an end of development vs. a means to imple-
ment centrally-decided projects at a low-cost. Second, the lack of consideration for local institu-
tions and politics in helping them understand why and how new approaches could be absorbed,
or instead resisted. And third, an apparently lack of consistency in policy directions over time,
with the abandonment of proven participatory practices, and the adoption of single-sided market-
based approaches to development, when history had shown that both were needed together.
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Title: Associate Professor of Law and Development
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Chapter 1 - Introduction: Beneficiary participation in urban upgrading
1.1 Prologue: Evolution of a research idea
I started my doctoral studies after returning from two years of work with Non-Government Or-
ganizations (NGOs) in the slums of Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia. There, I learned in
practice how living conditions in informal settlements could be improved through incremental
physical upgrading, the development of small-scale enterprises, and the organization of people in
local associations, which gave them the means to jointly implement projects and to be heard by
their government and aid agencies. I had been thrilled to see how poor urban dwellers could im-
prove their living conditions largely on their own when there was only limited external support.
At the same time, I had been puzzled by the apparent lack of collaboration between the agencies
I worked with, all of whom claimed to help the urban poor. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)
competed over their turfs, the Municipality's police evicted communities that its poverty reduc-
tion unit was attending to, and United Nations (UN) agencies wasted much time on internal dis-
putes. I often felt that when poor families improved their living conditions, they were much more
deserving of credit than us, and that many facilitating agencies could learn how to develop syn-
ergies if they were to better serve their objectives. I therefore came to MIT to find ways to coor-
dinate the actions of such agencies, and I studied innovative arrangements where public, private,
and voluntary agents of urban development could work with a common aim of public service.
As I started these studies, UN-Habitat-the UN agency in charge of urban development issues-
was setting up a strategy for participatory poverty reduction in Phnom Penh to enable innovative
partnerships. The strategy was to learn from a pilot phase of upgrading activities which the UN
had supported from 1996 to 2000, and to scale-up its outreach. It would have two components.
One, the Municipality of Phnom Penh (MPP) would design policies to best employ the capacities
of the urban poor to improve their settlements and economies in collaboration with local authori-
ties and private investors. Two, poor communities would organize for collective action, would
prepare proposals for small projects to upgrade roads, drainage systems, schools, or health posts,
and would carry out the activities. UN-Habitat would support the MPP, the communities, and the
facilitating NGOs by providing financial and technical support, and by helping set up mecha-
nisms for sustained collaboration between all of them.
As part of this work, I was hired to measure the impacts of the approach on improving urban liv-
ing conditions and reducing poverty. The results would inform its actors during the implementa-
tion of the strategy so they could adapt their policies and practices in a timely manner. This
perfectly suited my interests, and from 2000 to 2003, it was with the hope of witnessing an inno-
vative partnership for poverty reduction that I documented the unfolding of the poverty reduction
strategy, and monitored the evolution of living conditions in Phnom Penh's poor settlements.
As we shall see, the results of the strategy were however much less positive than all its actors
had initially hoped, both in terms of poverty reduction and of good-will collaboration. There
would hence be little to learn in terms of innovative partnerships.
Analyzing the policy process may yet be illuminating. It will help understand the complexity of a
mechanism of participatory local planning that appeared simple in its initial design. This in turn
will help interpret some of the recurring difficulties faced by participatory approaches to urban
poverty reduction internationally. These difficulties are rarely acknowledged in policy making,
which limits the ability to scale-up the participatory upgrading programs successfully.
1.2 Urban poverty reduction: Concepts and actors
There is no single understanding of what poverty is and how it should be tackled. There are in-
stead complementary views of the elements of ill-being that compose poverty, and of ways to
improve people's capacities to live better lives. This section introduces the main concepts and
actors in the debate on poverty and on its urban facets, discussed in this dissertation.
1.2.1 Defining urban poverty
a. Two contending views of poverty
Two main approaches have long competed to define poverty and to propose solutions to it. Each
is promoted by one of the two most influential agencies supporting international development.
The World Bank sees poverty in large part as a deficiency in terms of people's economic capaci-
ties to produce or consume-an "Economic Growth" view. In contrast, the United Nations De-
velopment Programme (UNDP) uses an approach centered on qualitative indicators of people's
ability to lead long, healthy, and creative lives-a view it refers to as "Human Development".
The Economic Growth approach: Until the early 1990s, macro-economists mainly associated
the level of a country's development with measures of its economic growth. Economies with
high growth rates were considered on the road to poverty reduction. That vision emphasized the
acquisition of wealth and technology as a path to development and assumed that improved lives
for all would result. It gave little regard to the social redistribution of its benefits, or to the side
effects of growth onto the quality of human and natural resources (Rapley, 2002).
Following that line, economists at the World Bank consider poverty in terms of the level of eco-
nomic resources or abilities people have to meet their material needs. They measure poverty
through income levels, purchasing power, or levels of economic output (Ravallion, 1996). This
approach focuses mainly on the monetary dimension of well-being, comparing an individual's
income or consumption level with a defined threshold, or poverty line, below which that individ-
ual is counted as poor. That poverty line can be relative-e.g., 50 percent of the country's mean
income or consumption-or absolute, e.g., the cost of a basic needs basket for a typical family.
The Human Development approach, supported by UNDP, contends that poverty is not simply
the lack of access to material wealth, but also the deprivation of access to higher-levels of well-
being that cannot be measured in monetary terms alone, nor through aggregate indicators of con-
sumption or production. It considers low levels of income or expense only as elements of a
broader set of social deprivations including low education, poor health, and the lack of political
recognition. It views poverty as a situation of exclusion from access to basic survival needs (e.g.,
safe shelter, clean water, health services) and to the means of improving economic productivity
(e.g., education, skills, productive capital) and of fulfilling higher social needs (e.g., recognition
as a rightful citizen). This results in a limitation of opportunities for people to improve their
From these statistical indicators, they can derive the incidence ofpoverty (or headcount index)-i.e., the share of
the population whose income or consumption is below a given poverty line, the depth ofpoverty (or poverty gap),
which measures how far off households are from the poverty line, or the poverty severity (or squared poverty gap),
that highlights inequalities among the poor. They can further compute inequality in the distribution of income of
consumption across the population to measure the relative position of an individual or household in society. If data
exist that can be linked to the poverty indicators, poverty analyses can then compare characteristics of different
groups-e.g., poor vs. non-poor-in terms of employment, access to government services, and living standards
among others. With longitudinal data, such comparisons can as well be conducted over time (Klugman, 2002a).
long-term prospects for well-being. Reducing poverty is in turn to enable Human Development-
"a process of enlarging people's choices to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge
and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living" (United Nations Devel-
opment Programme, 1990). That approach aims to give people the means to develop opportuni-
ties to improve their lives, and to sustain achievements by recognizing their rights as citizens.2
I shall not compare the approaches at length, but merely note that the two main development aid
agencies central to our policy story use different lenses to understand the concepts of poverty,
and to find solutions to it.3 One sees increased income and consumption as the point of develop-
ment and hence focuses on enabling economic growth to achieve that end. The other is centered
on strengthening the capacities of individuals to not only improve their income and consumption
potentials, but to live fulfilling lives in which they are economically, socially, and politically in-
cluded in the larger society they live in. These two views lead to different styles of planning that
constantly compete in the development-aid debate and in the assistance provided to poor nations.
In my work in informal urban settlements, summarizing the multidimensional aspects of poverty
by a single indicator of income or productivity has limited use, as it neither fully depicts the
situations people face, nor suggests ways to improve them. Besides, when they exist, these indi-
cators are often unreliable to describe very poor and often illegal urban populations who-by
their very informal nature-are excluded from society and are rarely included in the formal sur-
veys used to produce quantitative poverty measures. In the case study, I thus opt for a qualitative,
multi-faceted approach to understand the economic, political, and social issues faced by people
living in poor urban settlements. I later describe at length the indicators of poverty used in
Phnom Penh and the method employed to measure its evolution.
b. Characteristics of urban poverty
In urban areas, the low-income settlements we are interested in are generically referred to as
slums, spontaneous, irregular, informal, illegal, or squatter settlements. Recent global studies on
slums have shown that no matter which of the labels is used, their inhabitants face roughly simi-
lar living conditions and relations with the rest of the urban communities in which they live in.
Low-income settlements are often built on insalubrious land that offers little attraction to private
real-estate developers, e.g., alongside public roads or waterways, on slopes, floodable lands, or in
other areas out of the reach of urban infrastructure and services (roads, water, sanitation, and
power networks). Typically, people live there without ownership titles, a situation which pro-
vides them only limited security of tenure and leaves them- vulnerable to eviction. Their shelters
2 The base indicator in this people-centered view of poverty is the Human Development Index (HDI), which meas-
ures the level of attainment of human development through a composite of longevity, knowledge, and standard of
living, and thus gives an appreciation both of people's choices in life and of the level of their well-being. Its baseline
is the highest standard that can be reached on a national average. The Human Poverty Index (HPI) builds on the HDI
to indicate levels of basic deprivations which poverty-reduction programs should aim at removing. It measures dep-
rivation by chances of survival-through the percentage of a population expected to die before 40, level of exclusion
from the reach of knowledge-through the percentage of adult illiteracy, and decency of living standard-through a
composite of the percentages of people with access to health service and safe water, and of malnourished children
under five (United Nations Development Programme, 1998).
3 Two good reviews of the economist's assessment of poverty are a World Bank extensive manual on poverty meas-
urement and policy tools (Klugman, 2002a, 2002b) and a summary of the uses and misunderstandings of quantita-
tive measures of poverty by Ravallion (2003). The merits of measuring "human" poverty over "income" poverty are
treated at length in Haq (1995) and McGee & Brock (2001).
are made of low-cost materials, including plastic, leaves, zinc, or mud. The settlements are over-
crowded, and living conditions are unsanitary and unsafe due to difficult physical access; the
lack of adequate water, toilet facilities, and public lighting; and criminality (United Nations Hu-
man Settlements Programme, 2003a).
People's livelihoods depend in large part on the informal economy. They are self-employed in
petty trading, building, or repair activities; are daily laborers on construction sites, markets, or
loading docks; taxi drivers; factory workers; or low-level civil servants. Few of their occupations
allow a single person to feed an entire family, and often even children must work at least part-
time to make ends meet. With low and unpredictable incomes, and usually little cultivable space
to produce their own food, poor urban families are vulnerable to shocks-from sickness, the loss
of work, natural disaster, or the death of a family member-which can precipitate destitution.
Further, without formal land titles or registered businesses, these people have difficulties access-
ing loans to invest in productive capital. They are also subjected to abuse from public authorities,
who charge them all sorts of unofficial fees to let them live and work in informality.
Politically, slum dwellers are further excluded from their larger urban communities and are often
not recognized the same rights as formal inhabitants. They may not have access to public utili-
ties, to health and education services, or even to voting rights. They are often even stigmatized as
being the causes of insecurity, environmental degradation, and crime (Satterthwaite, 2001).
Figure 1-1 shows how the different characteristics of urban poverty reinforce each other and
how, with inadequate access to health, education, or credit, and with no security over tenure, the
urban poor are given little chance to improve their prospects for a brighter future.
Figure 1-1: Cumulative impacts of urban poverty
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1.2.2 Reducing urban poverty
a. The role of housing
A country's industrialization process typically attracts migrants to urban areas where they expect
to find work. The growth in urban population then often outpaces the ability of governments and
housing markets to provide affordable shelter, infrastructure, and basic services to the workers
who form informal settlements in the outskirts of cities where poverty spreads. For governments
and aid agencies, improving the living conditions of growing masses of urban poor hence starts
with housing. Along with shelter comes the need to build infrastructure such as roads, water and
sanitation networks, to ensure that low-income families have access to health and education ser-
vices, and to recognize their equality of rights with other citizens (Gilbert & Gugler, 1992).
Taken in that large sense, urban housing policies in developing nations have been a core of urban
poverty reduction policies starting in the early 1950s (see Kelly, 1955; United Nations, 1959a).
This view has been reinforced in all major UN strategies for urban development ever since, with
the UN Development Decades for the 1960s and 1970s (United Nations, 1962b; United Nations
Secretary-General & Ward, 1970), the Habitat Declaration and Habitat Agenda (United Nations,
1977, 1996), the Millennium Declaration (United Nations, 2000), and UN-Habitat's Strategic
Vision for the New Millennium (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2003c).4
In 1976, the Habitat Declaration summarized the shared international view on what improving
the well-being of the urban poor meant as:
PRINCIPLES: (1.) The improvement of the quality of life of human beings is the first and most
important objective of every human settlement policy. These policies must facilitate the rapid and
continuous improvement in the quality of life of all people, beginning with the satisfaction of the
basic needs of food, shelter, clean water, employment, health, education, training, social security
without any discrimination [...] in aframe offreedom, dignity and social justice. (13.) All per-
sons have the right and the duty to participate individually and collectively in the elaboration
and implementation of policies and programs of their human settlements.
GUIDELINES FOR ACTION: (8.) Adequate shelter and services are a basic human right which
places an obligation on Governments to ensure their attainment by all people, beginning with di-
rect assistance to the least advantaged through guided programs of self-help and community ac-
tion. (11.) [... I recourse must therefore be made at all times to technical arrangements
permitting the use of all human resources, both skilled and unskilled. The equal participation of
women must be guaranteed. Excerpts, from the Habitat Declaration (United Nations, 1976, 1977).
b. The role of self-help and mutual-help
Despite generic agreements over the issues of urban poverty and of what improving urban living
conditions means, there is no single approach on how to transform policy views into activities,
nor on who should take the lead in dealing with urban housing and poverty reduction.
Instead, three main directions have competed for over fifty years. One-of centralized plan-
ning-considers that reducing poverty is the role of the state, which should lead policies and pro-
jects to produce low-cost public housing and provide services and targeted subsidies to the poor.
4 The World Bank has also emphasized housing issues in poverty reduction since its early urban strategy of 1972 (in
Churchill, Lycette et al., 1980; Cohen, 1991; Mayo & Angel, 1993; Mayo, Malpezzi et al., 1986; World Bank, 1972,
1974, 1975a). Improving the efficiency of housing markets-along with land and labor markets-remains the core
of its urban strategy in the 2000s (see Baharoglu and Kessides 2002; Kessides 2000).
A second-of participatory, bottom-up, or mutual-help planning-banks on the potentials of
poor urban dwellers to manage their own development using their local resources, complemented
by external technical and financial support. A third approach-promotingfree-markets-sees
poverty reduction as trickling down from an efficient economy in which land, labor, and capital
markets can provide housing and economic opportunities to all (Blore, 1999).
In reality, in most of the developing world, housing construction and the improvement of living
conditions in urban poor settlements are defacto based on participatory processes. People do not
sit waiting for external support to produce the shelters they live in; they build them using the ma-
terials and resources locally available. They do so either alone, through a process of self-help, or
with support of neighbors and family members, through mutual-help. In addition to building
their own houses, they devise ways to cope with difficult living conditions, and at times to im-
prove their environment, access to services, and local economies. They support each other to
build common infrastructure, to run community schools or health programs, and to set up saving
groups and cooperatives. Although one could refute that this community-led approach is a hous-
ing "policy" per se, as it is not planned by any public agency, since it is how most urban shelters
are produced, it qualifies as an important element of public action (Gilbert, 1992; Harris, 1999).
For public agencies with scarce resources, learning how to best use the existing practices and ca-
pacities of the urban poor to improve their own housing and living conditions can be an impor-
tant element of low-cost policies for poverty reduction that are easily acceptable to beneficiaries
(see Kelly, 1955). This is indeed how some governments have successfully responded to urban
housing and poverty crises in both rich and poor nations since the end of World War I to rebuild
war damage, to improve housing conditions in colonies, and to accommodate the growing num-
ber of migrants attracted by the industrialization of urban areas (see Harris, 1997, 1999).
That type of support has generically been labeled aided-self-help or aided-mutual-help. A key
component of such programs is to complement the local human, financial, and technical re-
sources, and to enable people to incrementally rehabilitate the settlements they live in. Projects
usually start by strengthening existing Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) for mutual sup-
port or by creating new ones. They then link them to more resources-such as technical training,
funding, or new ideas-to expand their capacity to plan on behalf of their members.
Concrete activities involve upgrading individual houses and common infrastructure (e.g., lanes,
water, sanitation, and drainage networks), improving access to social services (e.g., health, edu-
cation, or social protection for the poorest), and creating cooperative business ventures. The
CBOs manage the processes of housing construction, infrastructure improvement, and service
provision, or the creation of income generating activities. Local governments typically partici-
pate by relaxing their codes to allow dwellers to build or improve their homes with low-cost ma-
terials that may not meet formal standards, or to incrementally develop business that may not
initially have to register and pay taxes. External supporting agencies provide beneficiaries with
grants or subsidized loans in cash, or in kind. Most programs combine the in situ improvement of
existing houses and infrastructure, with the resettlement of some dwellers to more habitable sites,
on plots equipped with basic infrastructure for transportation, water access, and sanitation
(Davidson et al., 1981; Laquian, 1983a; Special Interest Group in Urban Settlements, 1999).
5 What motivates a family to build and maintain their own house (through self-help) is often different from what
motivates them to build and maintain communal infrastructure (through mutual-help). We are yet not looking at the
differences between self- and mutual-help and will use the terms interchangeably, as is often done in the literature.
The implementation of building activities then develops the local economies, and the experience
that community members gain through collective action further allows them to strengthen their
capacities to interact with government officials, and to become recognized as rightful citizens.
When upgrading evolves from building houses to providing more comprehensive responses to
poverty, the role of beneficiaries usually shifts from providing free labor on construction projects
to becoming participants in local planning processes. Therefore, while self-help can be seen as a
means to build houses, participation is in itself an end of development. It is the political empow-
erment of people formerly excluded from their larger urban communities (Arnstein, 1969;
Choguill, 1996). In line with that view of participation-detailed in section 1.3.1-I label the set
of approaches we are studying participatory urban upgrading rather than merely aided-self help
or aided-mutual-help, with participation being an important element of poverty reduction.
1.2.3 The actors of poverty reduction
a. Who makes poverty reduction policies?
The process of public policy making can be understood along a continuum ranging from a view
by which elected politicians alone decide on issues of public interest, devise responses to tackle
these issues, and pass guidelines that will be implemented by public agencies, to one where poli-
cies and their implementation are based in large part on the results of power struggles between
competing lobbies (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993). In the latter view, governments and politi-
cians are not alone responsible for deciding and implementing public policies. Other key agents
are the private sector-i.e., investors that run a large part of a country's economy-and volun-
tary agencies that represent the interests of specific citizen groups (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003).
In nations dependent on foreign assistance for public investments, international development
agencies are another type of actor that has a major influence on public policies. They can be mul-
tilateral agencies representing groups of countries-such as the United Nations, the World Bank,
or the European Union-or bilateral agencies representing a single government-such as the
United States Agency for International Development (see Reinicke, 1998).
Our study of public policy mechanisms for poverty reduction is concerned with the interactions
between governmental, for-profit, and voluntary agencies, both domestic and international. The
main international and local development actors in these interactions are presented hereafter.
b. Global actors of urban development aid
Four main international development agencies-which I also refer to as "aid agencies"-have
shaped the evolution of support to urban poverty reduction in developing countries.
The British Government was the earliest, and is still the longest-standing supporter of urban
development aid. It started promoting the improvement of urban housing conditions in the 1930s
through its Colonial Office. From 1970 to 1997, it acted through the Overseas Development Ad-
ministration (ODA), which then became the United Kingdom Departmentfor International De-
velopment (DFID) in 1997. At the country level, DFID supports governments to reduce poverty
in partnership with the World Bank, UN agencies, the European Union, and NGOs (Department
for International Development, 2003; Harris & Giles, 2003; Mutter, 2001).
The US Government started its aid to urban development at the beginning of the Cold War to
prevent Latin American countries from falling under communist control. Along with the Colo-
nial Office, it largely shaped international approaches to urban development support until the
1960s. It mainly acted through the US Housing Home Finance Agency (HHFA), and then the US
Agency for International Development, USAID (Crane & Foster, 1955; Harris, 1997, 1998).
The United Nations first supported urban issues through studies conducted for its Economic and
Social Council (EcoSoc) on the problems of urbanization and on local solutions in the 1950s (see
United Nations, 1959a, 1959b, 1959c; United Nations Mission on Tropical Housing, 1952).
EcoSoc's Housing Committee then collaborated closely with the UK and US development aid
until the 1960s, when it became the main leader of international housing development efforts. By
the late 1960s, the UN realized that it had little power to enforce its recommendations, and it left
most concrete activities to the World Bank, starting in the 1970s (see United Nations, 1972). Fol-
lowing the 1976 UN conference on Human Settlements, it created UN-Habitat, an agency dedi-
cated to improving life in cities. In 2001, UN-Habitat transformed from a technical agency to a
"programme" of the UN, and officially gained autonomy in providing to governments policy di-
rections for urban poverty reduction (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2003c).
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), mainly the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) and the World Bank, have been the main financiers of urban development aid. The
IADB funded urban projects in the late 1950s and 1960s, then the World Bank became the main
urban funding agency starting in 1972. Along with loans, they provide support for the design of
projects. They have promoted an economic view of cities as made of infrastructure, and of mar-
kets for land, labor, and capital, in which economic forces rather than people's aspirations shape
the wealth of cities and their people (Jones & Ward, 1995; Zanetta, 2001).
c. Local actors of policy making
In the countries receiving aid from these agencies, four types of actors influence the policies we
shall discuss: aid beneficiaries, intermediaries, aid agencies, and the private sector.
The beneficiaries of projects and policies are the governments and people receiving assistance.
We focus on the central governments responsible for the design and implementation of national
poverty reduction strategies, and the municipal authorities in charge of planning and managing
urban centers. We refer to end-beneficiaries as low-income urban dwellers, or urban poor. They
are represented by Community-Based Organizations, which are usually informal associations of
community volunteers acting as intermediaries between authorities, agencies supporting the
communities, and the people.
The intermediaries between aid providers and aid recipients are typically NGOs working on
behalf of the people, and Project Implementation Units (PIUs), usually semi-governmental agen-
cies set up by aid providers to support governments in managing specific projects or programs.
Aid agencies are the providers of technical and financial support for governments to design and
implement their national and local development policies. They extend support through grants-
usually for pilot projects or activities with no financial return-or through low-cost loans.
The private sector-i.e., the businesses that run the urban economy-is often not explicitly part
of the official policymaking processes. Yet, it has an important impact on urban life as it can de-
cide in practice of labor standards, including wages or working conditions, and it influences the
physical, social, and economic development of urban areas when it opens or closes factories or
when it appropriates the land on which informal communities are settled.
1.3 Current debate on participation in poverty reduction
1.3.1 Models of participation in urban upgrading
Although "participation" is widely recognized as a key element of successful urban poverty re-
duction programs (as detailed in Chapter Two), in practice each policy actor tends to understand
it differently. This section presents a model that defines the term along a continuum ranging from
one where the participation of beneficiaries is seen as a means to implement projects decided by
outside aid providers (governments or development agencies), to one where participating in local
decision processes is actually an end of development that allows people to take active part in
public policy making. This simple model will be useful later to decipher the diverging under-
standing and attitudes of communities, government officials, and development agencies toward
what they all refer to as "participation," while having very different concepts in mind.
In the late 1960s, defining participation in (US) community planning as "the redistribution of
power that enables the have-not citizens excluded from the political and economic processes to
be deliberately included in the future" (p.216), Arnstein devised a ladder of citizen participation
in local planning that represented possible degrees of citizen involvement as eight rungs
(Arnstein, 1969). The strength of linkage between public officials and citizens ranged from non-
participation-a top-down approach by which officials merely informed people of development
plans centrally decided, to tokenism-in which consultations were undertaken but did not influ-
ence decisions still made by officials, to a state of citizen power-in which groups of citizens
shared with public authorities the responsibility of taking and implementing public decisions.
In low-income urban settlements of developing nations, the issues are relatively similar. Though
participation starts on pragmatic grounds of physical, economic, and social reconstruction, it has
an important political component of enabling disenfranchised communities to lead their own de-
velopment processes.
In urban upgrading, community participation thus has two main objectives. First, to improve the
living conditions of poor communities through upgrading housing and infrastructure and devel-
oping the local economy and social support mechanisms on a self- and mutual-help basis. Sec-
ond, for the poor to influence decisions taken on their behalf-especially in improving their
communities-and to obtain access to the same services and rights as other urban dwellers.
Reaching these objectives, however, requires that local governments accept low-income dwellers
as actors of their own planning process by recognizing their rights to tenure; by providing them
technical, financial, and legal support to improve their settlements; and by involving them in the
local planning processes that affect their lives (United Nations, 1976, 1977).
Recognizing this, Choguill (1996) adapted Arnstein's ladder to make sense of the forms that
community participation can take for urban upgrading in poor nations. Based on the analysis of
nearly seven hundred sources, ranging from case studies of community upgrading projects to
theoretical propositions on the role of participation, she developed the model presented in Figure
1-2. The top rung corresponds to the highest degree of willingness from Government to support
communities in designing and carrying out participatory improvement activities on their own.
Figure 1-2: Ladder of community participation in urban upgrading
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2. Partnership
3. Conciliation
4. Dissimulation
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6. Informing
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Adapted from Choguill (1996)
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1. On the highest rung, empowerment reflects a situation in which local
delegate to communities the "power to initiate and control their own
with the assistance of outside help" (p.435).
authorities formally
improvement, possibly
2. The second rung is that of partnership, in which government, community members, outside
agencies, and possibly representatives of the private sector jointly manage policy boards,
planning committees, and mechanisms to resolve problems and conflicts.
3. Conciliation occurs when "government devises solutions that are eventually ratified by the
people, " i.e., when community representatives must accept decisions made by the elites.
4. Dissimulation is a level of participation in which community representatives may be invited
to attend project-related meetings, but are not given power to intervene or change existing
plans. They are manipulated by authorities who can claim to have received their agreement.
5. Diplomacy is when officials show no interest in supporting communities, at best letting them
conduct small projects on their own, possibly with external assistance.
6. A sixth level is one of informing, where municipalities let communities know of projects to
be implemented on their behalf, with no space for feedback or negotiations.
7. Conspiracy is where there is no community participation in the programs that will affect
them, and where this lack of participation is disguised by authorities. This is the case of the
clearance of slums for emergencies such as floods, fires, or threats to public health that "le-
gitimize" the forced removal of squatter settlements.
8. In self-management, government resigns from its role of provider and leaves communities to
plan and conduct their development projects on their own. Communities may, or may not,
improve their conditions, but they remain excluded from the larger urban community.
We should note the apparent similitude of the two end rungs of the ladder: in both, communities
manage their own development processes. One, empowerment, with government support and
political recognition, the other, self-management, despite government opposition. Although
eventually self-management can be transformed in empowerment, the process happens in a con-
text of disinterest, or opposition from the government to people's demands. That is, a project
may improve the well-being of community members, but since they are not recognized any new
rights, beneficiaries have no insurance that improvements will become long-term endowments.
1.3.2 Puzzle in urban poverty reduction
A main element that we will analyze in the evolution of policies and practices will be different
understandings of "participation" in urban upgrading. A second important one will be the forces
that shape the creation, adoption, or oblivion of specific policy recommendations. In that regard,
our main puzzle relates to the counterintuitive evolution of housing polices over time.
a. The apparent trajectory of participatory upgrading policies
According to a widely quoted literature on housing in developing nations, it is in the early 1970s
that the World Bank sparked a wide interest in participatory approaches to urban poverty reduc-
tion, through slum upgrading and sites and services projects (see Churchill et al., 1980; Mayo &
Angel, 1993; Pugh, 1997; D. G. Williams, 1984; World Bank, 1972, 1974, 1975a).
These projects used a method of aided-self-help borrowed from rural development programs of
the 1960s and from the arguments of a few academics (e.g., Turner, 1969; Turner & Fichter,
1972) who had allegedly convinced the Bank that it made sense to use the capacities of poor
people (understood as their labor, savings, and local knowledge) to gradually improve slums
through community-led rehabilitation projects for housing and infrastructure that would in turn
develop the local economies. In the 1970s and 1980s, these participatory methods of urban up-
grading were then tried worldwide and became the core of policies and projects for urban pov-
erty reduction, as acknowledged by the 1976 Habitat Declaration (in United Nations, 1977).
Despite the recognition of their achievements and potentials (e.g., in Buckley & Mayo, 1988;
Cohen, 1983; Keare & Parris, 1982; Laquian, 1983b; Payne, 1984; Yap, 1984), these approaches
were largely discarded by the mid 1980s after a new development ideology replaced project-
based with policy-based lending in development aid (see Gruder, 1979; Williamson, 1994;
Wright, 1980). The World Bank then decided that developing urban markets for land, labor, and
capital would be more efficient to lift large populations out of poverty than supporting myriads
of projects. It drastically reduced its investments in participatory urban upgrading projects (see
Cohen, 1991; Mayo & Angel, 1993; Mayo et al., 1986) and, given the prominence of the Bank in
the development discourse, few agencies challenged that decision in practice.
A central reason given to move away from participatory upgrading was that the approach could
not be scaled up to reach a large number of poor families. The Bank had found upgrading and
sites-and-services technically appropriate, but institutionally it could not find how to recover
costs and to get local governments to implement the approach by themselves on a larger scale.
b. The forgotten experience
In that mainstream literature though, one issue was puzzling: Given the low-cost and technical
simplicity of participatory upgrading approaches, why had these not been tried before the 1970s?
If they had, there should have been lessons to learn from by the early 1970s, so the Bank could
concentrate on figuring out how the approach could be scaled up and accepted as a regular prac-
tice by governments, rather than on testing technicalities of project design and cost-recovery.
The existence of prior lessons would have shifted the issue of finding ways to reduce urban pov-
erty from a technical one of how to develop new types of projects to an institutional one of how
technically recognized practices could become part of accepted policy processes.
That puzzle matured as I worked in Zambia from 2003 to 2005 where, in 1974, the Bank had
started the Lusaka Squatter Upgrading and Site and Services Project. The Bank presented it as a
new approach and the Lusaka project became a flagship of its urban operations, from which ex-
tensive lessons were drawn in the 1970s and 1980s. Conducting research on urban living condi-
tions in Zambia, I learned that the acceptance of aided-self-help was in large part due to the fact
that it had long been used there. Projects to upgrade informal settlements and to create new ser-
viced sites had been tried from the 1920s in the Copperbelt and in the 1950s in Lusaka, and it
was because Zambia's 1972 National Development Plan included the aim of building on its ex-
perience with participatory upgrading that the Bank supported the 1974 project. The Bank did
not import the concept. Rather, it worked relatively well because techniques had been exten-
sively tried in the country, and a local political will to support the approach had been built over
the years (see Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1972; Jere, 1984; 2004; Tipple, 1981).
Realizing this discrepancy developed my interest in delving into the history of participation in
urban housing (detailed in Chapter Two), and my findings highlighted two issues that reinforce
the puzzle and will give depth to findings of the later Cambodian case study:
The first issue is that participatory approaches to urban upgrading actually have a much
longer history to learn from than is usually acknowledged. They were first documented in the
1920s as government policies for the post-war reconstruction of Europe, where they were then
extensively used until the 1950s. From the 1930s, similar approaches of aided-self-help were
used for development assistance in British colonies and in some US territories. From the late
1940s, building upon the early lessons, the US and UK governments then applied the methods
systematically as central elements of their growing efforts to support international development
(Crane et al., 1944; Harris, 1997, 1998, 1999; Kelly, 1955; Tipple, 1979). The UN later adopted
them as global policies in its 1960s' First Development Decade (United Nations, 1959a, 1960,
1962b). In the early 1970s, there were therefore many lessons to learn from on participatory up-
grading (e.g., in United States Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1951, 1952, 1964).
The second issue is that international development agencies seemed to each draw differ-
ent lessons from the experience of participatory upgrading. What some considered successes,
others saw as failures. They were perceived as positive in terms of community empowerment
and the potential for autonomous replication (e.g., in Abrams, 1966a; Burchard, 1955; Isham et
al., 1994; Keare & Parris, 1982; Laquian, 1983b; Payne, 1984; Swan et al., 1983; Yap, 1984),
and as negative in terms of targeting and cost recovery when they were standardized and applied
as part of large, centrally controlled projects (in Churchill et al., 1980; Mayo & Gross, 1985;
Sanyal, 1981; Turok & Sanyal, 1980). Meanwhile, these aid agencies spent only a little effort to
understand how and why the governments of poor nations did-or did not-adopt the participa-
tory upgrading policies as regular features of their response to urban poverty (see Giles, 2003).
1.3.3 Relevance of the puzzle in current development discourse
The divergent perceptions of participation and the ignorance of past lessons remain timely issues
to understand current international support to urban poverty reduction. They are also more gen-
erally relevant to interpret discrepancies between the discourse and practice of international aid
agencies on the values and role of participation in development.
a. Participation in urban upgrading: gap between knowledge, policies, and practice
The population of slums, estimated at 924 million in 2003, is likely to reach two billions by
2030. There is, however, a wide gap between the calls for urgent action to improve urban living
conditions (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c), the recog-
nized need for local participation if results are to reach a large scale and be sustainable
(Baharoglu & Kessides, 2002; Mutter, 2001; Rakodi & Lloyd-Jones, 2002), and the as yet still
limited international support to participatory urban upgrading.
In fact, the approach to reduce urban poverty through community-led participatory upgrading
activities has been largely discontinued since the mid-1980s and has not been replaced with a
clear alternative. The development paradigm that displaced it as part of Structural Adjustment
Programs turned to a macro policy support aimed at enabling more efficient economies and gov-
ernments to reduce poverty, but it did not build upon previous lessons on participation. In prac-
tice, urban programs involving beneficiaries in improving their living conditions drastically
decreased in the investment of aid agencies. While participatory upgrading projects represented
68% of the World Bank's urban support from 1972 to 1986, they dropped to 20.3% from 1987 to
2003 (see Figure 2-4 p. 46). The Bank's strategic directions for poverty reduction in the 2000s
now focus almost exclusively on macro and rural issues (see Kanbur & Lustig, 2000), as do the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that direct international assistance to the poorest
countries. In urban areas, aid programs are mostly based on infrastructure development and train-
ing on "good governance," with little space to enable the participation of the urban poor in ac-
tivities with a direct goal of poverty reduction (see Amis, 2001).
b. Participation in development: ambiguity of the concepts
Outside the urban realm, there are also debates about the apparent discrepancy between the dis-
course of international aid agencies, promoting the use of participation, and the activities they
support in practice, which either distort the initial concepts, or include little participation at all.
Theoretically, the reflections on human development of the 1990s highlighted how a key goal of
poverty reduction was to enable people to take a central role in their development process (e.g.,
in Haq, 1995; Sen, 1999; United Nations Development Programme, 1990). This was even taken
on by the World Bank in its 1999 World Development Report, that stressed the importance of
people's participation and political empowerment in reducing poverty (see Yusuf & World Bank,
1999). In the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, 189 countries then further agreed on shared
goals of development, in which expanding people's participation in their own development was
central to ensure that interventions could be sustained in the long term (United Nations, 2000).
At the community level, increased participation was to give the poor a role in local planning and
a voice in demanding results from their governments. At the national level, it implied that na-
tional governments be the ones deciding local goals and mechanisms for poverty reduction. In
that view, aid agencies were to support the development of local capacities technically, finan-
cially, and institutionally. Not to substitute for them (Boulton et al., 2001; Moore, 2001).
Yet today, these agencies seem at a loss about how to promote participation in practice. Research
on how decisions are taken in formulating the frameworks for national poverty reduction in de-
veloping country tend to demonstrate that a handful of development agencies (mainly the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund-IMF) still take most decisions, rather than recipient
governments. The PRSPs that are to direct the development of the poorest countries are therefore
criticized as being mainly driven by the views and interests of IFIs (Brock et al., 2001; Cornwall,
2002).6 In turn, if there is little participation from local governments in crafting their own pov-
erty reduction frameworks, it seems quite awkward to expect "participation" to trickle down to
the community-level of development projects.
Aside from deploring weak links between creeds and their implementation, other critiques warn
of the "quality" of participation promoted in some development practices (see Cooke & Kothari,
2001). In analyzing the sometime superficial use of "participation" in development, the critiques
show how its meaning is filtered by the institutions using it. They call for the consideration of
three important criteria in assessing the quality of participation, which we shall see apply both at
the scale of local planning, and at that of the international discourse of development policies.
First is the extent to which the "participatory" modes of decision making actually pay attention
to local knowledge or merely impose outside models (Mosse, 2001). Second is the extent to
which they are adapted to local social structures and can therefore be locally appropriated in the
long-term (Cleaver, 2001). Third is whether they consider the relations of power between par-
ticipants in the decision-making processes, and do not merely provide opportunities to the more
powerful (Hildyard et al., 2001). What these warning boil down to is that some development or-
ganizations may integrate "participation" in their operations without fully reflecting on what it
means and what they want to achieve with it. They use sets of tools and techniques more as pro-
cedures to follow than as ways to give participants an active voice over their planning processes.
Without prior reflection on what they want to achieve, it is unlikely that such participatory proc-
esses can be adopted in the long-term as local practices.
We are indeed interested in an approach of participation that enables people to lead their own
development process. In that sense, we rejoin the definition of "deep" participation described by
Fung, Sabel, and Wright, in their search for institutional arrangements at the local level by which
laypersons find ways to work together with public authorities to improve their living conditions
and provide public services (see Fung & Wright, 2003).
Consistent with that approach, we use a generic understanding of governance, as "the direction
and management of public affairs as shared by both public, private and voluntary actors" (see
Commission on Global Governance, 1995, 2000), and not just as regulated by governments.
Similarly, we will analyze policy making, i.e. the transformation of ideas into public decisions,
as an incremental and dialectic process in which all stages of formulation, implementation, and
analysis depend on both rationality and power struggles, following the views of Lindblom (1959;
1980). Hence our use of a narrative analysis rather than a mainly legalistic or a quantitative
analysis, following the approaches of Kaplan (1985), Friedmann (1987), or Roe (1994).
6 Numerous critiques have analyzed the limitations of PRSPs. Craig (2003) demonstrated how PRSPs merely repli-
cated one another, "favoring the technical and juridical over the political economic, and a disciplinary framework
over a practical contest." Others remarked on the lack of genuine local participation in the design of these papers
(Whaites, 2002), the superficial treatment of civil society-and of empowerment-whose role was seen merely as im-
plementing policies decided by international development agencies (Moore, 2001), and the lack of treatment of two
major issues that are HIV/AIDS (Barnett & Whiteside, 2001) and urban poverty (Amis, 2001).
1.4 Research issue and expected contribution
1.4.1 Research interest
In reference to this puzzle, my interest is to understand the evolution of policies to reduce urban
poverty in developing nations, and the apparent difficulty of translating internationally agreed
principles of beneficiary participation into practice. I am further interested in how participatory
policies, formulated in large part by aid providers, are absorbed by recipient governments and
contribute-or fail to contribute-to long term changes in local policymaking approaches.
1.4.2 Knowledge gap
The World Bank and the UN have produced large bodies of literature on participatory urban de-
velopment, providing directions to public policy-makers. A rich practitioner literature hence ex-
ists on assistance to urban poverty reduction in developing countries (see Table 2-2, p. 55). As
Chapter Two shows, it yet lacks of depth in analyzing the processes of public policy (including
policy making, policy analysis, and the evolution of public institutions) and the role of participa-
tion in them. In that regard, it remains particularly short of associating three important concerns:
First, it tends to forget history. While aided-self-help has been used in urban development
programs since the 1920s, a large part of the literature portrays it as only starting in the 1970s.
Not linking new policies to earlier lessons yet defeats the aim of piloting. Findings on the tech-
nique of community participation hence seem to be constantly re-invented, while important is-
sues of how to successfully scale up small upgrading programs remain under-researched.
Second, the relation between multiple facets of poverty is often underplayed by individ-
ual disciplines, which compete for mutually exclusive answers to poverty, rather than recognize
the synergies of their approaches to solving complex problems. While sociologists and planners
had a voice in early debates on urban poverty up to the 1970s, economists now monopolize the
literature that influences development agencies. This has obfuscated some of the simple lessons
from experience which their disciplines cannot easily represent, such as the value of mutual-help.
Third, the role of local contexts and institutions is by and large dismissed, especially in
the poorest countries. In a quest for large-scale standardized answers to poverty, aid agencies ig-
nore the political situations in which their recommendations are to be applied, and thus do not
fully consider how policies and projects can become part of locally accepted practices.
In academia, a large body of writing explains how public policies are made, how they evolve,
and how agencies designing and implementing them tend to learn, or fail to learn, from imple-
mentation (e.g., in Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993; Pressman & Wil-
davsky, 1984; Roe, 1991; Stokey & Zeckhauser, 1978). We use their lessons when analyzing our
policy process, but they often study developed democracies in which public decisions are taken
with minimum interference from foreign decision-makers. This is not the case in many develop-
ing nations, which must accommodate advice from a range of aid agencies, each bringing a
whole set of policy conditions to their support and often with short-term horizons that may not
contribute to rendering the local policy process more predictable, or based on local participation.
Studies related to our international interest looked at how policies in development agencies and
in aid-recipient governments evolve. Collier (1976) studied the adoption of self-help housing in
Peru, and explained how their acceptance was due, in large part, to the complex political and
economic situation of the time in which the approach fit particularly well, and not mainly to the
intrinsic value of the self-help policies. Tendler's study (1975) of the organizational rules and
mechanisms that shape the behavior of aid agencies provided a strong basis to understand how
policies are filtered during their implementation by motivations independent from their contents.
Later, Grindle explained some of the processes of policy reform in developing nations and
showed the role of politics in the implementation of policies (see Grindle, 1980:3-39; Grindle &
Thomas, 1991). In the urban sector, Rakodi has raised the issues of participation and political
changes in urban projects (Rakodi, 1985, 1988, 1991; Rakodi & Lloyd-Jones, 2002), but overall,
little has been written on what may promote the lasting adoption of reforms, especially for urban
poverty policies (with the notable exception of Schlyter, 1998). We hope that by borrowing what
these studies pointed to analyze our cases, and by adding a historical perspective, our work can
contribute to this body of academic knowledge in the specific settings of Cambodia, and provide
some directions for reflection to practitioners
1.4.3 Approach and objectives
Our study does not intend to assess whether participatory programs are more appropriate than
other approaches for urban poverty reduction. This has been done quite extensively, and has
shown that participation is one element-but not the only one-of successful urban upgrading
programs (see Chapter Two). Instead, we aim to systematically analyze how and why "participa-
tory" urban poverty reduction policies are formulated, implemented, and adopted, or not.
We do so through studying the evolution of urban poverty reduction approaches on two levels.
The first, macro level, is the historical understanding of how and why international policies for
urban poverty reduction have evolved, both in terms of concepts and of practice. It will help un-
derstand the evolution of international policy advice. The second, micro level, is a case study of
the piloting, institutionalizing and implementation of a strategy for participatory urban poverty
reduction in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. It will help explain the complexity of implementing a par-
ticipatory upgrading program in a political context that does not initially promote participation.
To explore that main research issue, this study sets out to answer three questions. First, how has
knowledge on international assistance to urban poverty reduction evolved over time and why?
Second, how has the urban poverty reduction strategy in Phnom Penh unfolded, and what factors
were most influential in shaping its implementation and adoption? Third, using findings from the
macro and micro-policy stories, how can we refine our understanding of what promotes and what
hinders the adoption of participatory approaches to urban poverty reduction?
1.4.4 Relevance of the Phnom Penh case
The case study takes place in Phnom Penh, one of the poorest capitals of Southeast Asia, in a
country where the government largely resigned from its role during a protracted civil war, and
where it shares the management of public affairs with foreign aid agencies and private interests.
An allegedly participatory poverty reduction strategy unfolded there from 1996 to 2004, first
along a pilot phase of small upgrading projects, and then through a phase of institutionalization
to scale-up the approach. In that context, we aim to explain the trajectory of the policymaking
process and the factors that helped or hindered participatory upgrading in achieving its goals.
That case study will also reflect larger dilemmas of democratization in a country in transition
from central-planning. This includes the opposition between a view of poverty reduction in terms
of physical and economic improvement and one in terms of the political empowerment of disen-
franchised people, as well as the conflicts between foreign and local influence in policy-making.
The results of this study will be an enriched understanding of policy processes in aid programs
that seek to promote lasting improvement for the urban poor through their participation in urban
upgrading. The findings will also provide substantial new knowledge on Phnom Penh, where no
systematic analysis of the urban poverty reduction efforts has been conducted to date.
1.5 Research methodology
1.5.1 Guiding principles of the narrative analyses
Given the dynamic nature of public decision-making, we consider public policies not just as the
guidelines that initially direct interventions, but in large part as the processes by which decisions
are taken in practice, and actions unfold. That is, we take official policy directions as only ele-
ments of the actual policy process, which we try to follow along through its life cycle. To capture
the complexity and dynamics of policy processes that can be understood from multiple angles
and that evolve over time, we use a narrative analysis based on four components:
First, we explain the processes of urban poverty reduction strategies as they unfold, rather
than as they can be analyzed ex-ante-through their design, or ex-post-through their result.
This recognizes the influence of implementation on the making of policies, following arguments
by Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993: 57-72), Lipsky (1980), and Presman & Wildavsky (1984) on
how bureaucrats, or front-line service providers, actually "make" a large part of policies through
their interpretation of how rules should be applied in response to real-life constraints.
Second, we use participant observations collected during several years working with
NGOs, the UN, World Bank, and municipal agencies involved in the processes. Recognizing the
particular outlook-or frame-that each policy player has on a matter often shows that there are
several ways to define a policy issue. Schon & Rein (1994) and Hajer & Wagenaar (2003) hence
suggest that it is through action, rather than ideas, that collaboration might be achieved between
policy agents with diverging frames. In our case, it is by observing action that we try to under-
stand the collaboration-or lack thereof-between actors with different views. This helps make
explicit the frames that each actor uses to interpret reality, to propose, and to implement solu-
tions, and helps understand-from inside-the evolution of learning and the institutional change.
Third, the analysis highlights the importance of the contexts-e.g., the political, social,
and economic situations; unfolding events; and competing projects-that influence the imple-
mentation and absorption of recommendations, and which are often beyond the control of spe-
cific policies. Following the views of Kaplan (1985) and Roe (1994), we thus use a narrative
analysis to understand the dynamics of a governance system that is not dominated by predictable
rules of decision-making, but that results from the interplay of multiple actors from the public,
private, and voluntary sectors-local and foreign-each with specific frames to perceive the is-
sues, abilities to contribute to their resolution, and political leverage to enforce decisions.
Fourth, we use a historical analysis to understand the role of time in assessing the impact
of ideas; how they percolate into existing beliefs and practices of aid providers and aid recipi-
ents; and how fluctuations in advice and support from aid agencies can affect the process of ab-
sorbing ideas and practices and transforming them into regular policies.
1.5.2 Sources of data and information
a. Historical analysis
To research the evolution of policies and practices, I traced the roots of urban housing policies
and found that a body of literature had been produced since the 1940s on participatory upgrad-
ing, but that it had been largely ignored when the approaches re-emerged in the 1970s. The
analysis of the role of participation in urban upgrading over time is hence based on a critical re-
view of practitioner and academic writings as well as on "buried" literature recently rediscovered
by urban historians. That historical analysis covers major policy directions, projects and their
evaluation, and key academic writings on urban poverty and development since the late 1940s
with a focus on how relations of power between the proponents of different approaches shaped
the policies adopted.
For lessons from the early part of the twentieth century, I used secondary data from historical
research conducted in the archives of the main planners and heads of aid agencies of the time. As
key sources of such information, I used Third World Planning Review 1997 (19)1; Planning His-
tory Studies 1997 (11)1; Habitat International 1998: (22)2 and 2003: (27)2; and Housing Studies
1999 14(3). From these documents, I further read the extensive literature on housing produced by
the United Nations from the 1950s and the World Bank from the 1970s. I make no pretense that
this is an exhaustive review, but I believe that it provides enough material new to the policy dis-
course to warrant interest in the discussion.
b. Participatory Action Research in Phnom Penh
From 1999 to 2003, I worked as a planner and researcher on the design, implementation, and
monitoring of a participatory urban poverty reduction strategy in Phnom Penh with local and in-
ternational NGOs, UN-Habitat, and the Municipality of Phnom Penh. I use, for primary informa-
tion about that period, the results of over thirty participatory studies I led on the evolution of
urban living conditions and on the unfolding of poverty reduction activities in Phnom Penh, as
well as my own observations as a participant in the policy process.
The first of these studies was a baseline participatory analysis of urban poverty in Phnom Penh in
1999 that produced twelve studies of living conditions in poor settlements and an analytical re-
port for UN-Habitat (see Fallavier, 1999). The other studies were conducted from 2000 to 2003,
as I worked with UN-Habitat and Cambodian CSOs to monitor and evaluate the activities of the
urban poverty reduction strategy, and collected extensive primary data on the making and un-
folding of the strategy and of the projects implemented. With a local team, I documented living
conditions over time in fifteen communities and seven resettlement sites, followed half a dozen
disasters that struck urban communities, and prepared reports ranging from case studies to policy
analyses. I use data collected for these reports that informed the policy actors of the poverty re-
duction strategy, but that have not been formally published. These main reports are quoted as:
(Fallavier, 2002; Fallavier, Sin et al., 2001a, 2001c, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e, 2002f,
2002g, 2002h, 2002i, 2002k, 2003; Fallavier, Urban Resource Centre Cambodia et al., 2002).
To gather data, I mainly used focus groups and semi-structured interviews, but I also conducted
structured surveys on resettlement sites among up to 1,800 families at a time. Although the sub-
ject of each individual study dictated the exact methodology, I systematically collected qualita-
tive and quantitative information on a core set of indicators of urban poverty and development,
presented in Table 1-1. These indicators were consistent with these of the 1999 baseline study
and with UN guidelines for monitoring progress in implementing the Habitat Agenda (see
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 1997, 1999; United Nations Centre for Human
Settlements & World Bank, 2001). This approach allowed me to trace changes in living condi-
tions as systematically as possible, and to measure the extent to which the process and results of
the urban poverty reduction strategy followed their initial methods and objectives. Details on the
methodology are presented in (Fallavier et al., 2001b), including the rationale for the selection of
the indicators, a review of the participatory techniques used for data collection, household inter-
view guidelines, and directions for the coding and analysis of the indicators collected.
During that period, I also collected secondary data through project-related reports on the activi-
ties of the 1996-1999 pilot phase that preceded the poverty reduction strategy, and interviewed
its main actors while working alongside them. I complement this information with the limited
literature available on urban Cambodia, and with interviews held in 2005, 2006, and 2007 in
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand with actors involved in the strategy that ended in 2004.
Finally, I updated my analysis of the process of policy making for poverty reduction in Phnom
Penh during a mission I conducted there for UN-Habitat in early 2007, which led to preparation
of a new strategy to secure the rights of low-income urban dwellers to access decent housing.
Table 1-1: Qualitative indicators of urban poverty collected in Phnom Penh (1999 - 2003)
Category Qualitative indicator of development collected in settlements
A. Background data Al. Administrative and demographic data
B. Organization, participation
and sense of community
C. Socioeconomic development
A2.
A3.
Bl.
B2.
B3.
B4.
Cl.
C2.
C3.
C4.
C5.
C6.
Physical characteristics of settlement
History of settlement's creation & development
Organization of people's participation
Representation of minority groups
Social cohesion
Weight of corruption
Employment patterns
Income generation and expenses
Access to financial services; indebtedness
Health problems, access to care, cost, financing
Education levels, cost, barriers
Physical safety and criminality
D. Housing Dl. Housing types, household equipment, cost, quality, financing
D2. Security of tenure, threat of eviction
D3. Housing for the poorest
E. Infrastructure El. Water supply, access and affordability
E2. Electricity
E3. Drainage and sewerage
E4. Sanitation and health
F. Transportation Fl. Transport availability
F2. Usage Pattern
F3. Road access
G. Environmental management G1. Air and water quality
G2. Solid waste management
G3. Disaster risk and management
G4. Green spaces
.................
1.5.3 Structure of the argument
Following this introduction, the argument is organized in three stages:
The first stage (Chapter Two) lays the groundwork for the empirical case study. This historical
analysis retraces the evolution of contending approaches of urban poverty reduction policies in
international development, pointing to what influenced the evolution of international views over
time. It traces the roots of a conflicting understanding of the role and value of participation in
urban upgrading: as a low-cost means to implement projects decided from the top vs. as an end
of development that gives autonomy to aid recipients. It then articulates specific questions unan-
swered by the literature that direct the second stage of research.
The second stage (Chapters Three and Four) is a narrative analysis of the process of poverty re-
duction work conducted in Phnom Penh from 1996 to 2004. That case study investigates how an
allegedly participatory policy of urban poverty reduction-based in large part on aided-self-
help-came about, was implemented, and evolved. It helps explain how implementation shapes
policy-making especially in the presence of competing organizations, and what elements pro-
mote or prevent the genuine adoption of participatory practices by local development actors.
The third part of the argument (Chapter Five) extracts answers to the initial research issue from
the macro and micro findings. It uses results from the Phnom Penh case and from international
experience to explain the pattern of evolution in practices, and why it seems so difficult for par-
ticipation to become a standard part of poverty reduction approaches. This helps understand what
influences the adoption or rejection of participatory upgrading in urban poverty reduction.
The conclusion (Chapter Six) presents the limitations of the findings, and their possible implica-
tions for practice. It then opens the discussion to further research on the role of participation in
urban development theories.
1.5.4 Scope and limitations of the approach
While writing this dissertation, I spent the last eighteen months conducting supplementary inter-
views in Cambodia and researching the historical evolution of approaches to urban poverty re-
duction. The process and findings underscored the need for modesty in presenting the following
analysis. The richness of the literature and the diversity of disciplines on issues related to partici-
patory upgrading are such that one cannot pretend to understand them all.
After months of finding counter-arguments to my own understanding of the role and value of
participation, I came to realize that the conflicts between views of development and of the uses
of participation were intrinsic to the diverse natures of the agents promoting poverty reduction. I
therefore had to analyze the dilemmas that opposed them, rather than try to reconcile their views
or to assess which one was "better." The historical chapter itself, for instance, is not merely a
chronological listing of a set of undisputed facts. It required the deconstruction of my own be-
liefs on urban history, and the balanced re-assembly of facts and ideas, which, viewed from the
angle of different disciplines had at times opposing conclusions. As much as possible, I then
tried to make the best sense of diverging views of reality by using an extensive triangulation of
sources from different literatures, and by using works based on empirical findings from projects.
The literature I use is therefore much more practical than theoretical, as is this dissertation over-
all. I use the results of many projects, policy analyses, and works produced by international and
local aid agencies to explain the evolution of their own thinking. These usually have little theo-
retical contents, and when they do, it is largely self-referencing. As will be shown in the analysis,
this is indeed an important element explaining the (non)evolution of their views.
To the facts and literature collected and analyzed, I add my own perspective, elaborated while I
worked with agencies involved in the processes, to explain some of the tacit ways by which
knowledge, politics, and ingrained beliefs affect the evolution of their policies and actions. While
all other sources can be duly traced, these views can be construed as more subjective. Still, I en-
deavored to describe and analyze facts from the best information available, and when necessary,
from extrapolations based on experience and good faith. Any misinterpretation remains my own.
Regarding the relevance of the case, Cambodia is one of the poorest nations in the world and has
experienced a decline in human development and in urban living conditions since the late 1960s.
It is extremely dependent on foreign aid, intermediary agencies provide many services usually
expected from government, and the urban poor there are viewed as second-rate citizens with lit-
tle political voice. This makes it a concentrate of the main issues I am interested in, and hence
particularly suitable for this analysis. I recognize though, that the lessons drawn may be applica-
ble largely to countries with similarly dependent polities and weak democratic traditions.
In terms of validity, an important caveat regards the over-simplifying use of an organization's
name to designate it as whole. The "World Bank," "Municipality of Phnom Penh," or "UN-
Habitat" are not monolithic organizations where a single way of thinking prevails. I use their
names to represent their institutions (i.e., values, beliefs, and rules of conduct) in broad terms,
while recognizing that persons or units of a same organization may have different views.
Finally, the emphasis on participation is not to present it as a panacea to urban poverty in lieu of
other approaches. The whole dissertation in fact acknowledges that participation is only one-
though central-element of a larger set of measures to reduce poverty.
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2.0 Rationale and organization of the historical analysis
2.0.1 Mainstream history of urban upgrading: influential but incomplete
The literature produced by international aid agencies on the evolution of urban poverty reduction
policies for developing nations typically presents a linear approach in which policies matured in
three periods. First, governments provided low-cost public housing during the 1950s and 1960s.
In a second period, from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s, aid agencies and governments turned
towards supporting self- and mutual-help for slum-upgrading and sites-and-services projects.
The third period, since the mid-1980s, marked the advent of a market-centered approach to de-
velop efficient economies that would deliver housing, infrastructure, and public services to all.
That "mainstream" literature tends to present the evolution of policies as sequential, and their
approaches as mutually exclusive. It also considers that the participatory methods of self- and
mutual-help were specifically created for developing countries (see Duncan & Rowe, 1993).
The key analytical work prepared by the World Bank to develop its support of urban poverty re-
duction since 1972 relies heavily on these premises (e.g., Mayo & Angel, 1993; Pugh, 1997; D.
G. Williams, 1984; World Bank, 1972, 1974, 1975a), and given the Bank's weight in shaping the
international discourse on development aid, that literature has had a major influence on the un-
derstanding of urban poverty reduction by many current development actors (Zanetta, 2001).
Looking beyond that mainstream literature though, the history of policies for urban poverty re-
duction in developing nations goes back further in time and its evolution is more complex. It was
in Europe, after the end of World War I that the use of policies encouraging urban self-help and
mutual-help started, before it was adapted to developing nations from the 1930s. Then, progress
in policy recommendations did not follow a linear approach incrementally building upon earlier
lessons; it was instead marked by conflicts and shifts between modes of intervention. Lastly, aid-
recipient governments often did not follow the policies promoted by development agencies.
2.0.2 Organization of the chapter
This chapter reconstructs and analyzes the evolution of international approaches to urban poverty
reduction policies in three sections. First, a historical review emphasizes the evolution of prac-
tices, presenting the different international approaches to urban housing and poverty reduction as
they evolved since the early 1920s. A second section analyzes the premises of the policy recom-
mendations and the lessons drawn from them, emphasizing the evolution of ideas. The third sec-
tion then highlights gaps in knowledge regarding how recipient governments reacted to evolving
policies, i.e., how many of the recommendations they adopted and why.
2.1 The evolution of practice
2.1.1 Early stage of aided-self-help policies (1920s-1960s)
a. World War reconstruction in Europe
As early as 1918, the governments of Austria and Sweden established aided-self-help programs
to rebuild their countries' housing stock, destroyed during World War I. The two largest pro-
grams, in Vienna and Stockholm, provided grants, loans, and/or free plots equipped with basic
infrastructure to families and specialized cooperatives so they could build or upgrade low-
income housing. Supporting self-help was cheaper for governments than building public housing,
as home-builders used low-cost materials and free labor. In turn, improving housing while em-
ploying the urban poor helped governments contain social unrest among popular classes during
the rising communist disturbances that followed the 1917 Bolshevik revolution (Harris, 1999).
During the 1920s and into the economic depression of the 1930s, the participation of urban
dwellers in housing programs spread across other European countries-mainly Finland, Greece,
Germany, and the Soviet Republic. In the 1940s and 1950s, with post-World War II reconstruc-
tion, European governments further promoted the construction and rehabilitation of homes by
their owners as part of their housing policies through a mix of low-cost loans and the relaxation
of building codes. In France, for instance, a squatter movement followed by a cooperative self-
help program known as the Castor (beaver) movement was essential to address the post-war
housing crisis and to develop large-scale, low-income housing programs. The builders of their
own homes could obtain low-cost government loans against a down-payment in "sweat equity"
(i.e., the value of the labor they put in the house building). In Greece, by 1950, the self-sheltering
plan promoted by the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction was supporting three quarters of
all dwelling reconstruction, at a rate of 15,000 units per month (Harris, 1999; Wakeman, 1999).
In North America, the approach was more based on laisser-faire than on the provision of direct
support to develop housing. The US government started enabling the development of self-help
housing in the 1860s with the Homestead Law that gave people land ownership at a very low
cost ($18 of taxes per 160 acres of undeveloped land), provided they built on and cultivated their
plot. Prior to World War II, informal upgrading in urban fringes was then widely tolerated while
some Homestead Promotion Programs were launched to resettle miners who had obtained low-
cost housing loans. After the War, due to a backlogged shortage of housing that started during
the Great Depression and to the slow recovery of the private building industry, there was a resur-
gence of owner-construction. By 1949, one third of all new single family homes and one quarter
of all new dwelling units in the US were actually built by their owners. In Canada, housing co-
operatives developed from the 1930s to the mid 1970s to support self-help low-cost housing in
urban outskirts (Gates, 1936; Harris, 1999; Stuesse & Ward, 2001).
b. Initial support to self-help in developing nations
(i) The role of the UK government
In poorer nations, promoting the participation of urban dwellers in the construction or rehabilita-
tion of their homes also started in the early part of the twentieth century. The British Government
developed housing improvement programs for poor urban dwellers in its colonies starting in the
mid-1930s. This was partly to regain some of the political influence it was losing over these
countries, and partly to respond to popular pressure to change its imperial relation from one of
exploitation to one of development support.7 Numerous self-help housing programs were then set
up. In the 1930s and 1940s in Northern Rhodesia and South Africa, programs to "stabilize" Afri-
can workers developed in the cities where the workers were earlier only allowed to live tempo-
rarily. Governments and the companies running mining towns set up programs of aided-self-help
in which African miners were provided plots, some access to public services, and at times, tech-
nical support to build family-houses through self- and mutual-help (Harris, 1998; Rakodi, 1984).
After initial ad hoc responses to crises, the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act marked
the beginning of the British Crown's organized assistance for the social and economic develop-
ment of its colonies. In Africa, as a major step to enable the development of stable urban settle-
ments, it notably recognized the right for indigenous workers to settle in cities with their
families, rather than be only allowed temporary stays in employer-owned compounds on urban
peripheries. From then on, the Colonial Office promoted the improvement of urban living condi-
tions in colonies of the West Indies, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia (Tipple, 1979).
Between 1948 and 1962, under the influence of its main housing advisor G. Atkinson, the Office
strongly favored the use of local capacities in its urban programs: organizing communities for
collective action, using a local labor force, and developing technologies based on indigenous
skills and materials (Harris & Giles, 2003). That approach to beneficiary participation was
strengthened by the engagement of the richer member nations of the British Commonwealth in
the 1950 Colombo Plan to support the autonomous development of poorer member nations.
Some projects were directly supported by the Colonial Office, but the policy was also taken over
by local governments. In India for instance, starting in the late 1940s, city governments set up
self-help programs of open developed plots, which provided sites with minimal services and no
building regulation on which people could build their homes. The 1947 partitioning of India and
Pakistan that resulted in the displacement of millions of people prompted the creation of similar
low-cost self-help-based programs-often autonomous from external support-to house the
refugees in many cities. In Madras, the most notable of these schemes, Nilokheri and Faridabad,
attracted the attention of the mission preparing Housing in the Tropics, a UN report that docu-
mented local approaches to low-income housing, and that would be a foundation of its later pro-
motion of self-help. In Delhi, by 1950, the municipality had prepared 2,500 plots for the self-
help housing of refugees (Harris, 1998). The Governments of Kenya and of the Gold Coast fur-
ther adopted similar schemes in the 1950s to house the growing masses of workers attracted by
their cities' new industries (see Abrams et al., 1956; Bloomberg & Abrams, 1965).
7 The pressure for change came from colonies, such as Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), where copper miners led
strikes to protest the segregation and harsh living conditions they were subjected to under British rule (Tipple,
1981). Pressure also came domestically from a population supporting the rights of the working class, and even from
colonial administrators, such as Sir Frederick Lugard, who wrote in the mid 1930s that "the exploitation theory [...J
is dead, and the development theory has taken its place " (Bourdillon, 1937:75; cited in Rajagopal, 2000).
8 In 1950, members of the British Commonwealth met in Colombo to discuss how richer Commonwealth nations
could support the newly sovereign states of the Asia-Pacific area to form stable governments and lay the bases of
prosperous economies. The resulting Colombo Plan presented how Commonwealth nations could cooperate. A ma-
jor focus was to develop human resources by strengthening the existing bases of self-help, e.g., establishing coop-
eratives for agricultural extension, vocational training, the production of economic goods, and the improvement of
housing and local infrastructure. With a strong ideological orientation toward preventing new states from falling into
communism, the approach was based on recognizing and making the best use of existing local capacities ("The Co-
lombo Plan for Cooperative Social and Economic Development in Asia and the Pacific,"; Spender, 1955).
(ii) The role of the US government
In the US, public authorities were generally supportive of letting people build their own houses
with minimum intervention. However, some proactive programs for the participatory improve-
ment of slums were used domestically before they became widely employed in foreign develop-
ment aid. In 1939, the US Housing Authority started the Ponce program of slums upgrading and
land and utilities in Puerto Rico through aided-self-help. It was led by Jacob L. Crane, who later
became an ardent promoter of participatory approaches to urban upgrading.
While the conventional view of low-income housing in the continental US at the time was for
Government to build multi-unit dwellings and to rent them at subsidized rates, Crane claimed
that in a warm climate like Puerto Rico, access to services was more important than the quality
of housing. He therefore implemented aided-self-help schemes in which slum-dwellers were en-
couraged to move their existing shelters-however flimsy they were-onto plots with access to
basic public utilities and services. Families received land titles, and were expected to improve
their homes over time. The Ponce program was later regarded as highly successful. It was widely
replicated in British Caribbean islands and used as a demonstration case for officials from gov-
ernments and development agencies to learn how to house large numbers of low-income dwell-
ers with limited public resources. By 1960, the ten-thousandth owner-built dwelling was indeed
completed in the Puerto Rico scheme (Crane et al., 1944; Harris, 1997, 1998).
With the beginning of the Cold War, at the end of WWII, the US Government was also seeking
political allegiances in Latin America, where it started projects to help countries develop their
economies and stabilize their political regimes so they would not fall under soviet influence. As
part of that approach, it launched its first large-scale aided-self-help programs for urban housing
in Colombia and Peru in the late 1940s (Harris & Giles, 2003). In 1948, to coordinate the then
vibrant US housing assistance abroad, the US Housing Home Finance Agency (HHFA) created
its International Housing Office. Jacob Crane led it with a firm belief in the role of popular par-
ticipation not only as a low-cost approach to implement adapted projects, but as a goal of democ-
ratic development. He used lessons from Ponce and other projects he supervised to guide US
support to housing programs in developing nations and to influence the practices of the UN and
of the British development aid. As part of that collaboration, he prepared newsletters (such as
Ideas and Methods Exchange) and reference manuals on how to develop and implement self-
help housing policies (e.g., United States Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1951, 1952).
Until his retirement in 1953, Crane then led the implementation of numerous US-funded aided-
self-help programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, the better known perhaps being the Pe-
ruvian Arequipa project that John Turner later studied at length (e.g., in Turner, 1959, 1969). By
1960, USAID was supporting similar programs in twelve of the twenty Latin American coun-
tries. From 1959, in large part funded by the US, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
became a major player in promoting housing programs in Latin America. Up until 1963, it
placed $153 million dollars in loans for housing programs (with equal amounts of local matching
funds) in fifteen countries. 9 More than two thirds of the houses erected through these loans were
built through self-help, and in Peru alone the IADB financed the construction of 30,000 housing
units in 1961 and 1962 (Harris, 1998; Herrera & Inter-American Development Bank, 1963).
9 The US had created a $500 million Social Development Fund within the IADB for agrarian reforms, housing,
community facilities, and building material (Herrera & Inter-American Development Bank, 1963).
(iii) The role of the UN
A third main international agency, the United Nations (UN), was also concerned about the spread
of urban poverty resulting from the rapid urbanization of developing countries. In 1946, its Gen-
eral Assembly had already recommended the "study of housing problems, and of how interna-
tional exchange of information on town planning, building techniques, and the economic,
financial, and legal aspects of housing should be developed in response" (United Nations, 1946).
By the early 1950s, the General Assembly again stressed its concerns about the lack of adequate
housing as "one of the most serious deficiencies in the standards of living of large populations in
the world." It urged the exchange of information between nations on how to develop locally ap-
propriate low-cost building and planning techniques, so governments of developing nations
could provide housing on a large scale to their growing populations, in collaboration with the UN
and non-governmental organizations (United Nations, 1952).
In the same year, its report Housing in the Tropics took stock of housing programs then under-
way, underscoring the importance of supporting popular participation and community organiza-
tion in housing, and providing directions to support community-run urban upgrading activities:
Although resources and technicians are in short supply, the aspirations of man are not. Practical
solutions to the crushing problem of tropical housing [...] should combine the initiative and re-
sourcefulness of the people, the rational application of local materials and skills, the social ad-
vantages of group work, and the best use of resources and technical knowledge available. (United
Nations Mission on Tropical Housing, 1952:2)
On these bases, after mostly conducting studies on urban issues in the 1950s, the UN Division of
Social Affairs, led by Ernest Weissman, issued a Frameworkfor Urban Action that called on de-
veloping countries to undertake national housing programs based on self-help and mutual-help
(see United Nations, 1959c). That approach was part of a larger UN Development Decade Pro-
posalfor Action that recognized the importance of people as participants in their own develop-
ment processes, and that promoted the use of both national planning and widespread community
development programs (see United Nations, 1962b).10 Estimating that over one billion people in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America (half of these continents' populations) were "homeless or living
in housing which was a health hazard and an affront to human dignity" (p. 59), it called for ur-
gent efforts to improve urban housing conditions and to avoid that cities spread into vast slums
breeding ill-health and misery. To improve housing, low-income communities needed training in
community organization and in building techniques, as well as support in developing saving and
credit mechanisms. People would further use the skills they acquired in building their homes and
communities to develop the industries and economies of their cities and countries.
To support the expansion of urban housing, the UN then encouraged the governments who were
drafting national development plans to recognize the role of urbanization in economic growth
and to include in them nationwide urban and regional development strategies. With support from
rich countries, developing nations were to establish National Housing Authorities to purchase
land, check speculation, undertake research on urban development and construction practices,
1 The UN designated the 1960s the first Development Decade, in which nations agreed to intensify their common
efforts to "accelerate progress toward self-sustaining growth of the economy of nations and their social advance-
ment." Its 1962 Proposal for Action recognized that "development" concerned both the improvement of material
means and of social conditions, and the fulfillment of human aspirations (United Nations, 1962b). Development aid
had to not only support economic growth, but also the development of human capacities through education, voca-
tional training, community development, employment programs, and health promotion.
and support slum upgrading. Further, they were to reform land ownership so that the poor could
own their homes; to promote the development of building material industries; to support the
creation of housing credit agencies; to train architects, engineers, and planners; and to develop
urban studies and research centers (United Nations, 1959a, 1960, 1961a, 1965).
In 1962, the UN established a specialized Housing, Building, and Planning Branch to lead its
urban support with the improvement of squatter and shanty-town settlements through aided-self-
help and mutual-help as its main goal (United Nations, 1962a). During the 1960s, with the de-
colonization of British Territories, the UN moved into the former British domain; and it gained
influence in Latin America after Crane retired from the HHFA. It then became the most influen-
tial agency promoting urban aided-self-help programs until the early 1970s. With technical and
financial support from the IADB, colonial (or former colonial) powers, and local states, it pro-
vided technical services, equipment, and funds to establish pilot projects for low-cost housing
and community facilities, based on the use of local resources and capacities. In pilot countries-
such as El Salvador, Senegal, Ethiopia, or the Sudan- housing projects built several thousands
low-cost units at a time, established housing credit facilities, and upgraded squatter and shanty
town settlements through self- and mutual-help, usually as part of larger, centrally-controlled
public housing policies. In some places, projects were taken to an even larger scale. In Colombia
for instance, the National Housing Authority supported the construction of almost 52,000 hous-
ing units on a self-help basis between 1959 and 1965 (United Nations, 1973).
Following directions from the UN, during the Second Development Decade (the 1970s), aid
agencies and governments of rich nations were to build on that experience by: (i) providing fi-
nancial and technical contribution to develop urban housing programs; (ii) setting up an interna-
tional housing finance system; (iii) developing an international network of research and training
centers on urban and housing issues; (iv) strengthening the international organizations working
on housing and human settlement; and (v) conducting international campaigns to raise awareness
about problems of rapid urbanization (see United Nations Secretary-General & Ward, 1970).
2.1.2 Mainstreaming the use of self-help (1970s-1986)
a. The World Bank: a new actor in urban development
The World Bank entered the housing field in 1972 by publishing Urbanization, a key policy pa-
per on urban poverty and housing in developing countries (see World Bank, 1972). In economic
terms, this analysis recognized the links between urban poverty, unemployment, inadequate
housing and infrastructure, the importance of rural-to-urban migration during the industrializa-
tion of poor countries, and the resulting pressures onto cities to accommodate new comers,
mainly in informal settlements. It also acknowledged that policies to control migration, to pro-
mote rural development, and to develop secondary cities did not suffice to relieve migratory
pressures and to provide decent living conditions to the new urban populations. To improve these
situations, low-cost housing projects aiming directly at the urban poor were necessary.
The Bank then financed its first slum upgrading and sites-and-services schemes in Dakar starting
in 1972 and in Lusaka starting in 1974, unknowingly following approaches similar to Crane's
1939 upgrading and land-and-utilities projects in Puerto Rico. It developed the remainder of its
urban strategy in three papers: Sites and Services (World Bank, 1974), Housing (World Bank,
1975a), and Transport (World Bank, 1975b) that made beneficiary participation central to the
construction and management of urban infrastructure.
Until the mid 1980s, with the UN and the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA,
created in 1970), the Bank then massively funded and implemented projects that promoted low-
cost urban housing and community development, in large part using self-help and mutual-help.
Slum upgrading schemes supported low-income dwellers in the gradual improvement of their
houses and existing informal settlements, in obtaining access to basic infrastructure and services,
and in receiving some security of tenure. Sites and services projects provided-for a fee-plots
with access to basic utilities, and at times with housing-ranging from a "wet core," with piped
water and toilets, to a finished house. Projects further included components to develop local
economies through micro-credit, vocational training, and the creation of cooperatives.
From 1972 to 1986, the World Bank lent the equivalent of $7.4 billion to finance 97 urban hous-
ing projects." The portfolio was dominated by participatory projects with 68% going toward
sites-and-services and slum upgrading, and with only 25.7% of investments for the development
of housing policies or housing finance markets. The remaining 6.7% were for disaster relief.
Figure 2-1: Evolution of urban loans approved by the World Bank (1972-1986)
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b. Adoption of participation in international agreements on urban poverty reduction
With time, the initial housing schemes grew into integrated programs for the physical, economic,
and social development of low-income urban settlements. In 1976, the UN Conference on Habi-
tat and an ensuing resolution by the General Assembly in 1977 reinforced the 1950s views that
participatory approaches to housing were keys to urban poverty reduction (see United Nations,
1976, 1977). By the mid-1970s, participatory upgrading had become central to the international
policy approaches to tackle urban poverty, themselves understood in terms of improving the
physical, economic, and social conditions, as well as the political recognition of slum dwellers.
" These were the dominant components, but most projects had multiple activities: 65 comprised slum upgrading, 69
sites and services, 16 housing policies, 15 housing finance, and 6 disaster relief. Figures are in 2001 real prices. I
computed all figures on the Bank's housing portfolio from data on projects started from 1972 to 2003, available at
http://www.worldbank.orgurban/housing/. See appendix for details on the Bank housing portfolio.
Box 2-1: Highlights of the 1976 Vancouver Declaration on human settlements policies
Excerpts, from (United Nations, 1976)-original paragraph numbering kept, emphasis added
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. The improvement of the quality of life of human beings is the first and most important objective
of every human settlement policy. These policies must facilitate the rapid and continuous im-
provement in the quality of life of all people, beginning with the satisfaction of the basic needs of
food, shelter, clean water, employment, health, education, training, social security without any
discrimination [...] in a frame of freedom, dignity and social justice.
4. Human dignity and the exercise of free choice consistent with over-all public welfare are basic
rights which must be assured in every society. [ ... ]
13. All persons have the right and the duty to participate, individually and collectively in the elabora-
tion and implementation of policies and programs of their human settlements.
III. GUIDELINES FOR ACTION
3. A human settlement policy must seek harmonious integration or co-ordination of a wide variety
of components, including [...] population growth and distribution, employment, shelter, land use,
infrastructure and services.
6. Human settlement policies and programs should define and strive for progressive minimum stan-
dards for an acceptable quality of life. These standards will vary within and between countries,
and [...] must be subject to change in accordance with conditions and possibilities. [...]
7. Attention must also be drawn to the detrimental effects of transposing standards and criteria that
can only be adopted by minorities and could heighten inequalities, the misuse of resources and
the social, cultural and ecological deterioration of the developing countries.
8. Adequate shelter and services are a basic human right which places an obligation on Govern-
ments to ensure their attainment by all people, beginning with direct assistance to the least advan-
taged through guided programs of self-help and community action. Governments should endeavor
to remove all impediments hindering attainments of these goals.
10. Basic human dignity is the right of people, individually and collectively, to participate directly in
shaping the policies and programs affecting their lives. The process of choosing and carrying out
a given course of action for human settlement improvement should be designed expressly to ful-
fill that right. Effective human settlement policies require a continuous co-operative relationship
between a Government and its people at all levels. It is recommended that national Governments
promote programs that will encourage and assist local authorities to participate to a greater extent
in national development.
11. [...] recourse must therefore be made at all times to technical arrangements permitting the use of
all human resources, both skilled and unskilled. The equal participation of women must be guar-
anteed.
2.1.3 Turning toward market enablement (1987-2000s)
a. Structural adjustments: Leaving the planning role to market forces
The focus of international aid in urban development changed in the mid-1980s, when funding
agencies-led by the World Bank-assessed that it would take too long and be too costly to pro-
mote a project-based approach to housing and poverty reduction on a large scale.
Following a new strategy, sketched in Mayo & Malpezzi (1986) and later refined in Cohen
(1991) and Mayo & Angel (1993), starting in1987, the World Bank hence reduced its investment
in projects aiming directly at the urban poor. Rather than funding government-run or community-
led projects to produce low-cost housing, it moved toward a larger unit of intervention, testing
models to enable public authorities, via the market, to better serve a broader population (Special
Interest Group in Urban Settlements, 1999; Zanetta, 2001).
From the mid 1980s onward, this second generation of World Bank's urban projects, shared with
UN-Habitat and UNDP as the Urban Management Program's municipal reform agenda, focused
on policy support to develop the economic environment of cities and to improve their govern-
ments' performance. The Bank reduced loans for community-based upgrading projects and in-
stead supported policy work at the municipal and national levels. It did not fully drop
participatory upgrading but, in a marked reversal of earlier priorities, of the 118 urban projects it
financed from 1987 to 2003, only 20.3% primarily supported participatory upgrading, while
64.4% focused on housing policies and the development of housing finance.
Figure 2-2: Evolution of urban loans approved by the World Bank (1987-2003)
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That divestment from urban upgrading paralleled a shift by IFIs away from project-based lend-
ing towards policy support.2 In 1979, the Bank acknowledged that the project approach had
failed to achieve a main goal of the UN Second Development Decade, which was to help poor
countries achieve GDP annual growth rates of 6%. Meanwhile, rising energy prices were deep-
ening the debt of countries heavily dependent on oil for their industrialization, many of whom
had borrowed from oil-producing nations with loan terms dependent on oil price (Gruder, 1979).
The growing risk of governments defaulting made IFIs wary of extending new project loans. In-
stead, from 1980, they started funding policy support. The Bank proposed first to increase con-
cessional loans to countries with severe balance of payment difficulties to reduce the negative
effect of commercial debt on their development, and second to lend them funds to undertake
"structural adjustments necessary to avoid future balance of payment crises" (Wright, 1980).
These Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) aimed to liberalize economies and to encourage
an efficient use of public funds. They promoted policies to reduce budget deficits, shift public
spending to areas with high economic return, develop broad tax bases, liberalize financial mar-
kets, lower barriers to import and foreign investment, privatize markets, and ensure property
rights. SAPs became conditions to most IFI lending (Blore, 1999; Williamson, 1994).
In urban centers into the 1990s, municipalities could then request loans from the Bank to imple-
ment reforms in seven main areas: (i) developing property rights; (ii) developing mortgage fi-
nancing; (iii) rationalizing subsidies for the poorest; (iv) coordinating the agencies providing
public infrastructure and services; (v) improving land and housing regulations to facilitate hous-
ing supply; (vi) creating competition in the housing industry; and (vii) helping public, private,
and voluntary agencies cooperate in creating policies and programs to benefit the poor.
After implementing these institutional reforms, municipal governments would be able to borrow
for programs to improve the environment of the urban economy. These programs were to de-
velop the management of (i) land, as tenure would give people incentives to upgrade their homes
while contributing to develop tax revenues; (ii) urban infrastructure, to rebuild decaying utility
grids and to outsource services; (iii) municipal finances; and (iv) urban environment. To co-
finance the large-scale modernization of urban infrastructure and share the management of public
services, the Bank further encouraged the involvement of the private sector in delivering services
such as water supply or waste management. By further training city officials and changing their
incentive structures, the programs were also expected to promote professionalism and efficiency
in urban management (Cohen, 1991; Mayo & Angel, 1993; Mayo et al., 1986; Zanetta, 2001).
In this new style of urban programs, the Bank's support was to set up an enabling environment
rather than to directly provide services to the poor. By strengthening the management of public
infrastructure, the efficiency of market mechanisms, the participation of the private sector, and
the financial and technical capacities of municipalities, the approach intended to boost productiv-
ity, to revitalize the economy, and to enable the provision of housing and services to all urban
dwellers. Poverty was to be reduced through a trickle-down effect. Improved economic effi-
ciency would provide jobs to all urban dwellers, who would also benefit from national-level in-
vestment in health, education, and social protection as well as from the efficiency of private
providers delivering public services and affordable housing (PADCO & AECOM, 2000).
12 Since its creation in 1944, the World Bank had mostly lent money for development projects, which were proc-
esses and activities to achieve specific objectives of reconstruction and development, such as improved irrigation,
electrification, or communication (Zanetta, 2001).
b. The macro approach to poverty reduction in the 2000s
Along the 1990s, the structural adjustments and the liberalization of economies however, often
worsened conditions for the poor by reducing their access to wage employment, to social ser-
vices, and to subsidized foods or housing. This particularly affected urban residents who de-
pended more heavily on these than rural dwellers (Moser, 1998; Moser et al., 1993).
Recognizing that macroeconomic stability and efficient markets alone were not enough to ensure
long-term poverty reduction, the Bank revised its direction to reduce poverty for the 2000s. Its
report, Attacking Poverty (Kanbur & Lustig, 2000) laid out its new support strategy which started
to converge with the human development approach emphasized by UNDP. It partly refocused on
developing the capacities of individuals to live healthy and productive lives, and acknowledged
that improving access to education, vocational training, health, and protection for the most vul-
nerable required not just an efficient economy, but a government able to plan for improved social
well-being as well. This did not alter the Bank's faith in markets, but led it to reconsider the need
to design specific programs for the most vulnerable populations, with a renewed interest in
community development and in social protection through social funds and safety nets.
The development discourse of aid agencies for the 2000s now revolves around reaching a set of
objectives, agreed upon during international conferences in the 1990s and formalized in the 2000
Millennium Declaration. These objectives aim to reduce poverty, hunger, morbidity and mortal-
ity, gender disparities, and environmental degradation within a framework of liberalized econo-
mies (see United Nations, 2000). Known as International Development Targets (IDTs) in the
1990s, they became Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and are now considered the main
indicators of progress in poverty reduction (see United Nations Development Programme, 2003).
To achieve the MDGs, one model of poverty reduction prevails for the poorest countries, that of
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. These PRSPs are national planning strategies, providing pol-
icy directions for ministries and state agencies to develop their own work plans to reduce pov-
erty.13 Though officially produced by governments in collaboration with local civil societies,
PRSPs often directly reflect the World Bank's standardized macro approach to development,
drawn from its PRSP Sourcebooks1 4 (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2001; McGee & Norton, 2000).
c. Current disinterest in urban poverty
No particular MDG focuses on urban issues, but under the goal of Ensuring Environmental Sus-
tainability, a generic commitment engages UN member states to "improve the lives of at least
100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020." Though this is a recognition of urban issues, 100
'million represented less than 10% of the worldwide slum population in 2000, which could reach
3 billion by 2050 if left unchecked. As for PRSPs, they mostly ignore urban issues. They fail to
recognize the specific conditions faced by urban dwellers, the potentials of cities to contribute to
national economies, and the city's place in history as the cradle of social change (Amis, 2001).
Today, while international agreements still highlight the importance of tackling urban poverty
and the centrality of beneficiary participation for projects to be successful, in practice, the strate-
gies directing poverty reduction in developing nations tend to underplay urban issues.
13 Following a 1996 accord with IFIs to consider debt forgiveness, the world's 29 poorest nations (categorized as
Highly Indebted Poor Countries) have had to produce national strategies demonstrating their plans to spend on pov-
erty reduction the amounts potentially saved through debt cancellation (Klugman, 2002b).
14 The three main source books are (Klugman, 2002a, 2002b; World Bank, 2001).
As a comparison of Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4 points out, there is in fact a marked paradox be-
tween the projected growth of the needs for low-income urban housing in the world and the de-
creasing interests it attracts from the major funder of development programs.
Figure 2-3: Projected scope of urban poverty by 2050
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2.2 The evolution of ideas
As a second stage to understanding how knowledge evolved over time, and the extent to which
lessons were used by international aid agencies and by the governments receiving their support,
this section reviews the evolution of the lessons drawn from over seventy years of practice
2.2.1 Initial aim of international development aid: enabling local responses
As early as 1953, the heads of the main agencies supporting urban housing projects gathered at
MIT with leading academics to (i) take stock of experience from three decades of practice in
housing programs for local development and (ii) reflect on future directions to support. The les-
sons they enumerated laid the theoretical foundations of programs and policies for urban housing
and poverty reduction promoted until the mid 1980s (see Kelly, 1955).
Ideologically, participants agreed that it was in the best interests of rich countries to promote the
rapid economic growth and the political stabilization of poorer nations to avoid having them turn
into totalitarian regimes. Improved urban housing was central to development and to poverty re-
duction, but it would not simply trickle down from industrialization. State-led planning was nec-
essary to improve housing, and lessons from rich nations could serve developing countries.
Technically, given the scarcity of public resources and the lack of market mechanisms to provide
decent housing to all, the conference participants deemed that it was best to build upon existing
local practices by widely promoting the participation of project beneficiaries in the planning of
their communities, and by supporting self- and mutual-help.
Experience had already shown the importance of housing to economic development, and evi-
dence strongly supported that urban poverty could be addressed in large part by using indigenous
resources and adapting technical assistance to local capacities. The most important contribution
that international aid could provide was to invest in developing people's and governments' ca-
pacities to help themselves, a goal that participants already labeled Human Development.
The principal means that must be developed are the people themselves. It is only by developing
their potentialities that really significant progress can be made in the improvement of popular
housing and community conditions. Such human development needs to be the primary goal in in-
ternational housing finance, rather than the direct financing of home building with international
loans or grants. The available funds are so limited that the amounts likely to be available for
housing as such would hardly scratch the surface of world housing needs, if used merely for the
directfinancing of home building. (Crane & Foster, 1955:142, emphasis added)
Development programs were to set up demonstration projects that would later replicate autono-
mously through a chain-reaction in which local means would eventually replace foreign aid. Ini-
tial projects would help improve local practices, in large part run by people in collaboration with
their governments. They would support the development of adapted technologies, train local
dwellers in housing skills and community development, and start autonomous housing-finance
institutions (Crane & Foster, 1955). The UN would further help governments integrate the new
housing practices in town and regional plans to provide people with access to basic services
(Weissmann, 1955).
The conference's conclusion summarized how this approach to development could be supported
by a candid exchange of best practices between indigenous and foreign expertise, and by the em-
powerment of peoples to shape their own development according to local norms and institutions:
Let [projects] be big enough so that observing them can be meaningful. Let them be placed where
the people who occupy them can be seriously compared with similar people who do not [...]. Let
them be so indigenous that others observing them can imagine that they are within grasp [...].
Let them be not models but pilot experiments. Let as many of the ideas as possible come from the
native peoples, let our expert be an educator, not a teacher.
Thus, by research, by pilot housing, by regional and village planning, by the incessant education
of more and more Asians, and South Americans, to do their own work their own way we may
come to grips with this problem and solve it both pragmatically, and as human beings. In my
judgment, if we tackle it the other way, we shall do neither. (Burchard, 1955:160-161)
A key to enable the expected chain-reaction for pilot approaches to self-replicate on a large scale
was to remove the mental barriers that blocked the creativity of communities, planners and gov-
ernments, which prevented them from initially launching low-income housing projects. The first
barrier was the belief that houses were built with money, while in fact they did not need to cost
much. Experience had proven that an effective approach to low-income housing was to start with
very inexpensive programs in which people could devise methods to gradually improve their
shelters and communities. These could be built with locally available material (bamboo, thatch,
mud, wood) and the scrap of industry and commerce (gasoline tins, old lumber, etc.) The second
misconception was that only trained planners and architects knew about housing. That view
gave power to a limited number of professionals unable to respond to the scale of needs, while it
undervalued the potential contribution of the people (Crane & Foster, 1955).
The roots of successful housing programs were therefore to develop the autonomy of local com-
munities so they gained confidence in what they could accomplish by themselves. With appro-
priate training, the urban poor could undertake most of the work at a relatively low cost. Through
mutual emulation, other communities would then be enabled to replicate the approach and to
reach a larger number of people at a cost much lower than government-run programs.
2.2.2 Early lessons on housing: 1950s-60s
The heads of the three major agencies that influenced urban housing policies from the end of
WWII to the late 1960s, Crane, Weissmann, and Atkinson had developed planning styles that
placed people at the center of their improvement projects. They sought to establish collaborations
with local authorities, whose role was to give directions and support rather than to impose rigid
models of physical planning (Harris, 1997). All three had been influenced by the democratic ide-
als of European planners such as Patrick Geddes who, aside from creating community-centered
settlements in Europe, had also written on how colonial planners could learn from the mutual-
help approaches to housing in South Asia (see Geddes, 1918; Geddes & Tyrwhitt, 1947).
Building upon their recommendations, the UN, the British government, and the US HHFA
funded pilot projects in the 1950s and 1960s. Using these projects as models, they documented
how to produce locally adapted affordable housing that made best use of the comparative advan-
tages of aid-recipients, local governments, and aid-providers. While he led the HHFA, Crane
used the Ponce program extensively as a demonstration project. He organized conferences in
Puerto Rico, where he brought heads of national housing agencies from developing countries-
including Greece, whose aided-self-help housing reconstruction program (the Self-Sheltering
Plan) was designed after visits to Ponce-as well as officials from the UN and bilateral aid
agencies (Harris, 1998). Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger further conducted numerous
studies on housing techniques, organization, and finance in pilot projects for slum-upgrading and
serviced plots for instance in the Gold Coast (see Abrams et al., 1956), Pakistan (see Abrams &
Koenigsberger, 1957), Bolivia (see Abrams, 1959), the Philippines (see Abrams & Koenigsber-
ger, 1959), and Kenya (see Bloomberg & Abrams, 1965).
The lessons from these projects were analyzed and compiled in manuals to plan (see Abrams,
1958; Rodwin, 1957; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1962), to implement
(see United Nations, 1964), and to finance (see United Nations, 1968) self-help urban housing.
By 1964, the HHFA had even produced a Bibliography on Housing, Building and Planning for
the use of USAID mission overseas that provided links to the lessons learned on self-help by the
British Colonial Office, the HHFA, and the UN (see United States Housing and Home Finance
Agency, 1964). Academics further analyzed the potentials and limitations of using self-help in
large scale approaches to urban development, recognizing it as a key element of successful, long-
term programs, and emphasizing how it could enable slum dwellers, once organized, to autono-
mously plan for their own development (see Abrams, 1964, 1966b; Rodwin, 1965).
Most operational issues relating to the design and implementation of low-cost self-help housing
projects had been extensively documented by the mid 1960s (Table 2-2 p. 55 highlights the main
lessons developed in section 2.3.3). They were then integrated in the strategic directions that
supported urban housing programs during the first and second UN Development Decades, which
promoted both the use of self-help and the development of efficient housing and financial mar-
kets (see United Nations, 1959a, 1962b; United Nations Secretary-General & Ward, 1970).
By the late 1960s, planners such as John Turner and Prod Laquian, in the steps of Crane, Atkin-
son and Weissman, were further calling for a political understanding of the role of participation
in local development. Based on their planning experience and analyses of mutual-help programs,
they viewed progress in improving urban living conditions in terms of the capacities they gave
urban dwellers to obtain a voice in the planning of their settlements and cities (see Laquian,
1968; Turner, 1969, 1972). Mutual-help in housing programs gave the urban poor the means to
organize for collective action and a sense that they did not have to wait for patronizing handouts
from governments, but were entitled to public services. Participation was therefore a way for the
poor to gain autonomy in planning their own future and to assert their rights as citizens.
By then, the UN, British Colonial Office, and USAID were still the main actors of international
development aid in housing. They had roughly similar technical approaches, and complementary
geographical areas of intervention. In different combinations, all promoted a mix of self- and
mutual-help, as well as support for the private housing sector. The British emphasized technical
solutions, such as adapted building technologies; the Americans market enablement for building
materials and housing finance; and the UN focused on the role of aided-self-help (Harris, 1998).
Aside from technical lessons drawn from their work, the manuals and analyses raised key institu-
tional questions associated with the long-term adoption of such programs. They were concerned
with the replicability of approaches, including how to finance housing projects to reach larger
populations. Politically, they pointed toward integrating participatory approaches into policy
making and recognizing equal rights for the dwellers of formal and informal urban settlements.
2.2.3 A strengthened but hardly new knowledge: 1970s-80s
a. Learning by doing, again
The World Bank did not pick up on these institutional or political issues when it entered the ur-
ban field in 1972. Rather, it started from the perception that there was little international exper-
tise on self-help programs in urban poverty reduction. Its first key policy document on
urbanization hence noted some key challenges at hand, but did not give credit to past experience:
Before turning to consideration offuture Bank activities in this field, some limitations with which
the Bank is confronted deserve mention. The most obvious is shortage of experience and expertise
on the urbanization problems of developing countries both within and outside the Bank. Only
relatively recently have the acuteness and magnitude of the problems, deriving as they do from
the post-war upsurge in population and economic development, come to be recognized.[...] Con-
sultants experienced in the field are rare. (World Bank, 1972: 56)
Following what it considered a new approach, the Bank then launched a series of "pilot" projects
of slum upgrading and sites and services. It embarked on an approach of "learning by doing,"
mostly focused on understanding best practices in terms of adapted technologies and cost-
recovery at the project level (see Cohen, 1983).
b. Best practices on urban upgrading
Despite their oversight of past knowledge, the case studies, analyses, best practices, and critiques
of the urban programs and policies financed by the World Bank greatly enriched our knowledge
of urban self-help from the 1970s to the mid 1980s. Some were produced directly by the Bank,
others by outside planners and academics. The literature detailed the organization and funding of
self-help projects with standard methods and manuals for sites and services, for upgrading and
low-cost housing finance, and for project evaluations (see Table 2-2 p. 55 for key publications).
These documents showed that successful urban upgrading programs shared similar characteris-
tics (see Laquian, 1983a; Payne, 1984; Swan et al., 1983; Yap, 1984). Their designs associated
improving access to housing and basic services with promoting income generation and commu-
nity organization. Their processes built on local coping mechanisms, using mutual-help to mobi-
lize energies, to cut cost and to strengthen communities. They further offered some security of
tenure; adopted flexible standards on the use of building materials, styles, and time for housing
consolidation; and provided subsidies to the poorest. Institutionally, they built collaborations be-
tween local authorities, communities, funding agencies, and the private sector.
Conversely, projects typically failed because of a lack of access to job opportunity, to infrastruc-
ture or basic services; a lack of consultation with people; a weak community organization; the
isolation of projects located far from cities and stigmatized as "for the poor"; a scale too large for
effective management; or the use of projects as political showpieces to glorify authorities.
One way to enable self-help projects to become sustainable was to help local economies develop;
for instance, allowing people to run businesses from their homes, developing vocational training
and access to micro-finance, and linking large and medium-scale formal sector companies with
local subcontractors to develop cottage industries. With a functioning local economy and good
community organization, low-income settlements could operate and grow relatively autono-
mously from city governments, mainly requiring connections to utilities networks and access to
basic social services.
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The programs actually reaching the poor demonstrated that they did not have to be expensive.
What they required was the adaptation of project procedures to local norms, the availability of
skilled facilitators, and sufficient time to help organize people and build their self-confidence.
The involvement of community facilitators, and long-term support from aid agencies to develop
partnerships with local authorities and private investors, helped balance the communities' initial
lack of weight in the political dialogue with the more formal and powerful actors. Once they
gained experience and the ability to organize, community associations could credibly negotiate
and develop innovative ways to plan, build, and manage low-cost housing and infrastructure; to
set up community-based social services; and to strengthen the local economy. Reinforcing Bur-
chard's 1953 argument, they emphasized that time, human resource development, and political
support were needed more than money alone.
Scaling up was not as much an issue of funding as it was one of helping disseminate the lessons
learned across communities for mutual emulation. That is, going to scale did not have to be
based on the standardization of practices and their wide dissemination by a centrally-managed
project. Rather, what was important was the power of successful activities to demonstrate their
worth so that other communities would pick up the approach. Projects were to help by making
resources available, a large part of which was knowledge.
c. A missing element in lessons from the 1970s
These lessons did not markedly differ from the ones produced starting in the 1950s, but strik-
ingly, very little of the new literature referred to the experience from the UN-, UK-, and US-
support post-World War II, let alone from the earlier European reconstruction projects.15
As in the 1950s and 1960s, the manuals produced from 1972 to 1985 on self-help looked more at
the technical aspects of organizing, funding, and managing participatory upgrading projects than
at the institutional issues that could help them take root in local policy practices. Both the World
Bank and the UN focused on technical assessments based on the premise that aid recipients
lacked the technocratic skills to operate "efficiently," i.e., according to aid agencies' norms.
In its lessons learned from its first ten years of urban lending (see Cohen, 1983), the World Bank
did not address two important issues: (i) the impact of beneficiaries' participation in leading their
own development process on their autonomy and (ii) why governments were "so slow" to absorb
new agendas. While a key argument that supported the early use of local capacities was that they
were empowering communities through self-help in collaboration with local authorities, little
knowledge was produced on how to develop these capacities in urban settings, so that local insti-
tutions could later scale-up the pilot projects with minimal external support.
By 1986, in a methodology to measure the impacts of urban projects on poverty (Bamberger &
Hewitt, 1986) the Bank thus still only assessed changes in income, health, and employment. It
made no mention of what helped aid-recipient institutions change their beliefs, values and ways
of operating in the long term (see Figure 2-4). In that, it failed to investigate a major issue raised
in the late 1960s: How to enable the autonomous replication of projects, which success was due
more to harnessing local capacities than to funding large, centrally-controlled schemes?
1 An exception is the experience of upgrading in Peru, with extensive writing from Turner (1972) and Collier
(1976). But while Collier looked more at the political economy of the project than at its lessons for housing, Turner
himself later recognized that his writing on Peru came from his experience working there as a planner, and that he
had not read the analyses that the US HHFA had produced on these projects it had largely initiated (Harris, 2003).
Figure 2-5: World Bank framework to monitor and evaluate urban upgrading programs
Source: (Bamberger & Hewitt, 1986:6)
2.2.4 Lessons from structural adjustments?
a. The limitation of markets alone to house the poor
By the mid-1980s, as structural adjustments were implemented, the Bank started the Urban Man-
agement Program (UMP) with UN-Habitat and UNDP. That joint program was to simultane-
ously reflect on policies for urban development aid and train urban decision-makers on urban
management. The Bank led the UMP's first phase (1986-1990) with a focus on understanding
how to promote urban productivity and to answer the meso and macro issues perceived to disable
local economic efforts. Its resulting urban development strategy framework (see Cohen, 1991)
was largely influenced by the economic analysis of housing markets. Comparing housing de-
mands with the apparent limitations of projects to meet them and assessing the costs associated
with subsidies (Mayo et al., 1986), they elaborated a strategy aiming to enable markets to pro-
vide housing for all (Mayo & Angel, 1993), summarized in Table 2-1.
The same way that slum upgrading and sites and services were ideas tested long before the
Bank's arrival, the urban policy of market enablement during the SAPs was not based on new
ideas. As we showed, other aid agencies and academics had long advocated for a multi-pronged
approach to housing development, using self-help along with market mechanisms, and tried such
approaches in their projects. Although the Bank's view was more elaborate, it did not use that
early experience, and it largely sidelined the importance of participation in housing programs.
The structural reforms that were supposed to improve access to urban services however particu-
larly hit the urban poor with higher unemployment, lower wages, and reduced spending in social
sectors. They also failed to recognize the importance of the social networks and systems of sup-
port that mutual-help had developed. Reducing formal safety nets and social programs, while not
continuing to promote the strengthening of community organizations left many of the poor vul-
nerable to the social "readjustments" associated with the SAPs (see Moser et al., 1993).
Table 2-1: World Bank's dos and don'ts in enabling housing markets to work
INSTRUMENTS DO DON'T
Developing Property Rights
Regularize land tenure Engage in mass evictions
Expand land registration Institute costly titling systems
Privatize public housing stock Nationalize land
Establish property taxation Discourage land transactions
Developing Mortgage Finance
Allow private sector to lend Allow interest-rate subsidies
Lend at positive/market rates Discriminate against rental housing investment
Enforce foreclosure laws Neglect resource mobilization
Ensure prudential regulation Allow high default rates
Rationalizing Subsidies
Make subsidies transparent Build subsidized public housing
Target subsidies to the poor Allow for hidden subsidies
Subsidize people, not houses Let subsidies distort prices
Subject subsidies to review Use rent control as a subsidy
Providing Infrastructure
Coordinate land development Allow bias against infrastructure investments
Improve slum infrastructure Use environmental concerns to clear slum
Emphasize cost recovery
Base provision on demand
Regulating Land & Housing Development
Reduce regulatory complexity Impose unaffordable standards
Assess costs of regulation Maintain unenforceable rules
Remove price distortions Design project unliked to institutional reform
Remove artificial shortages
Organizing the Building Industry
Eliminate monopoly practices Allow long permit delays
Encourage small-firm entry Institute regulations inhibiting competition
Reduce import controls Continue public monopolies
Support building research
Developing a Policy & Institutional Framework
Balance public/private sector roles Engage in direct public housing delivery
Create forum to manage the housing Neglect local government role
sector as a whole
Develop enabling strategies Retain financially unsustainable institutions
Monitor sector performance
Source: (Mayo, 1994)
b. A new emphasis on good urban governance
In 1996, the second Habitat conference produced a set of 600 recommendations for urban devel-
opment in the new millennium, the Habitat Agenda, based on lessons learned since 1976. Fur-
ther, it gave UN-Habitat the role of advising governments on how to prioritize and implement
these recommendations. Subsequently, Habitat took over the UMP leadership and produced a
wealth of technical recommendations to implement the Agenda (for instance an extensive
sourcebook on urban management in United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, 2001a).
However, in practice, within the relatively hands-off approach of the PRSPs, aid agencies now
support more the development of policies than the implementation of projects aiming directly at
the poor. In urban areas, they promote good governance, land titling, and infrastructure devel-
opment to make markets and municipalities more efficient and accountable to their population.
The World Bank then integrated all urban issues into its infrastructure sector. Its urban strategy
for the 2000s generically aims to support municipal governments to "(i)formulate national ur-
ban strategies, (ii)facilitate city development strategies, (iii) scale up programs to provide ser-
vices to the poor, and (iv) expand assistance for capacity building" (Kessides, 2000: 61-70). In
practice, its main urban support is to develop infrastructure and to help formalize land titling.
UN-Habitat did develop guidelines for urban poverty reduction at three levels: (1) at the settle-
ment-level, through upgrading programs; (2) at the city-level through policies to develop the ur-
ban economy, the management of land and infrastructure, the provision of services,
improvements in municipal finance and management, and the provision of safety nets for the
poorest; and (3) at the regional-level by the development of secondary cities and of more effi-
cient urban-rural linkages (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2003c). In principle,
that approach complements the macro view promoted by the World Bank. In reality however, to
implement its recommendations, Habitat is highly dependent on agencies with financial means.
Though DFID now focuses more on sectoral issues (e.g., health, education, or social protection)
than on the urban-rural divide, it recognizes the need to accommodate growing concentrations of
poor dwellers in under-serviced slums and squatter settlements. Currently, DFID supports urban
programs to deliver services to the urban poor and to improve local systems of urban governance
to ensure that change can be sustained. To do so, it strengthens the management capacities of
municipalities and the capacity of civil society to represent the needs of the poor, and public-
private partnerships. It also supports the development of UN-Habitat and commissioned major
research on urban poverty and development, such as the Global Reports on Human Settlements
and the diffusion of Habitat's best practice program (Mutter, 2000, 2001).
If the Bank, UN-Habitat, and DFID still support urban development with components of market
enabling, strengthening of municipal governments, and upgrading, their efforts today are limited
compared to the growing need worldwide. Aside from the diminishing urban investments of the
World Bank, summarized in Figure 2-2 p. 43, and detailed in Table 6-1 p. 145, the most visible
international assistance program for urban housing is the Cities Alliance, which provides seed
funds for urban upgrading policies projects that meet standards of good practices. Since its crea-
tion in 1999, it has thus far only committed about $88 millions (see
http://www.citiesalliance.org/).
Table 2-2: Landmark publications on self-help in housing programs
1972-1986 1987- 2005
RECONSTRUTION & EMANCIPATION USING LOCAL CAPACITIES TO DEVELOP HOUSING
IDEOLOGY - Role of self-help in urban poverty reduction
RE-INVENTING PARTICIPATION IN HOUSING ENABLING MARKETS TO MEET NEEDS
Use low-cost means based on indigenous skills
and materials. Adapt regulations to local reali-
ties
o UN shows concern about urban housing and
poverty (United Nations, 1946, 1947)
International aid is to enable human development through self-help
o Aid to develop local capacities (Crane & Foster, 1955; Kelly, 1955)
Self-help toward local autonomy in projects and policies
o The value of local mechanisms (Turner, 1976)
" UN to integrate self-help in city & regional plans (Weissmann, 1955) * Participation key to housing policies (Laquian, 1983a; Payne, 1984)
" Candid exchange of best local and foreign practices (Burchard, 1955) Low-cost means to develop urban infrastructure and housing
" Political view of self-help (Laquian, 1968; Turner, 1959, 1969, 1972) e Urban infrastructure and housing development using self-help
(World Bank, 1972, 1974, 1975a, 1975b)
TECHNOLOGY / KNOWLEDGE - Lessons and good practices in urban housing and poverty reduction
Demonstrate the value of mutual- and self-help
to rebuild houses and develop democracy
e In Europe, planners need to adapt codes to local
needs (Crane, 1922) and to collaborate with
communities (Crane, 1930)
" Self-help seen as one solution to urban poverty
in India (Geddes, 1918)
Studies and lessons on housing techniques, organization and finance:
" Local bases for Housing in the Tropics (United Nations Mission on
Tropical Housing, 1952), participation in Arequipa, Peru (Turner,
1959)
" Lessons from UN experience on upgrading: (Abrams, 1959; Abrams
et al., 1956; Abrams & Koenigsberger, 1957, 1959; Bloomberg &
Abrams, 1965; United Nations, 1973)
e Manuals to plan (Abrams, 1958; Rodwin, 1957; United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, 1962), implement (United Nations,
1964), and finance (United Nations, 1968) urban housing.
e Guidelines for USAID housing support (United States Housing and
Home Finance Agency, 1964)
Potentials and limitation of self-help in urban development
e Academic analyses of potentials and limitations of self-help (Abrams,
1964, 1966b; Laquian, 1968; Rodwin, 1965; Turner, 1969; Turner &
Fichter, 1972).
POLICIES / PROGRAMS - To reduce urban poverty
Use of self-help in rich nations
" European reconstruction post World War 1/11
(Harris, 1999; Wakeman, 1999)
e US Homestead Law from 1860s (Gates, 1936),
Puerto Rico Upgrading & Land and Utilities
Schemes in 1930s (Crane et al., 1944)
e Canadian housing cooperatives from 1930s
(Stuesse & Ward, 2001)
Colonial plans to develop local capacities
e Early use of self-help in Africa (Tipple, 1981)
" British Development and Welfare Act: 1940
" Colombo Plan to develop human resources for
self-help: 1950 (Spender, 1955)
Plans for urban action through self-help, market support, and cen-
tral planning
" Plans for first and second development decade: support building in-
dustry, cooperatives, self help, and central planning (United Nations,
1959a, 1962b, 1971; United Nations Secretary-General & Ward,
1970)
" With support from rich countries, poor nations establish national
housing authorities; develop building material industries; train archi-
tects, engineers, and planners (United Nations, 1960, 1961a, 1965).
Manuals to design fund and evaluate participatory upgrading
e Designing upgrading projects (Caminos & Goethert, 1978; David-
son et al., 1981; Goethert & Hamdi, 1988)
" Managing upgrading (Campbell, 1985; Pasteur, 1979, 1982)
" Running non-profit housing associations (Lewin, 1981; United Na-
tions, 1975)
" Reaching the Urban Poor (Cheema, 1986)
" Evaluating urban development (Bamberger & Hewitt, 1986)
Lessons from project assessments
" Successful projects need small scale, access to jobs and services,
consultation and participation (Laquian, 1983a; Payne, 1984; Swan
et al., 1983; United Nations, 1973; Yap, 1984).
" Economic evaluation of shelter programs (Bamberger et al., 1982;
Buckley & Mayo, 1988; Cohen, 1983; Keare & Parris, 1982;
Laquian, 1983b).
" Issues with targeting, subsidies, and cost recovery (Mayo & Gross,
1985; Sanyal, 1981)
" Limitation of "project approach" to meet housing demand. (Buckley
& Mayo, 1988; Malpezzi et al., 1985; Mayo & Malpezzi, 1984;
Mayo et al., 1986)
Use local resources to build infrastructure (World Bank)
" Bank upgrading and sites-and-services schemes in Dakar (1972) and
Lusaka (1974); 1972-1986, Bank lent $7.4 billions to urban hous-
ing, mostly in self-help
" World Bank Shelter Strategy using participation to reduce cost
(Churchill et al., 1980)
Housing programs as poverty reduction (United Nations)
* Habitat conference and UN resolution (United Nations, 1976, 1977)
Economic response to debt crises
* Structural adjustment approach (Gruder, 1979; Wright, 1980) in
front of limited results of projects
Market enabling strategies and urban management
* Structural adjustments without urban concern. Poverty
to be reduced by market enablement (Cohen, 1991;
Mayo & Angel, 1993; Mayo et al., 1986).
Renewed UN concerns on urban poverty
* Habitat Agenda for integrated responses: self-help,
public, and private efforts (United Nations, 1996)
Focus on land markets & Public-Private partnerships
" Dos and don'ts of urban policies: (Mayo, 1994)
" Housing Policy matters (Angel, 2000)
" Rights vs. Markets in land tenure (De Soto, 2000;
Payne, 2002)
" Linking formal with informal planning methods
(Payne, 1999, 2004)
Literature on Urban Management
" Tools to Support Participatory Urban Decision Mak-
ing (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements,
2001b)
e Urban Management Program and City Development
Strategies
Negative urban impacts of structural adjustment
" Negative impacts of adjustments (Moser et al., 1993)
" Rising urban poverty and slums (United Nations Hu-
man Settlements Programme, 2003a)
Programs on infrastructure and market development
" Policy support of urban productivity and management
of urban infrastructure (Cohen, 1991).
* Enabling Markets to Work (Mayo & Angel, 1993)
" Financing shelter through local cooperatives: (United
Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2005)
PRSPs are growth-oriented with limited income redis-
tribution and no urban focus
" Attacking Poverty through PRSPs (Kanbur & Lustig,
2000; Klugman, 2002a, 2002b). with little urban focus
" Generic World Bank Urban Strategy to develop urban
infrastructure and "prop-poor" city development
strategies (Kessides, 2000).
Pre 1950 1950-1971
--------- ............... -- - -- -- ............ ...

2.3 Linking ideas with practice: directions to understand the trajectory of policy ideas
So far in this macro-policy story, we have looked at the role of international lesson-givers. De-
spite a few gaps in knowledge-e.g., on the exact scope of the urban projects before the 1970s-
we now have a relatively clear picture of the evolution of practices and ideas on assistance to ur-
ban housing and poverty. What we still need to understand is the extent to which policy lessons
were adopted by the governments of developing nations and why. This section presents some
background to these issues, which the Cambodia case study will then delve into more deeply.
2.3.1 Limited knowledge on the absorption of advice by recipient governments
We did note that in some countries, aided-self-help was well-received, as it built upon existing
views. In Senegal, the 1972 World Bank project continued a ten-year experiment supported by
the French. In Zambia, the 1974 Lusaka Squatter Upgrading and Site and Services Project was
to implement the directions laid in Zambia's Second National Plan, which were based on experi-
ence with aided-self-help as a government policy since 1936 (Jere, 2004).
But what do we know of the acceptance of participatory upgrading in countries which were not
at first inclined to the use of such techniques of cooperation between officials and "the people"?
How have the recommendations to involve the urban poor in the local planning process been ac-
cepted after they were supported on a large scale by the World Bank, starting in the early 1970s?
Little has been studied on how Governments of developing nations absorb foreign housing ad-
vice. Aside from the idiosyncratic cases of Singapore and Hong Kong-both having such high
proportion of public housing that they are hardly representative of other nations-we mainly
know of East Africa (Morrison & Gutkind, 1982; Stren, 1978), and of Thailand (Giles, 2003). In
both instances, since the 1950s, public authorities have focused on urban renewal, a policy of
slum clearance to be followed by their replacement with public housing. Even though they were
unable to rebuild to a scale matching the destruction and the housing needs, governments favored
the use of public housing schemes, as it was more profitable politically and financially to house
the middle-class and civil servants than the poor. They wanted to remain in charge of housing
construction, and privileged high standards of building over the gradual improvement of slums.
These states hence first opposed the international push toward adopting participatory upgrading.
Later, while the African states did undertake some participatory upgrading when they acknowl-
edged the cost of the public housing approach, in Thailand it is only when the policies promoted
by the Bank from the 1980s conformed to the government's views favoring a market approach,
that national programs started to match-but not tofollow-the recommendations. That is, until
the mid 1980s, the Thai government resisted the UN and the Bank's push for stopping slum
clearance and for adopting participatory upgrading policies. (In the 1970s, the Thai National
Housing Authority did announce a few self-help programs-and government accepted two
World Bank loans for upgrading in 1978 and 1982-but these were never implemented.)
2.3.2 The forgotten role of local policy practices
Through its relative disinterest in learning about institutional change in urban areas, the technical
assistance literature generally took for granted that aid-recipient governments were willing to
readily adopt the prescriptions of the development agencies. This belief presumed a void of local
institutions and processes of policymaking and also attributed little value to their histories of pol-
icy change and to the dynamics of their political economies.
However, since the end of World War II, as colonies were becoming independent, new states
wanted to exercise their sovereign power of decision. They considered centralized planning, in-
dustrialization, and technology transfers from rich nations as keys to development, and therefore
adopted a strong central planning view mixing the recipes for growth advocated by development
economists with socialist mechanisms of redistribution. Supported in this by economists who
believed that the state needed a strong role, most newly independent nations adopted a national
system of five-year planning, run by a centralized bureaucracy, which aimed to be politically
neutral, efficient, and to work solely in the public interest (Sanyal, 1994a).
From their independence, many governments thus believed more in the role of state-planning
than in self-help to house the growing number of urban dwellers. They viewed urban poverty as
a situation calling for the government to deliver more public housing, services, and infrastruc-
ture. Many dismissed the informal coping mechanisms of the urban poor as illegal, or of little
value. Slums had to be destroyed so the state could reengineer social order (Sanyal, 1994a).
A dual process of urbanization then took place in some countries. On the one hand, governments
used town planning methods inherited from the former colonial powers to design cities and hous-
ing development schemes. Following the example of richer nations, they built infrastructure in
urban centers and provided subsidized public housing to civil servants and to the employees of
state-owned enterprises. These projects concentrated on housing the upper and middle classes,
typically employed in the formal economy. On the other hand, newcomers to city fringes devel-
oped unplanned squatter settlements, with houses built of low-cost material and often without
access to public utilities or social services. In some cases, governments tolerated the illegal en-
croachments, which they deemed temporary, confident that the state could later provide formal
housing to all. More commonly though, municipalities forcibly cleared the slums. They could
not, however, provide adequate housing to the majority of low-income urban dwellers because of
the cost of such approaches and of the pace of urban growth. Centrally planned approaches to
urban development largely ignored the urban poor (PADCO & AECOM, 2000).
During the same time period, the participatory upgrading projects supported by international de-
velopment agencies helped poor urban dwellers articulate how they wanted to develop and run
their settlements, thus putting them in the position of influencing how cities were thought of and
run. They set up planning mechanisms that competed against those of municipal authorities, yet
officially working on behalf of the people. (Besides, by their informal nature, the techniques
used for upgrading often contravened city planning codes.) For public officials to accept the par-
ticipation of poor communities as "local planners" thus meant downplaying their own expertise
and power of decision. It was also to acknowledge the relevance of the non-professional skills of
the urban poor and to treat them as arm's length partners in local policymaking.
A main impediment to the adoption of participation in urban upgrading may have then come
from the reluctance of some governments to accept it, for it challenged their power and repre-
sented the continued intervention of former colonial masters in independent nations. During the
1950s and 1960s, it was thus an uneasy intellectual stretch for international development agen-
cies to promote both central planning and local empowerment because of the intrinsic divergence
in their goals. It was then quite a leap of faith to further believe that states would easily abandon
central planning in the 1970s to leave the place to grassroots planners.
2.3.3 Directions for the case study
These findings point to the importance of understanding how governments receive, interpret, im-
plement, and absorb-or not-the lessons given by aid agencies, i.e. how recommendations be-
come long-term policies and approaches. In the housing field, this has been little studied. Our
following case study of a policy process, based in large part on understanding how the local con-
texts affect the adoption of imported practices, should complement available knowledge of how
recipient governments actually absorb, or resist, policy advice.
We will investigate these issues in a narrative analysis of how policies for urban upgrading
evolved in practice, to later present an improved understanding of what may explain the trajecto-
ries of policies for urban poverty reduction. The case of Phnom Penh will help in that it starts in
a display of extremes: The utmost social exclusion of the poor, the total power of control by the
government, and a wide gap between the policies that officially shape public life and the actual
behaviors of public authorities. Through this narrative, we will try to understand how and why
participatory upgrading initially appeared to be a solution to urban poverty, and the extent to
which it was absorbed and re-defined in practice by local policy actors.
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3.0 Issue, objectives, and organization of the policy story
3.0.1 The complexity of governance in a participatory upgrading project
The story of Phnom Penh's Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy (UPRS) illustrates how a variety
of development agencies produced and implemented an allegedly participatory process of urban
upgrading from 1996 to 2004. It aims to explain the evolution of views and practices in a partici-
patory upgrading program, shedding light on the many forces that can influence and reshape ap-
parently straightforward policies and projects.
3.0.2 Objective: understand the making of policy through its implementation
According to its municipal officials, the city of Phnom Penh developed and successfully imple-
mented a poverty reduction strategy based on the participation of poor urban dwellers in local
planning. Between 1996 and 2004, it claims to have improved the living conditions of about
70,000 persons (Municipality of Phnom Penh, 2005). At the end of 2005, the MPP was indeed
given a World Leadership Award recognizing the international quality of its urban development
plans, including that of its pro-poor policies (See http://www.world-leadership-forum.org/).
However, these achievements and the basis for this award were self-reported, and there is no
documented analysis on the evolution of urban poverty in the city to balance the story that
Phnom Penh's officials present as best practices in international policy forums. I claim that their
story only represents a partial view of reality. From 1999 to 2003, I worked on the design, im-
plementation, and evaluation of that poverty reduction strategy. My documentation of its process
and impacts on poverty in fact illustrates a very different picture from the official one.
3.0.3 Organization of the narrative analysis
The following analysis, based on data collected while working with the main actors of the UPRS,
presents a documented view of the process by which the strategy originated, evolved, and was
implemented from 1996 to 2004. It explains how policies were redefined through practice by es-
tablishing the different understandings each actor had of participation and poverty reduction, and
presenting the influence of their power struggles, of a changing environment, and of shifting pol-
icy recommendations over the implementation of projects and the assessment of their results.
This chapter presents the context of poverty reduction and public policy in Phnom Penh. After
setting the historical and political background needed to understand the role of development aid
in Cambodian public policies, it reviews the peculiar history of Phnom Penh, the meaning and
scope of poverty in the city, and the main actors in its governance process.
Chapter Four then documents the two periods of the UPRS process. The first period was a pilot
phase of community-led upgrading projects from 1996 to 1999; lessons learned from that experi-
ence became the basis of the later city-wide strategy. The second period was the implementation
of that strategy from 2000 to 2004.
An explanation of the difficulty of transforming the successful pilot projects into a longer term
policy response is presented in Chapter Five, where it complements the analysis of the trajectory
of international approaches to similar policies of participatory urban upgrading.
V3.1 The Cambodian context of public policy-making
3.1.1 Overview of Cambodia's recent history
Cambodia is a small country (181,000 sq kin) with an estimated 14 million inhabitants. It is situ-
ated between Thailand on its western front, Laos to the north, and Vietnam on the east side.
The Khmer people were one of the earlier inhabitants of Southeast Asia, and their earliest known
kingdom, Funan, was much larger, covering most of current Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and
Thailand. From the ninth to the thirteenth century, Cambodia was in fact the most powerful em-
pire in the Indochinese region. However, military retaliation from its neighbors in response to
Khmer invasions, chronic fights within the monarchy, and the gradual deterioration of the com-
plex irrigation system that had ensured food security all contributed to the decline of its wealth,
territory, and regional political power. From the thirteen to the nineteenth century, Cambodia lost
its regional prominence and was often threatened with annexation by its neighbors. In 1863, its
King accepted protection from France to counter possible attacks from Thailand and Vietnam.
Cambodia became a protectorate under French administration until 1953.16
Fieure 3-1: Situation man of Cambodia
Source: (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007).
16 Information in this section are triangulated from the main histories of Cambodia's recent past by Chandler (1991;
2000), Isaacs (1987), Roberts (2002), Kiernan (2002), and Ledgerwood. Current demographics are from (Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2007).
In 1953, King Norodom Sihanouk negotiated Cambodia's independence from France. As Prime
Minister, he then adopted a policy of neutrality in the wars between communist and noncommu-
nist nations. Strongly opposing the US use of Cambodian soil to fight against North Vietnam,
including the bombing of its border with Vietnam, he broke with US military support in 1963.
This angered local right-wing economic and military elites who lost much revenue from trade
with the Americans, and were concerned that the country's neutrality could only bring further
economic decline. In 1970, supported by the CIA, they toppled Sihanouk and installed Lon Nol
as the Prime Minister of an overtly pro-US r6gime, the Khmer Republic.
The spread of left wing movements that had led the insurgency throughout Cambodia, starting at
the end of WWII further encouraged the deposing of Sihanouk. Started by the Viet Minh and
Khmer Issarak (independence) armed nationalist resistance movements, these groups had devel-
oped into several strands of communist and nationalist parties contesting French control of Cam-
bodia. They were headed by a handful of Paris-educated thinkers, including Saloth Sar, later
known as Pol Pot, who created the clandestine Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), a move-
ment nicknamed by Sihanouk the Khmers Rouges, or Red (for communist) Khmers. In 1967, a
civil war broke out when the CPK mounted an uprising that provoked escalating military retalia-
tion from government forces. It was fueled by increasing poverty and inequity within the country
and by constant bombing from US forces, which, from 1969 to 1973, killed over 100,000 per-
sons in the countryside, pushing many survivors to join the Khmer Rouge.
The political disunity within the new regime, its excessive exactions, and lack of regard for the
public good continued to fuel the communist insurgency and intensified the civil war in 1970.
That conflict not only opposed Cambodian factions-communists and royalists against Lon
Nol-but involved the main powers who waged the Vietnam War or supported its belligerents
from 1959 to 1975. The CPK was initially supported militarily by North Vietnam, while the US
supplied and trained Lon Nol's troops. By 1973 though, the CPK was fighting on its own against
government forces. Its troops controlled nearly 60% of Cambodia's territory and 25% of its
population. On January 1, 1975, they launched their most intense attack on Lon Nol in Phnom
Penh and along his re-supply routes. His government surrendered April 17, five days after the
US missions that supported his regime evacuated Cambodia, on the brink of Saigon's fall.
In April 1975, the Khmer Rouges then overturned the Khmer Republic to install a new regime,
of Democratic Kampuchea (DK). In DK's ideology, Cambodia was to recover the grandeur of
the Khmer Empire that had ruled Indochina a millennium earlier. It was to develop in autarky,
first by producing enough rice to feed itself-which it was unable to do during the Khmer Re-
public-and later by investing the revenue of its surplus food production into light, and eventu-
ally heavy industry. To that end, the new rulers' first decisions were to empty all cities, to
displace their populations to farming areas, and to increase the national agricultural output. They
outlawed cities, whose lavish lifestyles were the root of corruption, and considered that the-
pro-Lon Nol-urban dwellers had to be re-educated into traditional "base-people" by working in
agricultural labor camps.
Tragically, to achieve DK's goal of self-sufficiency, up to two millions people died from 1975 to
1979 in what amounted to a genocide. Of the Khmer ethnic majority, this included one fourth of
the earlier urban dwellers (650,000 deaths), and 15% of rural dwellers (675,000 deaths). In the
first year, they were decimated by illness, starvation and overwork. After the 1976 publication of
the CPK four-year plan "to build socialism in all fields", political purges added to the death toll,
as those who questioned the targets of the plan, were unable to meet them, or expressed any dis-
sention with the party's line were summarily killed (Chandler, 2000; Kiernan, 2002).
Restoring the grandeur of the Khmer people also involved the systematic elimination of groups
considered ethnically "impure." In pursuit of this goal, the DK regime killed over 250,000 ethnic
Chinese (half their population). They displaced Chams (Muslim Khmer) on a massive scale and
by 1979, had murdered, starved, or worked to death up to 100,000 of them (out of a 1975 popula-
tion of 250,000). After expelling 100,000 Vietnamese in 1975, the Khmer Rouges then hunted
and murdered the 10,000 remaining in the country in 1977 and 1978. Other groups, including
upland minorities, Lao and Thai, were similarly persecuted and eliminated (Kiernan, 2002).1
The DK's r6gime was ousted in January 1979 after the Khmer Rouges had repeatedly attempted
to "reclaim" territory located in Southern Vietnam and the Vietnamese army retaliated. It in-
vaded Cambodia, chased the Khmer Rouges from Phnom Penh, and installed an administration
known as the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) that was to stay for ten years.
The Khmer Rouges took to remote areas along the Thai border. There, funded by revenue from
illegal timber and gem trade, and initially with the covert military support of Thailand, China,
and the US, they waged a protracted guerilla war, first against the Vietnamese occupying army
(until 1989), and later against the central Cambodian government until 1998.
The UN, under the influence of China and the US (ardently opposed to Vietnam), never recog-
nized the PRK as legitimate. From 1978 to 1993, it was therefore a DK representative faithful to
Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot who represented Cambodia at the UN. Meanwhile, no UN agency
worked in Cambodia until 1989, upon the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops (Chandler, 2000).
As knowledge spread about the genocide perpetuated by DK, it became increasingly difficult for
the US, Thailand, and the UN to openly support the Khmer Rouges. They then pushed for the
formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), a government in
exile, made of an unstable coalition of rival factions (Khmer Rouge, royalists, and pre-revolution
pro-westerners). The UN officially supported the CGDK while it delivered aid to refugee camps
at the Thai and Vietnamese borders. The Thai camps were in large part run by Khmer Rouges,
who used some of the humanitarian aid to support their guerilla warfare (Kiernan, 2002).
The civil war formally ended with the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, and in 1992-1993, the UN
conducted its largest-to-date peace-keeping mission. The United Nations Transitional Authority
to Cambodia (UNTAC) took over the country's administration until it could organize elections.
Though an apparent political normalcy was restored after these general elections in 1993, on the
ground, it is not before 1998 that the country regained some calm and political stability, follow-
ing the amnesty and surrender of the last Khmer Rouges, and the second general elections that
legitimized a government that took power in a 1997 coup. Since then, the Royal Government of
Cambodia (RGC) has been led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, a defected Khmer Rouge guerilla
placed by the Vietnamese as the Minister of Foreign Affair in the 1979 PRK's government.' 8
17 Racial hatred has long been present in Cambodian history and since the end of WWII, "ethnic cleansing" has not
been a hallmark of the Khmer Rouges. In 1949 and 1952, one of the other pro-communist independence movements
had already conducted massacres of Vietnamese and Chams. From 1970 to 1975 under Lon Nol's Khmer Republic,
hundreds of Vietnamese residents were killed while 300,000 fled across the border into Vietnam (Kiernan, 2002).
18 He became Deputy Prime Minister in 1981, and has been Prime Minister since 1985 under the PRK, the State of
Cambodia (from 1991 to 1993), and the Kingdom of Cambodia (since 1993).
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3.1.2 Impacts of emergency rehabilitation and development aid on local governance
From the mid-1960s until the arrival of the Vietnamese army, civil war shattered the local capac-
ity to plan for and deliver any public services in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouges killed all former
mid- and high-level civil servants, as well as all "intellectuals," bluntly defined as anyone who
could read and write. During the PRK, the government was then run by mostly uneducated for-
mer Khmer Rouges commanders who had defected in 1978. Under the supervision of Vietnam-
ese officials, and with technical support from the USSR, they started to rebuild a basic education
system, while fighting against the Khmer Rouges and non-communist "resistance" forces that
had formed in the camps. However, the PRK r6gime did not leave a significant legacy of civil
service, aside from a collective ownership and production system that grew extremely unpopular.
Thus it is only since the early 1990s that the capacity of the national government to lead and
manage public affairs has been slowly rebuilt with the support of foreign development aid.
After 1988, the Soviet decline in aid and the Vietnamese policy of Doi Moi (renovation) opened
Cambodia to a market economy. This was just prior to the Vietnamese withdrawal, and the open-
ing was accompanied by a spike in corruption. Officials sold state property on a massive scale
before leaving power-from office equipment to medical supplies, vehicles and buildings-
dragging some ministries to a halt. Although the economy was officially still controlled by the
state, black market and smuggling to and from Thailand and Vietnam flourished, and powerful
officials made fortunes selling gems, timber, rubber, and military goods for their own profit. Stu-
dents led demonstrations against corruption in Phnom Penh in December 1991, which were vio-
lently repressed by the police and the army resulting in the death of at least eight persons.
In that chaotic environment, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) took over the
country's administration in February 1992 to implement the Paris Peace Agreement of October
1991. Its main goal was to help maintain peace while organizing general elections that would
reinstall a legitimate government. Its 16,000 military personnel and 5,000 civilians were also in
charge of coordinating the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; of launching a major
program of rehabilitation and reconstruction; of controlling local administrative structures coun-
trywide; of verifying both the withdrawal of foreign forces and the cessation of outside military
support; and the demobilization of 70% of the Cambodian armed forces. The UNTAC secured
and administered Cambodia until general elections were held in 1993. In addition, it started co-
ordinating humanitarian aid and emergency rehabilitation projects in the country, funded and
administered by international aid agencies (Barbier, 1999).
The 1993 elections were held without violence and brought almost 90% of the registered voters
to the ballot boxes, raising hope in the installation of a representative democratic system.
Unfortunately, the elections' results hardly helped clarify who was in charge in the country. Al-
though the royalist party (FUNCINPEC) won the elections with 45% of the votes, after very
tense disputes that threatened a return to violence, it had to agree to ruling jointly with the Cam-
bodian People Party (CPP), the losing party of Hun Sen, which had only gathered 38% of the
ballots. Two smaller parties-the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party and the Molinaka Party-
joined a quadripartite coalition government. The Khmer Rouges, under the new formation of the
Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), had refused to take part in the elections, and did not
recognize their results. Until the surrendering of its last leaders in 1998 and the integration of its
remaining troops into the national army, the movement would continue to lead a guerilla war
against the ruling governments.
The 120-member national assembly promulgated a new "constitutional monarchy" in September
1993, restoring Prince Sihanouk to the rank of King in the Kingdom of Cambodia (he had abdi-
cated in 1955 to become Prime Minister). Power within the new cabinet was shared equally be-
tween the two main parties, and Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen became First and Second Prime
Ministers respectively of the Royal Government of Cambodia, or RGC (Roberts, 2002).
In a first step toward democracy, nonviolent elections were conducted and a coalition govern-
ment was set up between parties that would have otherwise been at war with each other. Offi-
cially, power was shared equally, with two prime ministers, and one member from each of the
CPP and FUNCINPEC parties at every single level of decision-making in the government. In
reality though, the defeated CPP held much more power than FUNCINPEC. Hun Sen had been
in power since 1979 and had developed a network of allegiances down to the village level coun-
trywide; he had also cultivated very close links with the heads of the army and the police. In a
political system based on a hierarchy of power that requires the ability to reward followers with
gifts, he had more than a head-start on Ranariddh. The civil service "belonged" to him.
The UN and the "international community" of donors were promoting the advent of a representa-
tive democracy; however, the system of political patronage in place was well-established during
the previous 15 years of Hun Sen's power. There was a total lack of accountability from either
central or local government to the people, and no opposition with strong popular support. The
"democratically acceptable" opposition was subdued in the coalition government, while the only
strong opposition was made of the Khmer Rouge, which had become unacceptable to the interna-
tional community. Within that context, among the limited educated elite interested in public af-
fairs, there was no trust in the government's will or capacity to serve the public good.
Aside from continuing the struggle against the Khmer Rouges, the political factions elected to
run the country were also consumed by internal fights for lucrative positions that would allow
them to benefit from aid money and from the illegal trades that were the nation's main economic
activity. Between this and their violent settling of political disputes, culminating in Hun Sen tak-
ing the power as sole Prime Minister in 1997 in a coup, the elected government had little in-
volvement in long-term policies and implementation mechanisms to direct the country's
development (Chandler, 2000; Roberts, 2002).
Given the weakness of the RGC, civil society organizations were then created in the 1990s
(many originating from refugee camps) to take over roles traditionally assumed by the state, in-
cluding the construction of infrastructure and the delivery of social services countrywide. Aid
agencies, along with international and local NGOs, then ran the country through short-term reha-
bilitation projects, in a tense political situation marked by violence and several half-coups.
While humanitarian aid was a response to emergency situations, once a sense of peace and stabil-
ity was restored by the late 1990s, foreign assistance was expected to shift to a mode of interven-
tion, that would support local institutions to handle development issues autonomously in the long
term. But after years of emergency intervention, both assistance providers and recipients were
more immersed in a culture of short-term projects than in one of building systemic responses. It
is within this context of a weak public administration run by foreign advisors that we focus on
the capital city, Phnom Penh, from the mid 1990s, when interest in urban development started.19
19 Under the PRK, the few published documents on the period suggest that little rehabilitation was undertaken in
Phnom Penh, given the priorities of the civil conflict and the relative wealth of the capital compared to the country-
side (Ministere de la Culture du Cambodge & Atelier Parisien d'Urbanisme, 1997; Yap et al., 1992b).
3.2 The meaning of poverty in Phnom Penh
3.2.1 Phnom Penh: a revived ghost city
a. The early development of Phnom Penh
Cambodia is a rural society. Less than 16% of its 14 million inhabitants live in urban areas, pre-
dominantly in its capital city, Phnom Penh. With one million residents, it is 16 times the size of
the second largest city, Battambang (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2000). It is also one of the
poorest nations in the world. By the beginning of our policy story, it ranked 130 out of 163 coun-
tries on UNDP's Human Development Index, with a life expectancy of 53.5 years, a GDP per
capita of $1,084, and an adult literacy rate of about 35% (Ministry of Planning, 1998; Ministry of
Planning & United Nations Development Programme, 1997).
When the Kingdom became a French protectorate in 1863, Phnom Penh was a small port of
wooden houses. It was in 1865 that it started transforming into a modern city, when it became
the capital. In 1890, as a key part of that modernization process, the colonial administration in-
troduced private land ownership to replace a customary system of tenure in which a family de
facto "owned" the land they used productively. The government then registered land parcels and
levied taxes on real estate. This financed the modernization of the city, conducted through re-
claiming wetlands and creating water, sanitation, rail, and road networks. Until the Second
World War, Phnom Penh was then developed by colonial architects and engineers, first follow-
ing strict French planning codes, and later experimenting with the patterns of a garden city.
After WWII and the Japanese occupation of the country, in a larger effort to reestablish their po-
litical dominance over Indochina, the French administration started to redesign Phnom Penh to
fit the needs of its expected industrialization. It increased the density of residential areas and pre-
pared a master plan for the predicted growth of the city.
The country's accession to independence in 1953 cut short these planning efforts. Phnom Penh
then regained some national identity as Khmer architects adapted the legacies of French schools
to local tastes. They redesigned the capital into a garden-city with an efficient infrastructure,
home to 600,000 by 1969. It was then considered the prettiest capital of Southeast Asia and
praised as an "island of peace" by the foreign journalists covering the nearby US-Vietnam con-
flict (Ministere de la Culture du Cambodge & Atelier Parisien d'Urbanisme, 1997).
b. The political destruction of cities (1975-1978)
During the years of intense fighting between Lon Nol's government and the communist insur-
gents, refugees fleeing combats in the countryside inflated the population of Phnom Penh to
about two millions in 1974 (Yap et al., 1992b).
On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouges entered Phnom Penh and in two days forced all inhabi-
tants to march out of the city at gunpoint. The move was first presented to the population as a
temporary way to shelter them from imminent US bombing. It was instead a move to displace
them to farming areas and to reeducate urban dwellers into farmers or "base-people." However,
the exodus became permanent, and no one but a skeleton of Khmer Rouge cadres was to return
to the city for the next four years (Chandler, 2000). The DK period then witnessed the abandon-
ment of cities under a political system that made urban life and private property illegal, that emp-
tied cities of their populations, and that killed most educated Cambodians. During the next four
years, Phnom Penh's former inhabitants lived in rural areas, escaped the country when they
could, or died victim of political purges or sickness.
c. The rebirth of the capital (1979-1989)
The Vietnamese army entered Phnom Penh and installed the People's Republic of Kampuchea in
January 1979. The first flow of Khmer returnees then came back to a deserted capital where the
Vietnamese-backed government authorized them to occupy buildings on a first-come, first-
served basis. The authorities were not concerned about reallocating property to their former
owners because as much as half of the city's earlier population had died and the urgency to re-
build a country in shambles superseded all other considerations.
People joining the new civil service took centrally-located dwellings near the ministries where
they worked. Police and military officers grabbed the best housing and they shared, subdivided,
and sold buildings, houses, and apartments as more people arrived. The poorest and later comers
settled on the rooftops of multi-storey buildings, along public roadsides, and on the river banks.
The city's population grew back to 600,000 by 1989, living in less than 50,000 housing units,
which were only fit for about 250,000 persons. In the collectivist regime of PRK, land remained
state-owned, but twice, in 1979 and again in 1985, the government issuedfamily books that rec-
ognized the legal occupation rights of residents over the dwellings they occupied (Ministere de la
Culture du Cambodge & Atelier Parisien d'Urbanisme, 1997; Yap et al., 1992b).
It was only in 1989, once the PRK changed to the State of Cambodia (SOC), and in preparation
for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, that the Constitution was amended to again recognize
private land ownership. Urban dwellers who lived on land that had not been previously used for
public interest (e.g., areas along public roads or waterways) could receive ownership rights over
the land or dwelling they occupied, while the land left-over remained state property.
However, no one was allowed to claim the property they had owned before 1979, and the new
"owners" did not have secure and tradable properties. Although a cadastre office was instituted
to issue titles, their delivery was extremely slow and difficult. In a country run by brute force and
patronage, the military, the police, and powerful politicians could still easily grab land and
houses from long-standing occupants. They used that real estate power both to acquire wealth
and social status, and to redistribute housing to their political clientele, which was one of the
main ways to purchase allegiances in a civil service where official salaries did not even allow
renting an apartment in the city (Roberts, 2002; S. Williams, 1999; Yap et al., 1992b).
The 1991 Paris Peace Agreements marked the official end of civil conflicts and the start of a
massive return "home" for an additional 750,000 Cambodian refugees from border camps, for
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and for demobilized soldiers. An estimated 90% wanted to
return to the rural areas they originated from. However, because of the short supply of cultivable
land due to extensive land mining, widespread insecurity, and the poor conditions of rural infra-
structure, it was impossible to resettle more than one third of them in the countryside prior to
holding the 1993 general elections, after which UNTAC was to leave. The majority would hence
have to come to urban centers (Yap et al., 1992b).
The UN then commissioned a first assessment of the ability of Phnom Penh and of five provin-
cial capitals to serve as mid- to long-term resettlement sites. That UN-Habitat study demon-
strated that Cambodia's urban centers were unable to decently accommodate the new comers
(see Yap et al., 1992b). Their infrastructures had been devastated, most public utilities networks
could not even be rehabilitated, and there were no skilled staff or funds to replace and run them.
Phnom Penh itself had only been planned to accommodate half a million inhabitants in the
1960s, but by 1992 already housed about 700,000 permanent residents and up to 200,000 sea-
sonal migrants. Little housing construction had been undertaken since the 1980s, and no major
infrastructure work had been conducted since 1970. Water and power were only available a few
hours a day, mainly in the city's center. Paved roads were scarce and insecurity was rampant.
The UN recognized that given the lack of alternatives, returnees were likely to stay in the capital,
and that it would attract more rural migrants after the end of conflicts. It therefore recommended
developing a short- to mid-term plan to accommodate a large number of newcomers in the cities,
as well as training municipal officials to plan for the long-term needs of the populations (see Yap
et al., 1992a). In the competition with other pressing needs in rural areas, it would yet take until
the early 2000s before major urban planning efforts in Phnom Penh came into being.
3.2.2 The creation of squatter and urban poor settlements
Informal low-income settlements in Phnom Penh were created in the late 1980s by refugees re-
turning from camps, by internally displaced persons, and by rural migrants fleeing the country-
side because of violence, land-grabbing, indebtedness, and the lack of economic opportunities.
Most settled close to where they could work, in slums largely located in the city center, alongside
the river, near the main markets, and next to the train station (Slingsby, 2000).
The more stable settlements were the oldest. They were typically located in multi-storey apart-
ment buildings or on their rooftops. Inside the buildings, apartments were subdivided into single
rooms, each owned or rented by a family. On their rooftops, families created entire urban vil-
lages with their shops and shared spaces, some as small as ten families, other as large as two
hundred. Many of these settlements were formally recognized in 1985, when common inhabi-
tants received occupation rights. The Municipality gave dwellersfamily books, i.e., occupancy
titles acknowledging that they were long-term residents and could receive access to public utili-
ties. They were not considered owners but could be compensated in case of eviction.
Figure 3-3: Stable urban poor settlements in Phnom Penh
Urban village built on a rooftop Living inside an old building
20 Phnom Penh is built on reclaimed lands and needs to be protected from floods by maintaining dikes and pumping
stations. Yet, the management of its hydraulic infrastructures was abandoned between 1972 and 1990, destroying its
drainage and pumping systems (Ministere de la Culture du Cambodge & Atelier Parisien d'Urbanisme, 1997).
Another wave of settlements took place in 1994, when human-rights NGOs and UN agencies
provided support to refugees and IDPs to resettle in cities. Many newcomers created communi-
ties along streets, waterways, and railways. At that time, the MPP tolerated these as "transitional
communities," but issued neither ownership titles nor family books, since most were located on
unalienable state public land. Without deeds, residents could not claim connection to utilities
and remained vulnerable to uncompensated eviction (Fallavier, 1999; S. Williams, 1999).
Box 3-1: Typical story of a squatter settlement creation
Klang Romsev squatter community is located on a lane perpendicular to Mao Tse Dong Boulevard, one
of the busiest avenues of Phnom Penh. It is close to roads and major markets, and to some basic utilities
networks. It is composed of sixty families, twenty Vietnamese and forty Khmer, who work as laborers on
construction sites, as petty traders, and garbage pickers.
Another settlement existed before 1982, but its inhabitants were evicted under the PRK. The new settle-
ment was founded in 1994, when a few families moved to the side of the road. Most people arrived from
refugee camps or had earlier come to Cambodia from Vietnam as part of the liberation army.
The government first wanted to evict the newcomers. The community leader then asked for the protection
of a newly formed NGO defending human rights. All settlers further demonstrated in front of the National
Assembly and the Municipality. They also asked for the protection of the FUNCINPEC (royalist) party as
its main political opponent, the Cambodian People's Party, was pressing them to move out. After the
demonstrations, the Municipality decided to recognize them as a "transitional" community. Even though
their houses were not considered legal and the people could not have access to public services, the leader
officially represented the inhabitants and the settlement in front of local Sangkat (ward) authorities.
Source: Case study by the author for the 1999 poverty analysis. Klang Romsev was cleared in 2005.
Since 1995, rural migrants have further developed squatter areas on the rural fringe of the city, or
on non-constructible public land, where they expected that long-term occupation could guarantee
them tenure rights. Small clusters of families also settled in disaffected alleys of better-off dis-
tricts, while other groups lived as squatters in dilapidated multi-storey buildings in the city cen-
ter, where owners waited to sell the building for commercial development.
By 1998, Phnom Penh then had a population of one million, 94% living in urban areas, and the
remainder living in peri-urban districts (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2000). Out of the ur-
ban population, a census by SUPF, a local CSO, counted 35,000 families-or about 173,000 per-
sons-living in informal low-income settlements (Squatter and Urban Poor Federation, 1999).
However, this only counted members of local savings and credit groups. During our own survey
in 1999, we estimated that up to 20% of the settlements' inhabitants had not been accounted for
in that census. They were renters, seasonal migrants, and people too poor to participate in com-
munity saving schemes. Counting them added another 35,000 "invisible" poor for a figure of
208,000, i.e., about 22% of the city's urban population (Fallavier, 1999, 2002).
The SUPF census showed the existence of 414 distinct settlements. Three quarters of them had
been set up between 1979 and 1989, while 18.6% were established from 1989 to 1994. Only
5.8% were less than five years old. Of all the settlements, 47.8% were located on private land,
40.4% on state private land, and only 7.9% on state public land.
21 There are two types of state-owned land: state public land is national property to be used for the public interest
that cannot be sold (e.g., roads, parks, waterways), while state private land belongs to individual state institutions
(such as line ministries) who can transfer or distribute its ownership (articles 12 to 17 of the 2001 Land Law).
Figure 3-4: Location of low-income settle-
ments in Phnom Penh (1999)
Figure 3-5: Age of low-income settlements in Phnom Penh
(1999)
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Figure 3-6: Size of low-income settlements in Phnom Penh (1999)
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3.2.3 Squatters as non-citizens
Until 2000, the MPP informally categorized the dwellers of these informal settlements as either
"squatter" or "urban poor." Squatters were seen as illegally occupying public or private land,
while the urban poor had recognized occupancy status that gave them some security of tenure, if
not ownership. The distinction between squatter and owner was however blurred since there was
no clear land ownership system in Phnom Penh.
In fact, a provision in the 1992 Land Law recognized tenure rights for those who had peacefully
used private land for the five preceding years. The large majority of people occupying private
land were therefore legally eligible to apply for a title. Those occupying state private land could
also obtain a certificate of residence (family book), providing them rights for compensation if
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government needed to use that space. Only 7.9% of the informal dwellers lived on state public
land and did not match any legal criteria to claim occupancy rights.
In Khmer though, the term squatter conveys more than a connotation of illegal occupancy. It
disparagingly refers to "people living in anarchy," and is associated with immorality, disorder,
and criminality by middle class shopkeepers, formal sector employees, and civil servants who
often consider squatters as a threat to morality and to public order. For a long time, this provided
the grounds to municipal officials for refusing to engage in dialogue with informal settlement
dwellers and for refuting the legitimacy of their claims for public recognition. Therefore, by the
mid-1990s, there was virtually no dialogue between the MPP and the squatter and urban poor
communities. The municipality had no policy for developing squatter areas but would brutally
evict families from land it needed, either to develop public infrastructure or to sell to private in-
vestors. In turn, poor communities distrusted most public authorities.
3.2.4 Living conditions and prospects in informal settlements
As a basis for understanding progress-or the lack thereof-in reducing poverty, this section
provides an overview of what it meant to be poor in Phnom Penh at the beginning of our policy
story.
Limited research had been conducted on urban poverty since the 1992 UN-Habitat assessment,
aside from a study on vulnerable groups (Deutsch, 1997), and one on low-income housing
(Urban Sector Group, 1996). The other components of the local urban literature on poverty were
censuses of poor communities (Squatter and Urban Poor Federation, 1997, 1999), and newslet-
ters by CSOs that were more advocacy tools than research instruments (e.g., Asian Coalition for
Housing Rights, 1998, 1999; Urban Resource Centre, 1998, 1999a; Urban Sector Group, 1997).
None had rigorously studied the multiple components of urban living conditions or poverty.
In 1999, we produced a first systematic qualitative evaluation of living conditions in Phnom
Penh's squatter and urban poor communities, surveying settlements representative of the diverse
circumstances of its estimated 414 low-income communities (see Fallavier, 1999). Our study
showed how, in the majority of urban settlements (aside from where the pilot UN-Habitat pro-
ject-later described-operated), inhabitants survived on a hand-to-mouth basis, barely scraping
their daily needs for shelter and food, and living in harsh and dangerous environments. They
generally had little access to public services and sickness or accidents could easily destroy their
fragile lives. Although many did hope that through hard work and education their children could
build better lives, they also felt that as illegal dwellers, they were not recognized as full citizens,
and could not count on support from the government. The typical living conditions in Phnom
Penh poor settlements are summarized here from this study.
22 Private property was recognized in the constitution of 1993 (Art. 44), and the decision to deliver land titles was
taken in 1995. Yet it took until 1999 before the creation of the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning, and
Construction, which had the jurisdiction to deliver such titles. Until then in Phnom Penh, the municipal cadastre
could deliver documents recognizing de facto occupation, but not de jure ownership. Only the Governor could rec-
ognize legal land ownership and its transfer (decree (Annukret) 57 Sept. 29, 1994). Further, it took until 2001 for the
RGC to launch a land management project that included the deliverance of land titles. By 2006 though, considerable
discretionary power remained to civil servants in land allocation. High ranking officials still often trade land under
their jurisdiction as if it were their own property. The resulting tenure insecurity and inequality in access to land was
still both a main characteristic and a main cause of poverty countrywide in 2006 (Conway & Goh, 2006).
a. Livelihoods and income levels
Men worked as cyclo (pedicab) or motordup (motorcycle-taxi) drivers, as porters on the docks or
in the markets, as unskilled construction workers, or as scavengers. Women were petty vendors
of fruits or vegetables in the streets, worked as unskilled laborers on construction sites, or as gar-
bage pickers. Typically, to afford a basic food basket and sending two out of four children to
school, two parents had to work seven days a week. Yet few had that much work in the very thin
economy, and many could not afford to send all their children to school. The average daily in-
come for a family of five persons was 12,500 Riels (i.e., about $0.55 per person), with a contri-
bution of about 7,200 Riels from the head of household, and 5,300 Riels from other family
members. As for single-parent families, they needed children to work just to afford enough food.
b. Security of tenure
Three quarters of informal settlement dwellers were considered squatters by the municipality and
lived under the constant threat of eviction. Within squatter settlements, there was a further subdi-
vision between "owners" and "renters" of the illegal plots or dwellings. Owners had been able to
pay the local authorities to settle illegally on public or private land and were paying regular
bribes to keep the status quo and avoid being evicted. They were the "better off' among the poor
residents. Renters were either seasonal migrants who came to Phnom Penh for short periods, or
the destitute-often households headed by women, orphans, or elders-who could not afford to
"buy" the rights for a shelter. On a weekly or monthly basis, they rented a house, a room, or at
times a single bed from local inhabitants or from absentee slumlords. They lived where condi-
tions were the harshest: in makeshift shelters below flood level a large part of the year, in areas
very difficult to reach, in the alleys and corridors of dilapidated buildings, or on their rooftops.
c. Quality of housing
The quality of housing was low according to all standards. Most shelters were made of recycled
material, from paper to plastic sheets, palm leaves and wood (87.8% according to SUPF survey).
Brick-and-mortar houses (12.2%) belonged to shop-keepers or to petty civil servants. Only few
permanent houses were sturdy enough to prevent rain to flood in during the wet season.
Figure 3-7: Typical housing in Phnom Penh informal settlements
Living above a sewage pond Renting on the grounds of a pagoda
Squatting in a corridor inside a building
d. Infrastructure and services
In terms of physical access, most settlements were in areas difficult to reach, especially during
the rainy season. While located within the city, they were situated above open sewer canals or
lakes, at the end of long dirt paths, or on land partially flooded from three to five months per
year. Difficult approach affected people's access to services, such as going to a hospital, sending
children to school, or collecting waste. It further limited economic opportunities as people could
not set up profitable shops in their secluded settlements and at times could not even reach mar-
kets. The dark, insalubrious, and often flooded pathways further affected people's safety as they
would fall into filthy water while carrying loads or fall prey to muggers at night.
As squatters could not obtain connections to government-provided services, only a quarter of the
low-income settlements were officially connected to the city's water supply network. Families
had to purchase water from private vendors. It was often of low quality and priced from ten to
thirty times that of water from the municipal network. They would have to pay 10,000 to 30,000
Riels ($2.5 to $7.5) per cubic meter, while families who were better off and living in recognized
settlements only paid 350 Riels ($0.09) for water from the municipal network. Only about 30%
of families had indoor toilets, and human waste was mostly discharged into open spaces. A third
of the settlements did not have storm or wastewater drainage and suffered severe floods.
Squatters had no official connection to the main electrical grid either, but some could obtain
power from resellers at three to five times the regular rates. A fifth of households in all settle-
ments could only afford the use of batteries, candles, and lamp oil for lighting.
Table 3-1: Access to water and electricity in informal settlements
Water supply Electricity supply
Means of access # of settlements Percentage Means of access # of settlements Percentage
Private source 270 68.9% Private source 187 52.4%
Municipal network 68 17.3% Government meters 145 40.6%
Well or river 14 3.6%
Mixed sources 40 10.2% Mixed sources 25 7.0%
Total 392 100.0% 357 100.0%
Source: (Squatter and Urban Poor Federation, 1999)
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e. Social services
In terms of health, the most common illnesses in the settlements were diarrhea, fever, and the
common cold. Most were due to poor water quality and to an unhealthy environment, reinforced
by a lack of knowledge of basic hygiene and health care. It was extremely difficult for people to
access quality health services. Though government hospitals were supposedly free for the poor,
in reality everyone had to pay. Aside from transportation cost to reach the hospital, one had to
bribe its guard, its receptionist, its doctors, and its nurses. The costs were not only high for peo-
ple with very low revenues, but unpredictable, and always higher during emergencies. Accord-
ingly, many families self-medicated, with pills bought from local, improvised drug sellers.
"Free" public education also carried a fee. School teachers would ask for 500 Riels a day ($0.12)
per child to complement their own meager salary of $20 per month. Parents often believed that
educating their children could help improve their future living conditions, and many spent sub-
stantial part of their resources sending children to school. Distance to school and its cost were
two major impediments to access; many families could not pay the transportation costs, the com-
pulsory fee requested by teachers, or the cost of uniforms and supplies.
Box 3-2: Impacts of a health shock on a poor family
A 50-year-old woman lives with her husband and two children in a small cluster of wooden shacks hidden
by better-off houses near an open sewer.
The family moved from Kandal province in 1989 so their children could attend school. They thought that
their poverty was due to their own illiteracy and wanted their children to receive good schooling in
Phnom Penh. The husband rode a cyclo, while his wife sold vegetables and the children attended school.
A few months ago, their 16 year-old daughter got severely sick. She had to drop out of school and has
stayed in bed since. The mother had to stop working to look after her. Health spending has plunged the
family into debt. They could not afford to see a doctor, but have been purchasing drugs from a local resel-
ler. The only source they could get funds from was a loan shark who comes every other day for 24 days to
collect 6,000 Riels each time (i.e., a total of 72,000 Riels), to repay an initial loan of 10,000 Riels ($2.5).
They are afraid that he will take away their home if they cannot pay.
That illness affects the entire family. There is not enough income from the father's work to pay for medi-
cine, and there is often hardly enough to purchase sufficient food. They cannot afford to send the second
child to school anymore, thus destroying their hope that they could one day rely on their children for a
better life. Life in Kandal, they say, was easier than here, but they cannot see any way back to their home-
land as they had sold their house and belongings when moving to the capital.
Source: Case study by the author for the 1999 poverty analysis.
f Corruption
Petty corruption was a major issue that affected all aspects of people's lives and prevented them
from breaking out of a cycle of poverty and dependence. Local authorities from the police and
the district offices first extorted payments from squatters to obtain the "right" to settle on public
land. They then regularly levied informal fees for "protection" and for the "authorization" to re-
pair a leaking roof or to install an indoor toilet. In the markets where many urban poor worked,
either as vendors or as porters, they also had to pay daily informal fees to the guards, local po-
lice, or foremen. Because of these constant extortions, people could rarely accumulate enough
savings to scale up their businesses, to improve their homes, or to plan for a better future. Aside
from taking a heavy toll on their revenue, this prevented them from having any trust or respect in
local figures of authorities or even in outside agencies claiming to come and help for free.
Box 3-3: Illegitimate fees paid to the police in informal settlements
At the entrance of a lane in a squatter settlement, a new house of cement and bricks was under construc-
tion, a surprising sight in a settlement bound to face eviction soon.
The owner first said that because of the high price of wood, a cement house was cheaper to build. As we
talked longer, he looked very uncomfortable, until several men talking into walkie-talkies arrived. They
were the chiefs of community and of the local police, plus soldiers in uniform, and police officers. All
were very nervous, and asked our team to stop asking questions and to leave the area.
We later learned from neighbors that it was forbidden to build in the area, and that the police was in
charge of enforcing that rule. Yet, the house owner had paid a $300 "authorization fee" to the police and
local authorities for them to close their eyes (in comparison, the cost of materials for the house was $600).
We also learned that having a sturdy house (as opposed to a makeshift shack), was a good bet to be poten-
tially eligible for compensation, should the settlement be evicted.
In that area, as in many others in Phnom Penh, one of the first problem people mentioned that kept them
in poverty was corruption. Police "protection" alone averaged 130,000 Riels per year, to "insure" that a
family would not be evicted, or that its shelter would not "accidentally" burn down. The police collected
the money by monthly installments as most families could not pay a lump sum.
Source: Case study by the author for the 1999 poverty analysis.
3.2.5 Defining poverty in Phnom Penh
In Phnom Penh, the dwellers of informal settlements were hence not only "income-poor". They
were also socially and economically disempowered by stigmatization, harassment, and the lack
of access to basic services. Their low levels of income and savings made them especially vulner-
able to shocks such as flood, disease, or the death of an income earner that could easily plunge
them into destitution. Although the majority of them had lived in their communities long enough
to be granted tenure according to the Land Law, they were in practice denied rights of occu-
pancy, let alone of ownership. All through the 1990s, authorities considered most urban poor as
"squatters," an illegal status which precluded them from being recognized the same rights of pro-
tection and of access to public service as other urban citizens. Their lack of means to voice their
views and to negotiate with authorities further rendered them prone to evictions.
During focus groups, inhabitants summarized what they considered poverty along four lines:
- First, they suffered from isolation. Geographical isolation because of the lack of road access
and the floods that prevented from reaching their settlements; intellectual isolation because
they could not access education; social isolation as they felt discriminated against by other
urbanites; and economic isolation because of their inability to access skilled employment.
- Second, they were subject to high risks. Physical risks were due to the floods, insalubrious
living conditions, illnesses, and criminality. Economic risks resulted from low and unstable
revenue, the high cost of corruption, and indebtedness incurred for non-productive expenses.
- Third they lacked access to productive resources, including literacy and marketable skills,
and credit to finance small-scale investment.
- The fourth element was the lack of community cohesiveness and representation, as people
were not well-organized for collective action and could not dialogue with the Municipality.
3.3 Actors of the municipal governance process
This introduces the main actors of the following policy story, whose roles will be refined later.
- The Municipality of Phnom Penh is the governmental body that represents the city's in-
habitants. It plans and manages the city's daily life and growth. The Governor who heads the
MPP has a ministerial status, but is under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. He is ap-
pointed by the Prime Minister, usually along with four to six vice-governors. Each of them
shares authority over one or more departments, with the relevant national line ministries
(e.g., the vice-governor in charge of health depends in large part on the Ministry of Health).
The only autonomous office of the MPP is its Cabinet, which manages local authorities.
- Local authorities are representatives from the MPP and the Ministry of Interior. The Mu-
nicipality is divided in seven Khan (districts), themselves organized into 76 Sangkat (wards).
The Chiefs of Khan report to the MPP Chief of Cabinet. The three Deputy Chiefs of Khan
are responsible for administration, socioeconomic programs, and public works. Sangkats
have officers responsible for administration, economic, financial, and social affairs, culture,
religion, and hygiene (Slingsby, 2000). The police have representations at both the Khan and
Sangkat levels. They are supposed to assist the MPP, but are under direct orders from the
Ministry of Interior.
- Civil society organizations are composed of formally registered Non-Government Organi-
zations who provide technical or advocacy support to the urban poor with a degree of perma-
nency, and of Community-Based Organizations, much looser and more informal structures,
depending mainly on unpaid volunteers. By 1999, there were barely any local intellectuals,
research centers, or think tanks to represent "academia" in reflections on urban development.
The few local research units were working more on macro and rural development issues.
- International organizations, whose work affected the lives of the urban poor were of two
kinds. First were those working directly with informal communities. This was mainly UN-
Habitat, with financial support from DFID and from the Government of Japan, under the co-
ordination of UNDP Cambodia. Second were agencies whose work indirectly affected the
urban poor, for instance as the infrastructure they installed displaced communities, or as they
had the possibility of extending urban services to low-income communities. These were
mainly the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
- The private sector was an important actor of the poverty reduction process, since it provided
what few other actors could: funds and potential employment. A large number of the evic-
tions we refer to were due to investment from private real estate developers. However, it was
not officially involved in the policies for poverty reduction activities, until 2003.
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4.0 Analyzing policy-making by observing its implementation
This chapter presents the story of how a municipal urban poverty reduction strategy was initi-
ated, how it developed, and how it was implemented in Phnom Penh between 1996 and 2004.
We follow its inception through a pilot phase from 1996 to 1999, and its attempt to scale up from
2000 to 2004, before taking stock of its legacy in terms of improving living conditions in infor-
mal settlements and of setting up a system to reduce urban poverty in the long term. It is in
Chapter 5 that we will analyze the dynamics of the process to explain its evolution and results.
As detailed in the introduction, most information in this section are from unpublished primary
data collected during my work as a planner in Phnom Penh, including surveys, the results of par-
ticipatory monitoring and evaluation, interview with heads and staff of the different projects, and
daily interaction with all the local players while working with them on projects and policies.
4.1 Phase One: Establishing the potentials of aided-self-help (1996-1999)
4.1.1 Goal: Demonstrating how the urban poor can help themselves
The 1992 UN proposal to prepare the major Cambodian urban centers to absorb the influx of im-
migrants resulting from the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement did not lead to immediate activities.
The Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the European Union, and the French and Japa-
nese bilateral aids did conduct numerous appraisals for the physical improvement of Phnom
Penh-in water and sanitation, road, or master planning-but no major investment took place in
the unpredictable and often violent political environment preceding the 1998 general elections.
By 1995 though, DFID was willing to launch a pilot project for the participatory upgrading of
Phnom Penh's squatter and urban poor settlements, in collaboration with UN-Habitat and UNDP.
The concepts were based on positive experience with a series of slum rehabilitations DFID had
supported in India since 1984 through the Hyderabad Slum Improvement Project.
A first phase of intervention was to demonstrate to low-income communities and to municipal
authorities that small, low-cost upgrading projects could help improve people's living conditions
and their ability to respond on their own to some of their needs with minimum external support.
This was to open the way for a longer-term approach to poverty reduction, based on developing
and using the capacities of the urban poor, on strengthening the planning and management skills
of the Municipality, and on turning their relations from one of conflict to one of collaboration.
In 1996, UN-Habitat thus started a project entitled Support to Phnom Penh Squatter Communi-
ties and Municipality for Participatory Urban Development (hereafter referred to as the Project),
funded by DFID, and under the strategic coordination of UNDP Cambodia Office. The Project's
objectives were to improve the living conditions of a significant number of poor urban dwellers
while demonstrating the possibility for the municipality and informal communities to collaborate
in tackling urban poverty. Its primary beneficiaries were the urban poor and squatter communi-
ties, and the municipal officials at the central (MPP) and local (Khan and Sangkat) levels. The
civil society organizations supporting urban development activities composed a secondary target.
They were to receive technical and advocacy skills to later support informal urban communities.
The Project aimed to show the relevance of mutual-help, first in the more stable urban poor com-
munities. It would help improve their infrastructure and living environment, set up vocational
training schemes, train NGOs and CBOs to organize people for mutual-help, and develop sites
for the voluntary relocation of some communities. Based on the results, it then expected to move
into the controversial squatter settlements, which the municipality did not initially want to up-
grade. At a strategic level, the Project then aimed to influence the policies of the MPP in favor of
all residents of informal settlements and to strengthen its capacities to reduce urban poverty.
4.1.2 Means: Building capacity for collective action and participatory upgrading
From 1996 to 1999, the Project worked to demonstrate to the Municipality that in situ improve-
ment was a viable approach to improve living conditions in low-income settlements.
It first cooperated with Sangkat officials to identify communities that could be upgraded with the
approval of the MPP-i.e., that were not considered squatter areas. Local development activities
were then undertaken in these settlements with the collaboration of NGOs, which provided tech-
nical support, training in community organization, and research and advocacy skills.
A first step of activities was to form Community-Based Organizations and to train their members
in community mobilization and project planning. These CBOs would then conduct participatory
planning workshops to produce local development plans that prioritized problems and developed
strategies, options, and work-programs to solve these problems.
Through their CBOs, community residents would later present proposals for small-scale realiza-
tions to the Project and to other donors for support. They sought partial funding and technical
advice to improve road access, to build drains, or to set up water supply networks. Residents
contributed with unskilled labor and/or with cash for a portion of the materials purchased, while
the Project provided materials and paid for skilled foremen. It would also provide public equip-
ment, such as street lights and garbage collection carts, while communities would pay for elec-
tricity and would ensure the maintenance of that equipment and of the realizations.
In response to requests from NGOs and CBOs, the Project thus supported numerous mutual-help
upgrading activities. Some set up wooden footbridges and all-weather pathways in flooded areas,
street lights, drains, and toilets; some improved roads and footpaths; others cleaned heaps of gar-
bage accumulated over the years and launched community-run waste management services.
It also established a vocational training and apprenticeship program that provided startup capital
and tools to local artisans who hired paid-apprentices for on-the-job training. The apprentices
learned skills in sewing and tailoring; repairing motorcycles, engines, televisions, and electrical
appliances; or in producing doors, windows, water jars, or roof gutters. Aside from marketable
skills, they gained knowledge and experience in starting and managing their own businesses.
The Project further supported NGOs and CBOs through formal training, awareness trips, and
learning-by doing activities. It trained them to participatory planning, and to the skills necessary
to implement the projects they designed. CSOs and community members hence learned tech-
niques to build houses and to lay out small infrastructure as well as procedures to prepare and
manage small procurement, contracting, and financial activities. The CBOs were further trained
to represent the needs of their members in front of officials. They then conducted a citywide cen-
sus of informal communities to ensure they could all be accounted for at the Khan-level.
Senior municipal officials then participated in trainings and international conferences on urban
poverty and development. They were sent-along with Khan and Sangkat chiefs, community
leaders, and NGO staff-on awareness trips to Thailand and India, where they visited successful
upgrading programs and saw how others had collaborated to resolve problems similar to theirs.
4.1.3 Achievements: Poverty reduced and collaboration improved
The Project started in a post-emergency situation, at a time when there was little interest, or local
capacity, to conduct lengthy studies before starting aid projects. No baseline study had hence
been conducted at its start, and no rigorous analysis of "before-and-after" conditions could be
drawn from the pilot. Yet, a comparison between the few studies conducted in the early to mid-
1990s (in Deutsch, 1997; Urban Sector Group, 1996; Yap et al., 1992b), the 1999 census
(Squatter and Urban Poor Federation, 1999), reports from the Urban Health Project (Urban
Health Project, 1999, 2001), and our own 1999 poverty analysis (Fallavier, 1999), supplemented
by interviews with urban residents and local development agencies shows notable achievements.
a. Improved living conditions in informal settlements
(i) In situ upgrading
Over three years, the Project supported upgrading activities in more than one hundred communi-
ties, reaching over 8,000 families. Through its joint work with the local CSOs, it further helped
organize over 200 settlements for collective action so their inhabitants could plan for local de-
velopment projects. Although not all were able to present proposals or receive support, these ac-
tivities gave a voice to a part of the population that was initially unheard by municipal authorities
The physical improvements facilitated access to the settlements through wooden footbridges and
concrete lanes that could be used year-round. This changed the lives of families who previously
had to walk through sewerage to reach their homes during the three to five months of the rainy
season, and drastically decreased the amount of illness due to falling into polluted waters. The
clearing of garbage and the provision of street lights made the settlements cleaner and safer. The
installation of community drainage and sewage systems and of shared toilets further ameliorated
sanitary conditions by decreasing the incidence of floods and of related illnesses. In some peri-
urban settlements, the drilling of wells and the installation of pumps greatly reduced the time and
cost previously needed to fetch water from the river or to purchase it from private vendors.
In terms of access to social services, the Project worked with UNICEF's Municipal Health Pro-
ject, which helped set up several pilot health posts in informal settlements. These were extremely
low-cost operations, located near the people, and in part supported by communities, which pro-
vided a shelter to run the clinic and minimal user fees, with exemptions for the poorest.
All these activities required the active participation of beneficiaries. They initiated the requests
for training, organized their own CBOs, elected their leaders, prepared proposals, and contrib-
uted to the implementation of the activities by providing free labor or a financial contribution
from their savings. To further entice people to participate and to support the local economy, the
Project operated some activities under a "community-contracting" basis, by which CBOs were in
charge of the whole planning, procurement, and implementation process. Provided they re-
spected clear procedures and rules of transparency, they would purchase the materials needed
and hire workers from within the communities to complement the free labor already provided.
Unlike projects where outside contractors did most of the work, this was building the local own-
ership of the realizations, while at times training community members to new skills.
Over these few years, numerous settlements visibly gained a new life as small traders and repair
businesses could now operate in cleaner and safer streets under light poles in the evening. Fami-
lies were spending less on health costs and could even bring home the bicycles or motorcycles
they previously had to park outside the settlement at an added cost. Their savings could instead
go into their children's education and home improvement, and by the end of the project, many
settlements were becoming real "communities" where people were noticeably happier to live.
In terms of economic activities, the apprenticeship training and support in micro-finance demon-
strated the capacities of the urban poor to improve their income with very little external input. It
helped over 500 families improve their ability to generate income in the long run through voca-
tional training and simple classes on business management. The generalization of local savings
and credit groups as part of the community planning process further provided the foundations to
launch the Urban Poor Development Fund (UPDF), a rotating credit scheme gathering the sav-
ings of informal communities, and returning it to them in the form of housing and business loans.
(ii) Reaching squatter communities
Although, at the Project's start, the MPP had not wanted any work in squatter areas, fearing this
would be a de facto recognition of their legitimate occupancy, over time it accepted the Project's
support to squatters, though only in response to emergencies. After floods, squatters thus built
wooden footbridges to safely access inundated parts of their settlements, or toilets in areas where
families had been temporary relocated. This simple recognition of squatter dwellers was in itself
remarkable. It was the first positive interaction between the MPP and otherwise "illegal" settlers.
Building upon this, another aim of the Project was to support squatter communities who wanted
to relocate to better living environments. Several communities situated in insalubrious areas
above sewers, alongside roads, or against private buildings requested help to relocate where they
could build stable shelters and live in safer, more dignified conditions.
The first resettlement initiated by the Project happened to be the most successful. A community
of 128 squatter families had been living alongside the wall of the National Pediatric Hospital that
the NGO World Vision International (WVI) was helping renovate. The community leader was
one of the most articulate advocates of the urban poor and an active member of the Squatter and
Urban Poor Federation (SUPF), an informal mutual-help network of CBOs in Phnom Penh. He
approached the Project, seeking support to relocate families to a place where they could obtain
legal security of tenure, access to basic services, and the chance to find jobs.
After visiting possible relocation sites with the community members, the Project team organized
talks between several interested squatter communities, NGOs, and the Municipality to discuss
the possible effects of relocation on access to employment, health, and education services, as
well as ways to finance the purchase of land for relocation and the construction of new houses.
In the case of the Pediatric Hospital community, World Vision agreed to share the cost of land
with the MPP. UPDF was to provide housing loans to families, and the Project was to help pre-
pare the site with roads, and with infrastructure for water, power, sewage, and drainage. After
three years of joint work to find a suitable site, prepare it for relocation, and agree on how to
manage its development and the gradual move, the 128 families relocated voluntarily on one
hectare of serviced-land, forming Veng Sreng Community, nine km from Phnom Penh's center.
There, several factors combined to make the resettlement successful in improving living condi-
tions. First, wells allowed people to obtain clean drinking water for free, while they had previ-
ously spent up to 25% of their incomes on water cost. Second, the site was located near an
industrial area where garment factories had just been set up. This gave jobs to many, either in the
factories or selling food to workers. It also allowed them to rent out rooms in their new houses to
factory workers. This generated a steady income to repay their $400 loans from UPDF and to
upgrade the houses they had built, in large part with recycled material from their old shacks. In
less than six months, most houses were consolidated with concrete frames, brick walls, and tiled
roofs, and people had formed an economically vibrant community with access to basic services.
Two other relocations, totaling almost seven hundred squatter families, were then conducted as
part of the Project in Tuol Sambo and Tuol Rokakos areas. They were implemented quickly, un-
der pressure from the MPP to speed up the process. Although they helped people live in better
environments, they did not enable them to improve their revenues, for they were situated too far
from employment opportunities (see Table 4-2 p.99, and Figure 4-3 p.100). The poorer families
were thus unable to consolidate their houses or to ensure access to school to their children, and
many left the sites within six months.
b. Strengthened capacities for aided-mutual-help
A second major objective of the Project was to help poor urban dwellers speak in a unified voice
to the Municipality and to donors to propose improvements, to assert their rights, and to resist
eviction and abuses. To achieve this, the Project collaborated with the Asian Coalitionfor Hous-
ing Rights (ACHR), a network linking community organizers, civil society organizations, plan-
ners, and academics in Asia and Africa to collaborate and share lessons to improve the lives of
low-income urban dwellers (see http://www.achr.net/). ACHR helped develop local civil society
organizations to act as interfaces between poor communities, the MPP, and aid agencies. NGOs
would provide support and training, and CBOs would help organize and represent communities.
The Project helped set up the Urban Resource Centre (URC), an association of local architects
who trained communities to use locally adapted technologies for upgrading their homes and pro-
vided them with anti-eviction support. It further strengthened the Urban Sector Group (USG), an
NGO created in 1993 to help communities organize for collective action, and that provided them
with micro-finance services and vocational training. Out of USG, an informal network of CBOs
originated: the Squatter and Urban Poor Federation (SUPF-later renamed Solidarity for the
Urban Poor Federation), which helped communities organize, prepare, and submit proposals for
funding, and also to advocate for change from authorities. Unlike an NGO, SUPF was run very
informally by slum dwellers, on an unpaid basis, and out of people's shelters. It had less organ-
izational or technical skills than USG, but it had the potential to spread on a large scale. It helped
over 200 communities to organize between 1996 and 2000, while USG reached just 30.
Other organizations were created as a natural growth of these CSOs. The Urban Poor Women
Development Organization for instance branched out from SUPF to promote women's education
and leadership in communities. Specialized organizations were also created by volunteers-the
Community Sanitation and Recycling Organization worked on environmental health issues and
solid waste management; the Cambodia Volunteersfor Community Development provided voca-
tional training to the youth and ran environmental protection projects. ACHR also set up the Ur-
ban Poor Development Fund to provide low-interest housing loans to poor communities.
c. Enhanced relations between authorities and the urban poor
When the first urban NGOs were created in Phnom Penh following the UNTAC-led impetus for
the development of a local civil society, their relations with the MPP were based on suspicion,
and there was little dialogue between them. NGOs' noisy and discordant advocacy efforts on be-
half of squatters fell on the deaf ears of municipal officials who considered their own roles to be
maintaining law and order; they saw squatters as little more than brigands.
A turning point in opening the dialogue between the MPP, the urban poor, and NGOs happened
in 1996 when ACHR organized awareness trips to India and Thailand. Supported by the Project,
they loaded urban poor dwellers, NGO activists, and central and local officials from the MPP
onto the same planes and buses. All went traveled together, for three weeks of tours and meet-
ings with counterparts in foreign cities to see how the urban poor there had been able to improve
their own living conditions and how municipalities and CSOs had enabled them to do so.
This not only gave new ideas to participants and strengthened their belief that change could be
achieved, but it also created bonds between representatives of the urban poor, municipal offi-
cials, and NGO staff. Upon their return from the trips, all were then more confident in what they
could achieve, and more willing to work together to find common solutions to their problems.
The leaders of squatter and urban poor communities obtained direct access to the MPP and to
Khan and Sangkat officials. Some were later able to set up Community Development Councils in
their Khans as permanent forums to discuss problems in their areas and to review community
project proposals before they could be submitted to donors for funding.
This dialogue, and the concrete demonstration that it was possible to improve living conditions
in informal settlements at a relatively low-cost (the typical size of a community-led activity was
under $4,000) contributed to improving the willingness of the MPP to consider in situ upgrading
and voluntary relocation as components of a municipal approach to deal with urban poverty.
Over the course of the pilot phase, civil society, the municipality, and the UN had apparently de-
veloped a converging understanding of the issues faced and of possible solutions to them based
on supporting participatory upgrading. Meanwhile, CBOs and NGOs had gained the capacity to
undertake meaningful improvement projects, provided they received technical and financial sup-
port from outside, and that the MPP facilitated the process administratively.
4.1.4 Limitations: The fragility of results
Despite its achievements, the Project still had to account for three issues that would have lasting
effects: (i) its demonstration approach had not endowed any legal rights to the urban poor; (ii)
the community-based development approach excluded some of the poorest groups; and (iii) the
success of its main resettlement project was misread by the municipality.
First, ACHR had been in charge of most of the training, and had used its experience from Thai-
land to focus on developing the capacity of CSOs to directly respond to the needs of the commu-
nities. It had not, at that early stage, tried to integrate the pro-poor development work into a
larger strategic view of development for Phnom Penh, which still included large infrastructure
projects likely to displace poor communities. Nor had it tried to back up its achievements by de-
veloping legal instruments to recognize tenure in the communities that had been upgraded, or to
provide the same rights of access to public services to the urban poor as to any other citizens.
In a society run more by patronage and compromises than by the Rule of Law, both ACHR and
the Project had preferred to ignore legal issues. They instead concentrated on demonstrating to
the MPP that poor dwellers could improve their own living conditions and the city as a whole by
incrementally upgrading their settlements. All actors hoped that legal agreements could be bro-
kered later, in recognition that the majority of the urban poor had been living in their settlements
for a long time (by 1999, 95% of informal settlements existed for more than five years; they
could benefit from a clause in the Land Law by which people were eligible to occupation rights
if they had lived for five years or more on land that was not essential to the public good.)
This however meant that there could be no certainty regarding the permanence of achievements.
The communities that had been upgraded had no insurance that the MPP would not evict them
later on. As for the MIPP, it remained subordinate to decisions by the Ministry of Interior that
could overrule municipal decisions. The Project's prospects for scaling up hence relied heavily
on goodwill from all parties and were highly vulnerable to the changing mood of politicians who
had high stakes in the local land market.
Second, the community empowerment itself was not without drawbacks. Despite their success,
CBOs faced serious limitations in reaching out and representing the poorest. Creating CBOs that
elected committees who were then in charge of local development often reinforced inequalities
by formalizing existing structures of clientelism without providing mechanism to care for the
excluded. Some leaders only supported families affiliated with their political parties, limited ac-
cess to project benefits to their relatives, or extended help only after receiving bribes. In the best
cases, only members of saving groups were allowed to benefit from the Project's assistance.
Even successful activities then mainly benefited stable parts of the poor settlements as CBOs felt
they could not afford to consider the needs and constraints of the most vulnerable. Typically,
these were the destitute, the renters, and families who could not contribute in cash or in labor to
local projects. They were yet important expected beneficiaries of any poverty reduction activity.
Third, although secondary in terms of expected impact, the resettlement of squatter communities
was the most politically-charged component of the Project, and it was delicate to handle. In fact,
the successful relocation of small communities was a double-edged achievement.
Relocation had mainly demonstrated its ability to improve people's living conditions when bene-
ficiaries were volunteers and not the poorest, whose survival depended on being located near the
city center and who were highly vulnerable to any disruption of their fragile livelihood patterns.
The process also needed to be conducted gradually, allowing people to slowly build a new com-
munity and their new livelihoods. It was costlier overall than in situ upgrading and more risky, as
people often returned from resettlement sites located on the fringes of cities into city centers,
where they could find better job opportunities. In a 2000 assessment of resettlements around
Phnom Penh, we found that while accompanied-relocation on a well-planned site could be an
option of last resort, it was expensive and possible only for a few families at a time (Fallavier et
al., 2001a). The Veng Sreng Project had cost $2,000 per family (Urban Resource Centre, 1999b),
while a $4,000 in situ upgrading project could improve the life of 200 families. Therefore, reset-
tlements could not be considered practical, long-term responses to widespread urban poverty.
Although the MPP had demonstrated some willingness to support voluntary relocation-as op-
posed to its earlier violent evictions-its leaders had little understanding of the difficulty of
planning and implementing such projects. The success of the Veng Sreng experiment made it
look technically possible, and massive resettlement became extremely appealing to the Governor
as a way to reduce the number of poor settlements, though he could not voice this openly.2 4
23 The NGO Concern International had tried relocation outside Phnom Penh in 1992, but the experiment had failed
because of distance, the lack of services and employment, and land conflicts (Goad, 1999; Kong et al., 1999).
24 For the 1999 city consultation that sought directions for the municipal poverty reduction strategy, the Governor
had prepared a speech calling for the removal of squatter settlements, claiming that "poor people could not afford to
live in the capital and should rather return to rural areas" (see Chea, 1999). Given the consultation's emphasis on in
situ upgrading, he dropped the more radical elements of his talk when he delivered it, but still mentioned his wish to
develop new settlements "for the poor" outside the city (see Yap, 1999a).
4.1.5 Next steps: Scaling up through a systematic approach
Overall though, by the end of the Project's first phase, the mood of all its participants was up-
beat. The MPP had agreed that participatory in situ upgrading could help improve the living con-
ditions of the urban poor and the appearance of the city; that forced evictions were not long-term
solutions and would be discontinued; and that one needed to carefully plan for the gradual relo-
cation of the communities that could not stay in their current locations. It also recognized that
poverty reduction should be a key component of its future strategy of urban development.
In terms of engagement in public life, the urban poor and their representatives had moreover be-
come the most active citizens in Phnom Penh. In an authoritative political environment where
public officials were neither elected nor held accountable, and where the middle class did not get
involved into public affairs, that formerly outcast citizenry had apparently achieved to create
space for some type of democratic participation. This raised high expectations about the role of
such participatory projects not only for Phnom Penh, but for other cities in the country as well.
Thus the next logical step was to devise a strategy that would scale up the impact of community
projects and strengthen their achievements, supporting local actors to make the best use of their
individual capacities for poverty reduction and of the synergies developed between them.
After taking stock of lessons from its first phase, the Project helped prepare just such a strategy.
From participatory studies in poor communities, it produced a strategic plan to further support
community initiatives (see Fonseka & Mani, 1998) and a baseline poverty analysis to measure
future achievements (see Fallavier, 1999; Squatter and Urban Poor Federation, 1999). It then ran
a citywide consultation with community representatives, CSOs, aid agencies, and the MPP on
how to integrate the aspirations of the poor into a municipal development plan (see Yap, 1999a).
The consultation made clear that long-term improvement could only happen in a supportive envi-
ronment. The inhabitants of informal settlements needed to be recognized as having the same
rights as other citizens, starting with the right to obtain connections to public utilities and access
to free public services. Even then they would only invest in improving their houses and settle-
ments if (i) they received some security of tenure over their land or dwelling, (ii) they received
technical support in construction, and (iii) the legal, procedural, and practical barriers to in situ
upgrading were removed.
In terms of process, for success to be replicable, communities, municipal authorities, and CSOs
had to create partnerships based on mutual-respect. That is, the MPP had to delegate some au-
thority by entrusting communities to partly decide how they would upgrade their settlements in
consultation with the lowest level of government, i.e., the Sangkat. Reciprocally, communities
had to be ready to plan for alternatives to full land ownership and to in situ upgrading if the mu-
nicipality needed to redevelop the land they occupied for the public good (see Slingsby, 2000).
4.2 Phase Two: Transforming pilot activities into a citywide strategy (2000-2004)
4.2.1 Policy framework: The Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy
Based on these dialogues, findings, and recommendations, a few months prior to the completion
of the Project's first phase, UN-Habitat and UNDP helped the Municipality prepare an Urban
Poverty Reduction Strategy that provided policy guidelines for the MPP and for external aid
agencies to support the urban poor in a coordinated manner (see Yap, 1999b). It gave three main
objectives to reduce poverty:
- First, to improve the living conditions of the urban poor by helping them access affordable
land and housing, by extending the delivery of physical infrastructure and social services,
and by helping them prevent and manage disasters such as fires or floods;
- Second, to enhance the economic potentials of poor communities by providing them access
to education, vocational training, business skills, microfinance, and industrial employment;
- Third, to strengthen participatory urban governance by further training communities to
collective action by setting up joint mechanisms between local authorities, communities, civil
society, and aid agencies to coordinate local development; by creating pro-poor land and
housing policies; by simplifying local government procedures; and by eliminating corruption.
4.2.2 Implementation mechanism: the Phnom Penh Urban Poverty Reduction Project
To implement the UPRS, DFID funded a second phase of the UN-Habitat Project, now called
Phnom Penh Urban Poverty Reduction Project (PPUPRP). In the new Project, UN-Habitat
would continue to support community-based upgrading activities by providing funds and training
to CSOs, but its main role would be to train local authorities in adopting low-cost, pro-poor ur-
ban development policies, in answering basic needs, in promoting economic development, and in
reaching the poorest with adapted social services. It would also strengthen ties between the MPP,
community organizations, other technical cooperation projects, and civil society networks. 25
4.2.3 Necessary institutional changes: decentralizing power and monitoring actions
The pilot phase of the Project had directly supported the urban poor while demonstrating to the
Municipality the value of participatory upgrading. It had not tried to modify the way the MPP
was organized or run. To adopt its participatory approach to upgrading on a larger scale, it was
nevertheless necessary to make significant changes to that centrally-controlled organization.
a. Institutional constraints: Limited capacities of the MPP
By 1999, the MPP had a very limited workforce with scarce skills and little autonomy to plan
and finance its activities. It was located under the Ministry of Interior, which oversaw local au-
thorities, and from whom its budget was fully dependent. The Governor and five Vice-Governors
shared authority with national line ministries over municipal departments that remained under
25 Information in this section came in large part from primary data I collected for the Project. I also use information
from publications by the main CSOs working in Phnom Penh at the time: the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights
(2000; 2001; 2002) and the Urban Resource Centre (2000; 2001). Some elements on the organization of the MPP
come from Wakely (2001) and explanations of the relations between the actors from discussions with, and docu-
ments by, the project's Senior Technical Adviser (Swan, 2001, 2003). Information on the UPRS design and of the
Habitat project are from Yap (1999b), Slingsby (2000), Sharma (1999), and interviews with the different actors.
these ministries' control for budgeting and staffing. Accordingly, many decisions were made
outside the Municipality and its autonomy depended on the relations between the vice-governors
and their ministerial counterparts. The only department the MPP could establish and control was
its Cabinet, managing local authorities mostly for administrative matters (Slingsby, 2000).
Although the MPP officially gained financial autonomy in 1998, its budget was constrained by a
national law predefining all lines. The Ministry of Interior had to approve the budget and the Na-
tional Assembly had to ratify it. Besides, the city had little power or incentive to raise its own
revenue: it could not borrow, and even if it collected taxes (e.g., on vacant land or property trans-
fer) and income from public utilities, it had to transfer all collections to the Ministry of Economy
and Finance. All 11,000 technical agents working for the MPP were detached from line minis-
tries, of which 7,500 were employed by the education department. Only 240 (for a population of
one million) were engineers or technical staff employed in the Departments of Public Works,
Environment, Urbanization and Construction, and the Cadastre (Sharma, 1999; Wakely, 2001).
Few of the municipal employees came to work on a daily basis. Their extremely low salaries
($20 to $30 per month while $250 was the minimum needed for an average urban family) forced
them to hold other jobs. Their actual roles at the Municipality were therefore mainly to extend
"favors" by stamping official documents and authorization against informal fees. In fact, at all
levels, "selling" free public services-and at times public goods, including land-was the main
occupation of most municipal workers. Occasionally, they would also be employed as token con-
sultants by aid agencies that needed official connections with the Municipality.
The MPP was a small and relatively inactive organization compared to the city's population and
needs. It included the Governor, the Vice-Governors, their personal staff and that of the Cabinet,
who were mainly support personnel with little technical expertise. As mentioned earlier, the city
was administratively divided into seven Khans and further subdivided into 76 Sangkats. Local
authorities at these levels were under the authority of the Governor, but the police represented a
parallel structure of power under the direct authority of the Ministry of Interior. The Governor
could therefore exercise little control over them.
b. Proposed institutional changes toward power-sharing
For the Project to reach its objectives, a major change was necessary in the governance structure
of the MPP, which implied decentralizing some decision-making to local authorities and to
communities. This was in line with a national policy of decentralized planning implemented
across the country by the SEILA program, a UNDP-led experiment in which aid agencies coordi-
nated their support for the decentralized planning of local projects to reduce poverty and to pro-
mote peace (see http://www.seila.gov.kh/). Promoting decentralization in Phnom Penh would
further anticipate the 2002 local elections where, for the first time, Sangkat authorities were to be
directly elected by the people living in their constituencies.
The project was to launch these efforts of decentralization first by setting up permanent channels
of communication between the different levels of municipal authority, the communities, CSOs,
and external donors. These channels would enable the exchange of information about policies,
projects, and their advancement, and they would be part of a system to hold actors accountable
for their work in front of donors and beneficiaries.
The components of this coordination mechanism were at three levels:
1. The first level would be in the informal settlements. There, CBOs would prepare Community-
Action Plans (CAPs) to articulate what residents wanted to improve in their communities and
how. They would bring proposals for physical upgrading or social and economic develop-
ment activities to the Community Relations Sections (CRS) of the second level, the Khan.
2. At the Khan level, CRSs would be new units created to inform and assist poor households
and community representatives about the resources and services available to them through
the Project. They would also serve as monitoring and information links between municipal
layers, CSOs, and citywide programs in health, education, and human rights. They would
help coordinate the training of CBOs to prepare CAPs, and help Khans develop procedures
and regulations to support the development of communities.
Still at the Khan, Community Development Management Committees (CDMCs), composed of
representatives from CSOs and Khans, would meet regularly to review the CAPs, to priori-
tize the activities proposed, to match the selected projects with support available from do-
nors, the MPP or CSOs, and to ensure the coordination of activities in each Khan. They
would also collect data on the evolution of activities and of their impacts on living condi-
tions.
The CDMCs in the seven Khans would in turn collate and exchange that information with the
new Urban Poverty Reduction Unit (UPRU), centrally located at the Municipality.
3. At the third and highest level of the city government, the UPRU was to coordinate activities,
ensuring that they fit the municipal development agenda, and to adapt that agenda if needed.
It was to be a policy and planning bureau to monitor the evolution of poverty trends, to pre-
pare pro-poor policies as part of the city's development plans, and to coordinate donor inter-
vention. It would operate on a part-time basis, led by the MPP Chief of Cabinet supported by
five technical staff, all trained to the roles of participation in urban poverty reduction.
With the Project's support, the UPRU would create a regulatory environment to facilitate up-
grading activities. This would include policies on land regularization to provide different
types of tenure to low-income dwellers; on relocation to ensure that the best practices docu-
mented were used; and on low-income housing. The UPRU would further be in charge of re-
viewing the policies, laws, regulations, and practices that blocked access of the urban poor to
basic services, and of ensuring that their needs were factored into the city's physical, indus-
trial, and commercial development plans.
A UN-Habitat Project team of technical assistants (chief advisor, engineers, community devel-
opment, communication, and monitoring and evaluation specialists) would help plan and imple-
ment the activities decided by the UPRU. It would be located within the UPRU to which it would
gradually transfer all necessary capacities for the UPRU to later function autonomously.
In such approach, "participation" was supposed to evolve from mainly using the organizational
skills, workforce, and savings of community dwellers (in the pilot phase) into involving them as
full actors of local policymaking. Communities would produce the larger part of their own de-
velopment plans, which would be coordinated at the Khan level, and would be interactively con-
solidated into municipal-level development plans. Most financial and technical support would
originally come from international aid agencies and NGOs, possibly complemented by capital
from the private investors seeking to develop the land upon which communities lived.
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Figure 4-1: Implementation mechanisms of the Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy
MPP CABINET
Urban Poverty Reduction Unit
Coordinates aid, monitors poverty,
develops policies citywide.
PROJECT
UN-Habitat provides technical support
DFID funds, UNDP administers.
I
COMMUNITY 1
CBO prepares Community Action Plan
Community plans, implements, and monitors
COMMUNITY 2...x
CBO prepares Community Action Plan
Community plans, implements, and monitors
Note: in the initial design, there was no role for Sangkat authorities who-in practice-were merely under-staffed
administrative offices and did not have clear legal responsibilities.
To accompany this decentralization of power, the Project team was to provide the MPP and
CSOs with formal and on-the-job training, and to organize domestic and international awareness
trips and exchanges for communities, CSOs, and government officials.
In communities, through the Project's support, NGOs would further inform people of their rights
to services, help them organize for collective action, and train them to plan and implement activi-
ties for physical, economic, and social development. UN-Habitat would then train NGOs in par-
ticipatory monitoring and evaluation, and in improving coordination with other aid agencies.
At the level of local authorities, the Project would provide technical and managerial training for
participatory upgrading to Khan officials. To coordinate their efforts, it would place one Cambo-
dian United Nations Volunteer (UNV) in each Khan to help set up and manage the CDMCs for
the first two years, and to help collect and organize data from the participatory monitoring and
evaluation of activities. At the UPRU, it would train officials to plan and manage poverty reduc-
tion policies integrated in the larger city development strategies.
The approach counted on a phased intervention and on the gradual demonstration of what
worked to attract followers. It would first organize a few Khans to test and refine its support
mechanism, then slowly extend the approach to the remaining parts of the city. It was to adopt a
similar gradual approach to demonstrate the value of collective action to communities and the
possibility of working with the Municipality.
c. Interactive policy-making: Monitoring the processes and impacts of the UPRS
An important component of the second phase was also to measure the impact of its activities in
real-time and to adapt the municipal policy directions accordingly. From its beginning, the Pro-
ject started Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) of its activities and their impacts.
The PME aimed to provide feedback to all stakeholders on the implementation of activities and
on their achievement in terms of poverty reduction so as to feed the discussion on which ones to
improve or promote. Its participatory component was to help give a voice to community mem-
bers in the assessment of these activities and in the policymaking process.
With a team from local NGOs, I ran the PME. We conducted qualitative and quantitative base-
line studies in poor settlements, followed the fate of communities, and documented most of what
is presented herein. In the introduction, Table 1-1 (p.29) presented the detailed indicators we
regularly collected at the community-level, organized in seven categories (A. Background data;
B. Organization, participation, and sense of community; C. Socioeconomic development; D.
Housing; E. Infrastructure; F. Transportation; and G. Environmental management). Table 4-1
links these indicators to the three specific objectives of the UPRS and of the Project's second
phase.
Table 4-1: Measuring progress in reaching UPRS objectives
PROJECT
OBJECTIVES
ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS
1. Improve access
to basic services
PME indicators
measuring progress
Indicator Dl to D3,
El to E4, Cl to C6
El to E4, Fl to F3
Micro-level objectives
in settlements
Secure affordable land in suitable locations
- Develop physical infrastructure with water supply,
drainage, roads, sanitation, electricity, transport, and
solid waste collection
D1 to D3, C1I
El to E4, G3
CI to C6
C1 to C3
to C6 - Develop social services with affordable housing,
education, health care, and family planning
- Improve disaster management (fire/floods)
- Promote the provision of basic education and voca-
tional training, credit and saving schemes, and indus-
trial employment
- Facilitate the dissemination of marketing information
C1 to C3 - Create space for small businesses
3. Strengthen local B1 to B4 - Improve community organization and leadership
governance B1, B2 - Develop Community Development Management
Committees
D2, D3 - Draft Land and Housing policies to secure tenure for
the urban poor
B3, B4 - Reduce corruption
Framework developed by the author in 2000, based on initial 1999 baseline study and UPRS objectives
2. Enhance income
generation
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4.2.4 Implementing Phase Two: when action redesigned policies
a. UN disputes delay Project's start
Following the completion of the pilot phase in 1999, the intention of its Chief Technical Adviser
(CTA) was to rapidly support new community organization and upgrading activities in a large
number of settlements to use the momentum of good relations built earlier with the MPP.
Yet, dissentions between DFID, UN-Habitat, and UNDP delayed the start of the second phase by
a year. As part of its national support to decentralization, UNDP wanted the new phase to be run
solely by the MPP staff of the UPRU, with no foreign advisor. It therefore did not extend the
contract of the CTA who had led the pilot phase. DFID and UN-Habitat countered that autonomy
could only be gradually transferred to the MPP, given its lack of skilled staff, the widespread
corruption in its administration, and the constant pressure from high level politicians to clear the
city of its poor. They favored external supervision by a respected international adviser.
After a long standoff, during which the pilot phase was extended but could not fund activities,
UNDP agreed to the views of DFID and UN-Habitat's regarding the recruitment of a Senior
Technical Adviser (STA) who would guide the new phase for its first 18 months and gradually
transfer authority to the UPRU. The Project team was then organized into two distinct groups:
the UPRU of five MPP staff led by the Chief of Cabinet as a Project Director, and the UN-
Habitat team of ten non-MPP local advisers, paid by UN-Habitat and supervised by the STA.
The Project was launched in early 2001, and effectively started when its STA arrived in March.
Its focus was yet soon to be redefined away from its initial intentions when a series of disasters
forced its team to react to emergency needs instead of supporting long-term development plans.
b. "Accidents" redirect poverty reduction activities
A first fire caught in May 2001 in the Tonle Basac, one of the city's major squatter settlements
along the riverside. Overnight, it devastated the homes and livelihoods of over 600 families.
The morning after the blaze, in a surprisingly prompt reaction given its usual apathy, the Mu-
nicipality was ready to act. The Governor had decided to relocate all fire victims to a resettle-
ment site 17 km from the city, where each family would be given a plot of land and the basic
necessities to start a new life.
However, he decided to relocate only "legally recognized" victims, i.e., house-owners registered
with local authorities. This was an oxymoron given that all inhabitants were considered illegal
squatters. In practice, the only "registered" families were these who paid regular bribes to the
Sangkat and the police for "protection" in a district famed for one of the highest level of corrup-
tion in the city. In addition-on no specific legal or regulatory basis-the Governor specifically
excluded "renters, prostitutes, and Vietnamese" from eligibility.
Going against the good practices that the MPP had agreed to with regard to relocation guidelines
that it had adopted during the pilot phase in 1999, the MPP then blocked humanitarian aid agen-
cies from delivering any relief supplies to the site of the fire. Instead, it only allowed them to in-
tervene at the resettlement site, where it trucked the families in haste. However, that relocation
area was a rice field far from the city with no access to roads, no school or health post, and no
water or electricity supply. In the opinion of everyone we talked to-including municipal offi-
cials-the land was clearly unfit to live on.
U - - ___________________________________________________
Despite their unwillingness to endorse the MPP's use of emergency relocation, as they favored
helping families to rebuild their community in the Tonle Basac itself instead, aid organizations
led by UN-Habitat felt they had no choice but to follow and support fire victims at the new site.
The families first moved in with the few belongings they could salvage and stayed under plastic
sheeting, in conditions similar to these of emergency refugee camps. In the subsequent weeks,
they received wooden poles and zinc sheets; tools and technical advice to improve the settle-
ment; water; and emergency food provided by UN agencies and NGOs.
Figure 4-2: Emergency relocation after fire (2001)
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Although the Municipality officially declared this fire an accident, we documented it-along
with several following ones-as a deliberate act by the authorities (see Fallavier et al., 2001c,
2002c). Most notably, the fire happened on a Friday evening, just after UN offices, newspapers,
and NGOs had closed for the weekend and would be unlikely to witness the events. It was set by
people from outside the settlements, and although the fire brigade was present during the blaze,
they did not deploy much effort, and even refused payments offered by some nearby shopkeepers
to save their businesses. It was a way to clear a slum, while intimidating other squatters in the
city, so they would choose to "voluntarily" leave areas that the Municipality wanted to develop.
In November 2001, two new fires then occurred: one in the Tonle Basac again and the other in
Chba Ampov, rendering another 3,100 households homeless. As with the earlier fire, the MPP
quickly moved the victims off-site to rice fields and aid agencies scrambled to support a process
for which they were not prepared.
Box 4-1: Views from fire victims in the Basac (2001)
The November 2001fire that swept through Tonle Basac affected 13 communities, destroying 1,853 shel-
ters in which over 2,140 families lived. Six children and an elderly man died in the blaze.
Survivors were shocked by the brutality, but few were surprised that it happened. For years, the munici-
pality had wanted to reclaim the land they lived on and develop the area for tourism. Residents we inter-
viewed said that after the municipality promised it would not conduct anymore evictions, "disasters" had
become a convenient way to remove unwanted communities. They therefore thought that the fire had
been intentionally set on behalf of the authorities to disguise the evictions. Numerous witnesses said that
the fire started in several places in the same time, strengthening their view that it was not an accident.
Just after the fire, a 60 year-old man stated: "There was no justicefor the victims of thefire. Twofire
trucks came, but they did not do anything to stop the fire from spreading before it was too late. Why did
they come? They could have stopped the flames, especially for houses near by the road, but they refused
to help those would tried to fight the fire with their neighbors."
Later, a woman at the Anlong Kngan resettlement site said: "We knewfor long than the government
wanted us to move away from the Basac. We had even started to plan for a voluntary relocation and went
to several places around the city to find a good spot. But this fire and the relocation were nothing volun-
tary. Only the families who could afford to bribe the authorities received some support. The others did not
get anything, and the municipality prevented organizations [the UN and NGOs] from distributing aid in
the Tonle Basac. We were told we would only receive food and support if we moved to the new site. This
was an eviction, and community leaders supported the authorities more than their community members."
(Observations and interviews by the author)
c. Provoked disasters as a de facto strategy
The MPP had earlier promised that there would not be any more evictions; that inhabitants of
informal settlements would not be displaced without their consent; and that any resettlement
would be conducted in accordance with agreed best practices. However, using fires as a pretext,
rapid relocations were conducted en masse, disregarding agreements inscribed in the UPRS and
municipal relocation guidelines. The land summarily cleared was sold to private developers or
transformed in public gardens, through a process in which local inhabitants had no voice.
Though the wave of fires stopped after a year and a half, many communities were further pressed
into relocating overnight to unprepared sites in the far outskirts of Phnom Penh. To achieve their
ends, local authorities used numerous strategies: They would, for instance, offer several plots on
relocation sites to community leaders who could convince community residents to relocate "vol-
untarily." To break up cohesiveness, they would bypass CBOs and bargain individually with
families, telling them that others had already accepted individual deals. They would even send
monks to convince people that "good Buddhists" should not oppose men higher up in the social
hierarchy. Soon, faced with violence and intimidation from the municipality, both communities
and CSOs felt that they could not resist the push and had little choice but to accept relocations,
even if it meant agreeing to the municipality's breach of its earlier agreements. This of course
weakened the self-confidence of communities', their trust in the power of collective action, and
their belief in benevolent external support that had taken so long to build during the 1990s.
Pressed by the emergency accommodation of victims, the Project itself could at first do little
more than catch up with the MPP while it multiplied resettlements. The Project put its full efforts
into ensuring that relocated families could access basic shelter and-over time-infrastructure
and services. To achieve this, its STA had to raise funds to cover the costs that the Project could
not pay for, as it had limited budget for emergency work. Its team then concentrated on manag-
ing relocation processes plagued by corruption in the most humane way. During this time, many
new, non-urban NGOs intervened with little regard for synergies and for long term impacts.
Following these events, the focus of the Project's activities shifted from an initial approach of
bottom-up, collaborative community empowerment to the accommodation of disaster victims on
a massive scale. Thousands of families needed to be housed, fed, and protected; new settlements
needed to be built from scratch on mostly unviable ground, with limited resources and time. In
this process, communities, CSOs, and aid agencies scrambled to help out. Initially, the shelters
they helped people build had no walls, and no access to water or sanitation. But with time it was
expected that people could improve these shelters into houses. Over the following months (and
eventually years), UN agencies and CSOs helped improve street layouts, provide access to water
and sanitation, and develop local schools, health posts, and basic markets.
The Project's initial goals were completely usurped by the need to respond to these "emergen-
cies." The rapid accommodation of thousands of families on floodable land without access to
shelter, water, sanitation, food, or nearby job opportunities was the very opposite of the models
of gradual participatory development that were the bases of the UPRS. The emergency process
was fraught with irregularities (see Box 4-2) and rendered families dependent on the MPP..
Box 4-2: Resettling fire victims: a fruitful business opportunity
Relocating "victims" of fire was not just a way to clear the slums. It was a source of revenue for all levels
of municipal officials. In Sangkats and Khans, officials were to draw the lists of the residents allowed to
resettle after the blazes. Given the lack of census in the informal settlements, it was easy enough to make
up lists that excluded some-who could not pay the bribes necessary to get their names on the lists-
while including others-who paid their ways onto the lists or were designated by the Municipality.
Proceeds would then be redistributed among local authorities, ensuring a widespread support of the proc-
ess. The higher levels of decision makers at the MPP could share the gains from the sale of the public
land cleared by the fires, while obtaining political mileage from the urban middle class for cleaning up the
areas. All authorities would later have ample opportunity to further gain during the distribution of hu-
manitarian aid and the construction of the infrastructure on the resettlement sites. Portions of the aid
would be diverted, and rather than providing employment to the people resettled and paying them to build
the infrastructure, work would go to private contractors closely associated with some municipal officials.
d. Putting an end to the fires
A tipping point that restored some sense to the initial UPRS occurred in the wake of what turned
out to be the final fire. This blaze destroyed one of the oldest informal settlements, Block Tampa,
a community of two hundred families that had developed over twenty years on the rooftops of a
block of apartment buildings. In March 2002, the Governor visited Hem Cheat, a small rooftop
settlement which the Project had helped upgrade in addition to its activities on relocation sites.
While, in terms of the official UPRS, the upgrading was a symbol of the successful low-cost im-
provement of living conditions-and even though this project had been approved by the
UPRU-the Governor was irate over it. He had thought that the fires were sufficient warning to
aid agencies that they were to follow the MPP's drive to relocate all informal communities out-
side Phnom Penh, not to entice them to stay in the city.
The day after that visit, Block Tampa burned to the ground under the watchful eye of the munici-
pal fire brigade, which only intervened to cool off the ashes. The origin of the fire was no secret:
one of the vice-governors acknowledged on the spot that this was not an accident (via personal
conversation with the author). The Governor intended this to be a last warning to pro-squatter aid
agencies that he would not accept any squatter area to be further upgraded.
Then the strong leaders of Block Tampa-supported by an unprecedented campaign to rally the
press and human rights activists-refused to move to the MIPP-designated relocation site. The
Project's STA then convinced the Governor that it would be politically disastrous to displace still
more people while evidence mounted regarding the inadequacy of the resettlements, and that it
was time to find alternative solutions.26 The victims were then temporarily accommodated in the
streets near their former community, and then a planned relocation process started, in which a
proper site was selected and prepared. From then on, the MPP put the "accidental fires" on hold
and even considered alternatives to mass relocations, for instance, discussing the creation of low-
income housing schemes as part of larger commercial development projects.
By October 2002 though, less than two years into the Project, an estimated 6,300 families
(36,500 persons) had been forcibly relocated after fires, while only 221 families were resettled
following principles agreed for voluntary relocation. Relocating fire victims had become the
main activity of most agencies working with the urban poor, and in situ upgrading had been
minimal. The training of municipal officials had been mostly led by on-the-job training to handle
relocation management, but little had been done in terms of participatory planning.
Table 4-2: Main characteristics of resettlement sites around Phnom Penh (end 2003)
# on map Name Emergency Khan Distance to PP (km) # of families % of total
I Veng Sreng No Mean Chey 9 128 1.7%
2 Tuol Sambo No Dangkor 25 211 2.8%
3 Ko Kleang 1 No Russey Keo 9 111 1.5%
4 Ko Kleang 2 No Russey Keo 9 98 1.3%
5 Tuol Rokakos No Dangkor 12 488 6.5%
6 Samaki 1 Yes Dangkor 17 249 3.3%
7 Samaki 2 Yes Dangkor 17 291 3.9%
8 Samaki 3 Yes Dangkor 17 253 3.4%
9 Samaki 4 Yes Dangkor 16 297 3.9%
10 Samaki 5 Yes Dangkor 17 165 2.2%
11 Samaki 6 Yes Dangkor 17 133 1.8%
12 Anlong Kngan Yes Russey Keo 20 3,631 48.1%
13 Kraing Angkrang 1 Yes Dangkor 9 88 1.2%
14 Kraing Angkrang 2 Yes Dangkor 11 298 4.0%
15 Anlong Khong Yes Dangkor 17 432 5.7%16 Lor Kambor Yes Russey Keo 12 134 1.8%
17 Anlong Kngan Tauch Yes Russey Keo 20 329 4.4%
18 KopSreou Thom No Dangkor 20 100 1.3%
19 Boeng Tompun No Mean Chey 4 111 1.5%
7,547 100.0%
Families relocated in emergency 6,300 83.5%
Source: author's own investigations, detailed in (Fallavier et al., 2001c, 2002a, 2002c, 2002d, 2003).
26 UN-Habitat and CSOs had long demonstrated how relocations did not serve the urban poor and pointed out that
reconstruction could be conducted on the original sites of the fires. The PME extensively documented the inequita-
ble process of resettlement, in which many victims were never compensated; the corruption in the distribution of aid,
which was rampant; the inability for most to improve their living conditions after an emergency resettlement; and, in
contrast, the slow process by which some voluntary resettlements were successful in improving living conditions.
Figure 4-3: Location of resettlement sites as of October 2002
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Accommodating thousands of families on initially unviable plots far from public infrastructure
took the full attention of UN-Habitat and most CSOs from 2001 to 2003. They were cornered
into responding to created "emergencies" in which it was extremely difficult to implement the
good practices of transparency and participation previously agreed upon or to follow any sound
practices of resettlement. In so doing, the tension between the municipality, UN-Habitat, and
civil society increased, as the latter two felt manipulated. They were handed displaced residents,
after the repeated torching of slums by the Municipality, disguised in accidents. They were mor-
ally obligated to respond to the needs of people, but could not do this without playing the game
of the MPP, ultimately discrediting their earlier work on giving a voice to the poor. Supporting
the MPP meant accepting the "treatment" of poverty through summary slum clearance.
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The UN-Habitat team took two approaches to stop the clearance of slums. First, they expressed
concern in the media about the human rights abuses of not letting victims stay in the city to re-
cover after the traumas they had endured. Second, they demonstrated-by documenting the evo-
lution of their living conditions-that the lives of the families were worse at the unplanned and
un-serviced sites, and that many of the aid beneficiaries were not on the initial list of victims. It
then became publicly known that many families were dumped onto unviable sites and that some
waited for months before they could obtain a plot, while parcels were sold by local officials to
newcomers who were not entitled to them. DFID added to the pressure by threatening to with-
draw its financial support if the MPP continued using such disguised eviction practices. They
also helped to raise the level of scrutiny from human rights agencies in Cambodia and abroad.
After the fire of Block Tampa, the Project regained some of its original direction, and could refo-
cus on some in situ development work. Though the municipality would continue to exert strong
pressure until 2004 on poor communities to "voluntary" relocate, it stopped the arson. Neverthe-
less, its relations with the Project had greatly deteriorated. The MPP viewed that the UN-Habitat
team was to serve the Governor's directions and it wanted to use the Project's funds to build in-
frastructure on the relocation sites. It was not keen on considering the concerns of the STA,
whom it saw as unjustified human-right activism in favor of second rate citizens.
Box 4-3: UNDP's administrative response to human rights issues
It was only long after the repeated arson of slums, and once news of the brutality and corruption of the
forced relocations reached the public, that UNDP stepped in to acknowledge the issues. Yet, it did so in a
way that did not help restart a constructive dialogue with the MPP.
At a July 2002 meeting to find solutions to outstanding problems, UNDP's Resident Representative gave
a speech that antagonized the MPP in front of an assembly of municipal officials, community representa-
tives, and NGOs. Picking on the evidence collected that the massive relocations had hijacked the Project's
intentions and had not served its aims of poverty reduction, then noting many irregularities of procure-
ment in the resettlement process, she mentioned that UNDP would not authorize any more expense for
infrastructure on relocation sites. She further emphasized the need to better train municipal authorities and
went on to challenge the legality of the CDMCs, insisting that following the recent local elections, the
Project should refrain from working through CDMCs and instead use the newly elected Sangkat councils.
Her strongly worded position was an insult to the Governor, who responded by closing the meeting and
forfeiting the chance for constructive discussion on how to improve some of the many problems the Pro-
ject faced. This marked the divorce between the MPP and UNDP, each representing two extremes of poli-
cymaking: the use of raw force vs. that of a formal bureaucratic understanding of the policy process.
After that strong clash, to avoid further direct confrontation with the government, UNDP returned to fo-
cus merely on procedural matters in its relation with the Project. It put more emphasis on following the
initial project document than on responding to the political realities of working in a confrontational and
unpredictable environment. It then became obsessed with internal matters, measuring the relevance of
work not by the impacts it had, but rather by how results could be perceived in its New York headquar-
ters. National Execution, and the delivery of the initial plan's exact output were more important than the
long-term impact such delivery might have. To keep itself from supporting any further wrongdoing by the
MPP, UINDP used its power of pre-authorizing the Project's work-plans and expenses to delay all work
that might depart from the initial project document. The UPRU team would have to present many ver-
sions of their work-plans before getting them approved, while UNDP administrators would never be
"convinced" of the appropriateness of tasks and budgets proposed and reviewed by the STA.
This caused further tensions within the Project. The UPRU perceived UN-Habitat as unresponsive to its
needs for capacity building and infrastructure delivery and UNDP as unstable and overly bureaucratic.
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e. Moving away from project toward policy support
In this context, by the end of 2002 a mid-term review assessed the Project's achievements to re-
direct its second half. The review decided to ignore the causes of the fires, but pointed out that in
order to have any influence on long term policies, the Project should redirect its efforts from mi-
cro-level upgrading and relocation activities in settlements to a higher level of policymaking.
Despite disagreements between UN agencies and the MPP about the amount of concrete realiza-
tions vs. policy support that the Project should concentrate on (the MPP wanted more funding for
infrastructure on resettlements), the Project was extended until mid 2004, amended to put more
emphasis on policy work. This redirected its focus away from the delivery of concrete realiza-
tions back toward the training and institutional development of the UPRU, of local authorities,
and key CSOs, and toward the support of the MPP to draft pro-poor urban development policies.
In line with its original schedule, as part of the transfer of capacities to local decision-makers, the
Project was then supposed to change from a status of Direct Execution in which UNDP/UN-
Habitat had controlled the allocation of funds, to one of National Execution (NEX) in which the
MPP would be in charge of all resources. The STA would remain to advise the UPRU on poli-
cies, but operational and financial decisions were to be made by the national Project Director,
who was the MPP's Chief of Cabinet. Faced with the marked weaknesses of the UPRU to follow
any agreed policy or procedures, however, UNDP decided to adopt a "reduced" version of NEX,
by which it would keep control over the budget through approving most spending ex-ante. This
meant that the UPRU would propose work plans and their budgets to UNDP, which would have
to approve them ahead of time. UNDP would only pay after expenses were incurred, provided
the UPRU followed all UN procurement and administrative regulations.
This shift away from conducting concrete upgrading projects was not without a cost. Given the
limited upgrading component, it would strip the project of its "learning by doing" approach,
which had thus far proven to be more efficient in building good-will partnerships than the mere
reorganization of procedures, which the MPP never had much regard for anyway.
Starting in early 2003, the Project team then devoted more time to training municipal officials on
participatory poverty reduction approaches and less on supervising the realization of upgrading
activities or the development of resettlement sites, leaving the latter to local authorities and
CSOs. It trained MPP staff to understand and design alternatives to relocation, for instance ex-
ploring measure to absorb households in the immediate areas of their current settlements through
"land sharing." (A system ACHR was trying to promote by which investors buy public land at a
low price, develop low-cost housing on part of it to accommodate the squatters they displace,
and develop the second part for commercial use.) It also sent members of the UPRU to interna-
tional meetings on urban poverty and development and helped disseminate the guidelines previ-
ously prepared on voluntary relocation and on operating CDMCs to local authorities.
Community-level activities were now run by local CSOs. The Project supported them to conduct
advocacy work and help communities plan ahead of possible relocations linked to the develop-
ment of municipal infrastructure or to the sale of public land to developers. Communities would
look for suitable land located near access to services and to employment opportunities. With
support from ACHR and UPDF, they would try to develop funding mechanisms that used local
savings, housing loans, and the participation of private investors to fund the relocation. During
the Project's last year, some in situ upgrading was then undertaken on a small scale in the city
and activities for livelihood promotion were developed in the settlements least prone to eviction.
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f A disappointing conclusion in a volatile environment
In January 2003, political turbulence yet again modified the environment in which the Project
operated. Violent riots resulted in the partial destruction of the Thai Embassy and of Thai-owned
companies in Phnom Penh. Unable to control the rampage that led to serious diplomatic tensions
with Thailand, the Governor was sacked. The new Governor, although more interested in pro-
poor urban development, lacked the acumen to control the increasingly opportunistic behavior of
the MPP staff. For them, the arrival of investors in the city, the passing of a new Land Law, the
beginning of several large-scale infrastructure projects, and the continuing relocation of poor
families provided numerous opportunities for land speculation and rent-seeking. The new Gov-
ernor did not either have strong links to the police, who periodically evicted communities for the
benefit of private investors without the municipality's knowledge.
In its last year, an administrative constraint further diverted the Project from its goals of promot-
ing community-led activities and a governance system based on shared power and accountabil-
ity. It was the need to quickly disburse its remaining budget. Since little upgrading had been
undertaken, and relocation work had been paid mainly with funds raised specifically for emer-
gency relief, about half of the Project's initial budget had not been spent. Being unable to spend
aid money in a country much in need of resources was an embarrassment for UNDP. As for the
MPP, this meant foregone revenue from informal commissions on these activities. Both the MPP
and UNDP therefore wanted a clean slate with a budget fully expended.
To that end, it was in the best immediate interests of both organizations to minimize any over-
sight of how the funds would be spent. By mid-2004 then, against DFID and UN-Habitat advice,
UNDP decided to fully transfer responsibilities to the UPRU while extending the Project by an-
other six months. It therefore did not extend the STA's contract and the last six months of the
Project were conducted without external oversight. Officially, the MPP had received all neces-
sary training on how to undertake activities in terms of technical, financial, and managerial pro-
cedures. Though the STA had left, some Cambodian technical assistants, paid by UN-Habitat,
were to remain with the UPRU to provide support when needed until the end of the project.
Because of the urge to disburse and their increased control over the budget, the UPRU then im-
plemented many physical improvement activities on resettlement sites and some small-scale up-
grading works in the city with little regard for agreed procedures. The UPRU national Director
(who was also Chief of Cabinet) placed a close relative in charge of the Project's accounting and
some UN-Habitat technical assistants resigned when asked to follow the MPP's way of manag-
ing the Project. Conveniently, the bookkeeping for that period was kept extremely confused, but
all activities were budgeted with much higher unit costs than any time before. Several scandals
arose regarding the misallocation of funds, and one of the main NGOs supporting the urban poor
was closed for allegedly embezzling funds (though it later surfaced that the wrongdoing came
from the UPRU side). In fact, six months after the end of the Project, UN-Habitat could still not
obtain a clear picture of its remaining funds, with possibly as much as E200,000 (15% of its ini-
tial budget) being unaccounted for. (Source: author's own investigation and communications
with UNDP, DFID, and the Project.)
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4.3 Nine years of learning-by-doing: progress and lessons
The Project's second phase had aimed to scale-up access to basic services, to improve economic
opportunities in poor communities, and to develop a system of participatory governance involv-
ing beneficiaries, CSOs, local authorities, and the MPP. After four years of implementation, what
did it achieve? To what extent did it build upon lessons from the previous phase?
It had indeed trained and advised the MPP, communities, and CSOs on technical approaches,
long-term policies, and synergies they could develop. It also funded activities for housing im-
provement and local economic development. The in situ upgrading of informal settlements had
nevertheless been minimal and most activities were conducted on relocation sites. This section
summarizes the Project's impacts upon the three main initial objectives of the UPRS.
4.3.1 Objective One: Improving access to basic services
The Project aimed to improve living conditions by (i) securing land in suitable locations; (ii) de-
veloping infrastructure; (iii) developing social services; and (iv) improving disaster management.
(i) Securing affordable land in suitable locations. Most families living in the settlements we
studied had come to Phnom Penh to find work and to provide an education to their children. To
them, a "suitable" location to live had to be close to employment opportunities and to schools.
Unfortunately, the relocation sites where they were displaced were all far from job opportunities
(i.e., the city center of factories). The largest settlement, Anlong Kngan, was 20 km from Phnom
Penh, and most other sites were located 12 to 20 km from the city centre (see Table 4-2 p.9 9 and
Figure 4-3 p.100). Their isolation prevented access to jobs and resulted in very high costs for the
families relocated. Our study at five sites showed that 65% of residents had to commute daily to
Phnom Penh to find work. Transportation took them an average of 85 minutes per day, and these
travel cost alone represented 27% of typical daily expenses for a single-income household, just
after food (47%), and before water (10%). Distance from the city centre also reduced access to
education. Many children had to drop out until primary schools were built and in operation on
the sites. And since there was no secondary school on or near the sites, older children either had
to find a place to stay in Phnom Penh or forgo further education.
27 Table 4-1 p. 94 presented the indicators we collected over time to measure progress. An extensive summary of
findings is presented in Table 6-2 p. 15 1. As mentioned earlier, we collected indicators consistent with these of the
1999 poverty analysis so as to observe change over time and to feed the policy dialogue. Quantitative data are based
on surveys conducted over 17 months after the beginning of the relocations. Although this is too short a time to fully
assess impacts on poverty, it is long enough to assess effects on the poorest, who had short-term planning horizons
because of immediate needs and had little capacity to absorb shocks. The statistical data come from two sources: (i)
an extensive socio-economic survey conducted with 140 households in five relocation sites three to eight months
after their creations and (ii) a shorter one conducted with 1,890 households in Anlong Kngan relocation site, seven
months after its creation. The population of Anlong Kngan represented 48.1% of all families resettled around Phnom
Penh. As most sites and relocation processes were relatively similar, we believe that the evidence from Anlong
Kngan apply to the majority of the other sites developed under emergency conditions. Qualitative observations are
drawn from the extensive set of data collected since July 2001 in 15 communities in Phnom Penh (we followed
many who were then resettled) and resettlement sites in the outskirts of the city. Our latest visits to the resettlement
sites were in 2007.
Primary data on governance collected at the settlement level concerned issues of community organization, cohesive-
ness, and corruption. On issues at the MPP level, we used our participant observation in the policy process, archives,
and correspondence between the Project and the MPP, as well as reports by Wakely (2001) and Sharma (1999).
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As a consequence, in Anlong Kngan, only 1,890 of the initial 3,631 families still lived on the site
seven months after its creation. Half had abandoned the plots, which they could not survive on.
And in fact, of the 1,800 remaining families, many were not the initial beneficiaries. They were
better-off households who had illegally purchased plots from their initial occupants.
(ii) Developing physical infrastructure: The relocation sites were originally rice fields i.e.,
flood areas with no road access, power, water, or drainage. The Project and other donors helped
provide basic infrastructure and in most cases, eight to twelve months after relocation, access to
services had improved for most families still on the sites. These services were often less devel-
oped and of a lower quality than in the original settlements in Phnom Penh. The initial lack of
services during the first few months particularly affected the poorest families. With much lower
income than in the city, the cost of water, electricity, and transportation represented a larger part
of their budget, which caused many to leave the sites and return to the city.
Water access. After three to eight months on the sites, half the households used less than 8.7 li-
ters of clean water per person per day.28 Obtaining quality ground water was not possible on
most sites and people had to buy bottled water at an average of 500 Riels per 25 liters. Because
of the high cost, many families used the non-potable ground water, which caused diarrhea and
skin rashes, the prevalent types of sicknesses on the sites.
Drainage and sewage. No emergency resettlement sites initially had drainage or sewage systems.
During rain seasons, most houses were flooded and many families left the sites. Remaining fami-
lies lived among sewage and floating garbage for three to five months.
Sanitation. Despite support by the Project to build shared latrines, a year after their moves on the
sites, more than half of residents still had no access to toilets. Along with the lack of waste man-
agement and drainage, this posed serious health hazards, especially after rains.
Road access. Over 80% of families living on the sites considered the roads unsafe, either because
of their poor quality (they were dirt tracks among rice paddies) or of the lack of lights that made
them unusable in the early morning or the evening when they needed to commute to the city.
Electricity. Only 43% of the shelters used electricity eight months after relocation (versus 80% in
Phnom Penh), purchased mostly from resellers who ran small generators. The average cost per
kilowatt was 1,400 Riels vs. 350 Riels in the city. Therefore, most families only used oil lamps
or candles for light. Aside from inconvenience, this limited economic and social activities in
communities and contributed to both insecurity and difficulty in reaching or moving around the
settlements at night.
Transportation. The MPP did not provide regular transportation to the sites or facilitate the crea-
tion of locally-run transport services, and transportation to find work was a main problem.
(iii) Developing social services. The key services the Project aimed to provide access were de-
cent housing, health, and education. On the relocation sites, all had to be built from scratch.
Affordable housing. During some early relocations, fire victims were given core housing kits,
i.e., basic construction material to build a zinc roof supported by nine columns. This was to pro-
vide them with a basic shelter which they could later consolidate on their own. Aside from core
housing though, there were not enough resources to help people produce housing adapted to their
28 In refugee camps, 7 liters of water per person per day is the minimum vital, which should be raised to 15-20 liters
as soon as possible after an emergency (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2002).
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needs and capacities. The UPDF did provide some loans, but the funding and technical abilities
of families remained low and many could not complete their houses. Housing quality was actu-
ally a setback for many, compared to their earlier conditions in the city. In Anlong Kngan, 80%
of families still lived in very low quality housing seven months after relocation, with a third still
under tents. Ninety percent of the construction was directly on the dirt, 36% had no furniture at
all, and another 46% had nothing but a bed. The persistent substandard housing conditions had
strong negative impacts on people's health, ability to work, and sense of dignity.
The impacts of relocation on security of tenure were mixed. Relocated families were supposed to
receive a certificate of occupation that they could exchange five years later against a land title.
Meanwhile, they had to stay permanently on their plots, and were not allowed to sell them. Yet,
if 95% of families living on resettlement sites felt they had legal proof that ensured their tenure
security, a large proportion of actual victims of fires were never able to relocate or to obtain a
plot. We estimated that eight to twelve months after relocation, between 50 and 80% of the vic-
tims of the fires either never received a plot or could not keep it and left the sites. Therefore, if
tenure had improved, it did not benefit the people most in need who had been initially targeted.
Education. Primary education was one of the first services set up on most sites, although it often
took three to six months to develop. Though it was not more expensive than in Phnom Penh, it
represented a higher proportion of families' spending, as their revenues were lower. Over time,
the lack of income forced many families to take their children out of school, either because they
could not afford the cost or because they needed the children to work and provide supplementary
income to the family. Most sites had no access to secondary schools.
Health care. After the initial trauma following the fires, health was better on the relocation sites
than in many settlements in Phnom Penh. Although there were fewer health hazards in their rural
environment, there was still a high prevalence of intestinal diseases because of insufficient water
and the lack of sanitation. Distance further prevented access to the hospitals that provided free
care. As people could not obtain care nearby, many would only seek help when their conditions
became very serious. Benign illnesses would thus become major problems, running families into
debt (85% of families indebted had borrowed for health expenses, which was one of the first rea-
sons why people sold their plots.)
(iv) Improving disaster management. After the fires that struck the Tonle Basac, many com-
munities around Phnom Penh organized brigades to patrol their settlements at night as there were
rumors that more fires might be set to clear squatter settlements. There was, however, no support
from external agencies or from the MPP to help them prevent and manage fires. On the resettle-
ments, there were no activities to prevent or manage fire. Many sites suffered from flood because
of their location in former rice fields. The problems were structural, and drainage systems were
difficult to install. Better-off families coped by setting their houses on stilts or by filling in their
plots. Many of the poorer families had to leave the sites.
4.3.2 Objective Two: Enhancing income generation
(i) Promoting vocational training, credit, and saving schemes, as well as industrial em-
ployment. Over its last year of activity, the Project supported NGO-conducted training programs
to give people skills to start their own small enterprises or to find employment. Unfortunately,
these programs were mainly conducted in the city, and only a few families on resettlement sites
benefited from them.
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On the resettlement sites, most heads of household worked as unskilled workers: men were cyclo
or motordup drivers and unskilled laborers, while women were street sellers. Skilled men were
often masons, mechanics, or iron workers, while skilled women were seamstresses. There was
little opportunity to find employment in or near the sites, and two-third of people ended up work-
ing in Phnom Penh, 13 to 20 km away. Employment rates seriously declined after relocation. In
Anlong Kngan, after seven months, 21.6% of the heads of household were unemployed, while
only 9% had been jobless in the city. There was also a shift toward lower-income work from
their previous occupations, with a diminution of activities as motordup drivers and government
employees, as many of them were forced to become unskilled construction laborers or cyclos.
The "middle-class" groups were sliding down into lower income occupations.
The low and volatile income allowed the survival of families with at least two incomes, but fami-
lies with a single income could not meet daily survival needs of food and water, and were de-
pendent upon outside support. They represented 53% of the population on the sites.
The outreach of financial services to the poor also remained extremely limited. CBOs offered
saving schemes, but these were mostly a token activity to show donors that communities could
raise local funds as a contribution to projects. Besides, many members of the schemes com-
plained that they could not withdraw their savings when needed and that there were many prob-
lems with poor management of the community funds (it was not uncommon for a community
leader to disappear with the community's savings). UPDF did provide loans, but most were for
housing. Most families relied on loans from friends, family members, or private money lenders.
The very high cost of private sources often ran them into debt traps.
As for the promotion of industrial employment, there remained no formal linkage between large-
scale employers and the relocation projects implemented. Many families who "volunteered" to
relocate on sites distant from the city agreed to it after they were told by municipal officials they
would find work in nearby garment factories. Yet, soon after resettlement, it became clear that
the MPP had set up no agreement with the garment factories. The factory managers we inter-
viewed all responded that they would rather hire qualified workers or relatives of their employ-
ees than untrained newcomers. None of the large-scale job creation expected actually took place.
(ii) Facilitating the dissemination of marketing information. Little information was available
in resettlement sites for people to know where they could find work or how they could work
from home and sell their production at good prices. Some home-based seamstresses worked for
middlemen who then sold their products to garment factories, but they were not organized to
have any have bargaining power with these intermediaries.
(iii) Creating space for small businesses. Many urban poor were self-employed. Besides driv-
ing motordups, many offered services (e.g., repairing tires, making keys) in the street or near
markets. However, the interdiction to sell in the streets, more strictly enforced by the MPP be-
cause of an alleged "fear of terrorism" after 2001, forced many to stop their activities in the city
or to move their workplaces to more hidden and unsanitary locations. For people on the reloca-
tion sites, this added more inconvenience to their already difficult access to job opportunities.
4.3.3 Objective Three: strengthening local governance
In terms of governance, the Project had aimed to (i) improve community organization and lead-
ership; (ii) reduce corruption; and (iii) produce and implement pro-poor development policies.
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(i) Improving community organization and leadership. At the community level, organizations
such as the SUPF, the USG and the URC had continued to set up CBOs in the settlements where
they provided support for local planning. The quality of these CBOs was irregular and remained
very dependent on the personality of each leader. Many leaders continued to use a system of de-
cision-making where the person in charge extended favors to others in exchange for recompense.
The trust in CBOs that had been slowly built over the years since the mid-1990s was seriously
undermined during the emergency relocations. Corruption and speculation settled in the commu-
nity planning process as "free plots" became a commodity on the land-market, which leaders
were selling both on the sites of origin and on the sites of relocation. Because of this and of nu-
merous failures of saving groups, many families stopped trusting the CBOs, who also lost legiti-
macy in the eyes of NGOs and aid organizations as representing "the people." In terms of
inclusiveness, there was marked discrimination against the destitute, renters, and Vietnamese
families in the resettlement process. While local authorities refused to provide them with reloca-
tion plots, few CBOs advocated on their favor, even when they were long-term residents.
Box 4-4: The commercialization of saving books
The first large fires were followed by the expulsion of families who lost their homes and the resettlement
of some of them to plots far outside the city. This mainly benefited slumlords and the better-offs within
the settlements who had alternative places to stay in the city. They obtained free plots on land that was not
habitable, but that would be developed over the years through UN and NGO support. They would leave a
family member as a gatekeeper on their plots at the relocation sites and would also buy plots from poorer
families who could not stay on sites that had no service and no way to earn a living.
In some settlements in the city, new organizations then appeared that were more ad hoc business ventures
than representative CBOs. With the mass evictions, the lists of members in community saving groups had
taken on a commercial value. They became considered as the lists of "community-members" and could
testify as to who was entitled to compensation in case of relocation. While these lists already excluded
some of the poorest families, they quickly started to include more people external to the settlements.
A market thus developed in which some CBOs "sold" saving books to outsiders so that they could be
listed as community members. Some settlements were then infiltrated by speculators who moved in, an-
ticipating evictions, while CBOs there were losing the respect of many residents for selling off saving
books. (We documented the extreme impacts of such activities in one case that showed lists of over 600
saving group members in a community where only 200 families actually lived (in Fallavier et al., 2002b).)
On the positive side, following the large-scale training of the SJPF communities by URC, more
organizations and communities in the city started to adopt a Community Action Planning process
that focused on action as a way to unite people, rather than merely on a prior formal organization
around saving groups. When such planning process was well facilitated, it gave all community
members a more equal voice in local decision-making and helped reduce social exclusion.
In terms of participation in the citywide governance process, the MPP did not take into consid-
eration the inputs of community organizations during the resettlements, using them merely to
disseminate information to people on decisions already made. Therefore, after the fires, civil so-
ciety lost much of its weight in local planning and its impact on policy making was weaker in
comparison to 1999, when the UPRS was designed in great part with the contribution of CSOs.
(ii) Reducing corruption. The 1999 Poverty Analysis had shown corruption's disabling impact
on the poor in Phnom Penh. People living in informal settlements had to pay a large proportion
of their income for public services that were meant to be free and they were never sure of the
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quality of service they could receive in exchange. This situation did not markedly improve after
the Project.
In the settlements within the city, the police and local authorities shifted from requesting protec-
tion money against eviction to selling proofs of residence in the settlements in case of relocation.
In addition, community leaders started to sell the saving books that showed membership in
communities and that could help get one's name on a relocation list.
All emergency relocations were then conducted too fast and at a scale too large to ensure their
effective and transparent management or the participation of beneficiaries in the process. Plan-
ning by authorities without the involvement of beneficiaries made people even more dependent
of the goodwill of a few officials and strengthened relations of clientelism. Many families had to
pay during the process to obtain goods and services that were supposed to be free.
(iii) Developing and implementing prop-poor development policies. The project did support
the MPP in developing its long-term policies to reduce poverty and in delegating responsibility
to local authorities. Adding to a revised Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2002, UN-Habitat
and ACHR helped CSOs and the MPP produce a pro-poor City Development Strategy (CDS),
and helped draft the urban component of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy, the plan to
achieve the goals of the PRSP.
Meanwhile, linked with the Project, work by Geoffrey Payne at the Ministry of Land Manage-
ment, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) had provided new ideas to the central gov-
ernment on how to regularize urban land tenure. Rather than focusing on a formal view of legal
vs. illegal occupancy, he showed that in practice there was a continuum of legitimacy in the oc-
cupancy and ownership of real estate, from short-term seasonal rental to long term ownership
(see Khemro & Payne, 2004). His work helped the government recognize the need to grant not
merely ownership titles, but a range of intermediary deeds, such as rental rights and social con-
cessions. Following this, the Ministry ran a campaign to educate local authorities about the pos-
sibilities to finding alternative tenure agreements with informal urban communities.
The Project then supported a study on the availability of land to develop low-income housing in
Phnom Penh and worked with the MLMUPC to prepare a National Housing Policy that recog-
nized the complementary roles of self-help and market mechanisms, with the government as a
facilitator to enable building houses for lower and middle-income populations (see Yap, 2001).
Following a renewed commitment from the Prime Minister to support physical upgrading of one
hundred urban poor communities per year by 2003, the MPP then officially agreed that commu-
nities themselves would select which settlements would be upgraded and which ones voluntary
resettled.
The MPP had thus developed a set of analyses, guidelines, and official policies that sounded very
pro-poor. Many of its officers had also been trained on a wide range of issues related to urban
poverty reduction, decentralization, and participatory planning.
But what were the links between the lessons learned from experience of almost a decade of
aided-self-help, the policies prepared, the actual activities implemented, and the long-term adop-
tion of pro-poor public policies?
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4.3.4 Impacts of UPRS and ownership of institutional changes
a. Impacts on poverty reduction
The UPRS had aimed to improve the living conditions of poor communities, to develop their
economic potentials, and to strengthen pro-poor participatory governance in Phnom Penh. Yet
little of its initially planned activities of in situ upgrading were implemented. Instead, over 7,500
families were relocated to 19 sites between 2000 and 2003, most of them involuntarily, after
staged emergencies. In the process, many poor families never obtained a plot on the resettlement
sites while free-riders did. Once on the sites, only families who could pay usually obtained all the
support they were entitled to. Then, without food, access to sufficient water, or to basic services,
the poorest families often sold their new plots and came back to live as renters in squatter settle-
ments of Phnom Penh. Many others have done the same since, and the resettlement sites are now
in large part occupied by people who bought the land as a way to obtain low-cost serviced plots.
In fact, the relocations led by the MPP had opposite characteristics to these shown to work in the
pilot phase: they were implemented quickly, with people unwilling to move, on land unsuitable
to live on, far from job opportunities; they involved up to thousands of families at a time, break-
ing social ties that existed in former communities; and they did not involve beneficiaries in the
planning process, ignored their claims, and rendered them dependent upon the authorities.
To date, their impact on poverty is negative and the processes exemplify more errors to avoid
than innovative paths to follow. First, if activities did take place to provide basic housing and
infrastructure on the sites, services arrived too late for the poor, who had no shelter, water, food,
or work and had to leave the sites in the first few weeks or months after relocation. Thus the
people most in need of support did not benefit from the relocations. Second, there had not been
any planning of how relocated families could make a living on the sites. Without enough funding
and training to support the creation of local enterprises, and without linkages to large-scale em-
ployers, many of the people displaced became even poorer in the relocation sites than they were
in the city. Third, CSOs could never truly represent the people in the planning process. Under the
cover of an emergency response, NGOs, CBOs, and international organizations were only in-
volved in response to urgent need after the municipality single-handedly moved families onto the
relocation sites. This weakened the mechanisms of participatory governance that had emerged
since 1998, when CSOs had gained an important role in community upgrading and in the deliv-
ery of social services to the poor. Their voice had been reflected in the UPRS.
These resettlements were the main activity conducted as part of the UPRS. Within Phnom Penh,
upgrading was neither conducted on a scale sufficient to make a dent in poverty, nor in a way
that built a system in which communities would be empowered over their own planning proc-
esses. The commercial development of the historical core of the city for tourism had further dis-
placed families, many taking to live in the streets or becoming renters in other squatter areas.
Therefore, while poor settlements had developed mostly in the city centre until 1998, the massive
relocation programs contributed to establish peri-urban zones of poverty in resettlement sites and
created more rental communities in even more congested slums for victims of evictions who
came back from the sites or who were never deemed eligible to relocate.
About 40,000 persons had been relocated on the outskirts of the city, and after several years,
some sites had obtained access to water, electricity, schools, and health posts. Thus, some fami-
lies there did live better than in the inner city slums. Yet, the improvements had little impact on
the poorest, as many of them were unable to stay on the sites. Most of the people remaining on
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the sites had in fact purchased plots from the poor or were not fire victims in the first place. Few
of the Project's intended beneficiaries were thus reached and a large part of its resources had
served to develop middle-income housing in the urban periphery. The initial beneficiaries who
made it to the sites-and were still there-were hardly better-off than previously, in the city.
Overall then, few concrete achievements could count as long term progress for the poor, as they
had made them more dependent on a local government unable to provide them with services.
Since then, the urban poor and their representative CSOs lost most of the ground they gained in
the 1990s with regard to having a say in the planning of their settlements and the MPP has shown
little interest in recognizing informal settlement dwellers as rightful citizens. Resettlements by
the MPP have continued and, as of early 2007, there were 43 sites outside Phnom Penh for about
16,000 families, or over 92,000 persons. Meanwhile, the municipality fabricated a myth of pov-
erty reduction by presenting the image that it had decreased poverty by relocating slum dwellers
into "new suburban communities" (e.g., see in Municipality of Phnom Penh, 2005).
b. Impacts on local public policy institutions
At the UPRU, policies were well-learned by a few top officials. However, this was more for pub-
lic relation use than to refine and implement their knowledge. If, at the international conferences
they attended, MPP officials presented a set of pro-poor policies, local authorities had not in fact
changed their ways of dealing with slum dwellers through arbitrary decisions, rent-extraction,
and the ruthless execution of top-down orders bypassing all written commitments.
The MPP's implementation was far from the official policy directions produced by the Project.
As the resettlements sites were incrementally equipped with roads, water access, and some basic
social services funded by emergency aid money, the MPP would present these realizations as
part of its efforts for poverty reduction. The Chief of Cabinet would display "before and after"
pictures to international conferences and unknowing donors, showing the squalid living condi-
tions of the former slums then the neatly aligned plots on the resettlement sites, all the while
praising the efforts of the MPP. He would remain silent on the fact that most people still on the
sites were neither the original fire victims nor former slum dwellers.
In terms of strengthening local institutions to implement these policies, the project had trained
Khan and Sangkat authorities to conduct participatory planning with communities and to coordi-
nate some upgrading activities in their precincts. But the Sangkat-level elections held in 2002 did
not make local authorities more accountable to community members, as Sangkats were not dele-
gated much power of decision. Their roles were mainly to implement central orders from the
governor, relayed by MPP-appointed Chiefs of Khan. Neither people, through voting, nor the
Project-who did not receive the UNVs supposed to link different levels of municipal authori-
ties-had much leverage over local authorities who were thus not held accountable.
To improve the knowledge basis upon which to make decisions, the Project had trained local ac-
tors in participatory action-research and advocacy. Within the MPP, it had set up a database to
monitor living conditions in informal settlements citywide and to assess changes in poverty lev-
els. It had accumulated several years of studies on what worked and what didn't in poverty re-
duction. In fact, the exchange of information between NGOs, CBOs, the MPP, and UN-Habitat
greatly increased. Unfortunately, this did not result in more informed public decisions. For local
authorities, data collection was just an administrative burden and at the MPP, the Governor still
did not base his decisions on any of the results. Most CSOs got entangled in an emergency mode
of reaction to fires that dictated their responses. Knowledge was not a strong basis for action.
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Ultimately, the MPP's implementation of the UPRS had not tackled in depth any of the three
elements of its own definition of poverty. The city now had a series of progressive, pro-poor
policies, but they reflected more the views of UN-Habitat and UNDP than that of the Municipal
staff, who however knew well how to use them in their favor, while continuing to promote an
unrealistic model of relocation as an achievement in terms of poverty reduction. Meanwhile, the
CSOs supporting the poor had been weakened rather than strengthened by the experience and
pervasive corruption remained a major barrier to both poverty reduction and good governance,
with private interests preventing most official policies from being implemented.
c. Directions to understand the discrepancy between policies and actions
This chapter analyzed the evolution of urban poverty reduction approaches in Phnom Penh in
relation to the dynamics of governance that shaped its policymaking process. It related how a
conflictual but improving collaboration between the municipality and the urban poor failed to
transform into a long-term participatory approach to governance for urban upgrading despite an
official policy to do so and the support of a dedicated project to achieve it.
But this story is not merely one of the inability or unwillingness of municipal authorities to fol-
low up on earlier commitments. The initial hopes by the end of the Project's first phase were
based on tested practices and on improved personal relations between municipal leaders and the
heads of CSOs. What happened that prevented them from building upon these foundations?
The project's second phase had relied on three key assumptions to transform the policy into con-
crete achievements: (1) the goodwill of actors to improve the welfare of the urban poor, (2) the
consistent support of aid agencies in pressuring authorities to keep up a pro-poor approach, and
(3) the absence of major unforeseen events that could void a large part of the efforts.
The political stability that was expected to enable the more predictable implementation of poli-
cies and the recognition of rights to the poor had instead attracted investors with much more bar-
gaining power than the poor over the use of the urban space they lived on. Then, the expected
good faith and arm's length relation between the policy actors was absent. Instead of building
trust and cooperation with CSOs and aid agencies, the MPP manipulated them to serve its own
goals. Lastly, the expected political support from UNDP to ensure that central government would
champion pro-poor urban polices had been overtaken by a process of petty bureaucracy that con-
trolled the project's activities to superficially fit UNDP's prescriptions.
Today, policies, programs, and projects "for the poor" in Phnom Penh are still run, at best, of be-
half of rather than with the poor. If light infrastructure is being improved in some settlements in
the city, the achievements have no permanence and the poor are still largely cut from access to
the public services that are central to improving their living conditions and the basis for brighter
prospects. Because of entrenched social discrimination, they have not acquired the same rights as
the inhabitants of formal settlements and can still be arbitrarily evicted. Over the last ten years
then, although there has been some progress in improving local-level urban management and in
enhancing the lives of some poor communities in Phnom Penh, little was achieved to ensure the
permanency of these improvements. Activities did not secure rights over tenure and had limited
impact on national approaches to tackling issues of urban housing and poverty.
How does this relate to the larger history of urban poverty reduction? Linking results to the
macro evolution of policies, Chapter Five will show that the Cambodian case points to important
determinants that shape the way tested policy ideas are absorbed, or ignored, by policy makers.
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5.0 The meaning of results: organization of the chapter
Our initial research interest was to understand and explain the evolution of policies to reduce ur-
ban poverty in developing nations and the apparent difficulty of translating internationally agreed
principles of beneficiary participation into practice. It was further to understand whether and how
participatory policies formulated by aid providers were absorbed by recipient governments and
contributed-or not to contribute-to long term changes in local policymaking approaches.
To explore these issues, we set out to answer three main questions: (i) how knowledge on inter-
national assistance to urban poverty reduction evolved over time and why; (ii) how the urban
poverty reduction strategy in Phnom Penh unfolded and what factors were most influential in
shaping its implementation and adoption; and, based on these results (iii) what factors then seem
to promote or to hinder the adoption of participatory approaches to urban upgrading.
The preceding chapters have presented policy stories at the macro and micro levels, retracing
how policies and practices evolved, thus answering the initial parts of questions (i) and (ii). This
chapter now extracts the reasons for that evolution-or lack thereof-in policies and practices. It
does so by first explaining the development of the international discourse on urban aid, then by
deciphering what influenced the policy process in Phnom Penh, and third by extracting the bridg-
ing elements between the global and local policy stories that explain the overall trajectory of pol-
icy recommendations and their implementation in participatory urban upgrading.
5.1 Explaining the evolution of international policies and practices
A striking element in our historical review has been the recurrence of ideas and recommenda-
tions. To reduce urban poverty, international development agencies have long recommended a
mix of three approaches: Using local resources, enabling markets to deliver housing and ser-
vices, and strengthening people's and government's capacities to help themselves. Yet, if experi-
ence has shown that the urban poor could efficiently participate in all three components, and
although human resources represent the main asset of poor countries, popular participation in
urban upgrading is now only weakly supported by these aid agencies. Given that no tested alter-
native has yet discredited these low-cost methods, we wondered why international aid agencies
did not seem to learn more from the positive experience of participatory upgrading.
To answer this question, this section presents key elements that competed over time with lessons
from experience in shaping the evolution of international approaches: (i) the lack of historical
hindsight of some policy recommendations; (ii) the conflicts of frames and the changing balance
of power between aid agencies over time; and (iii) the intrinsic opposition between the dominant
cultures of aid providers and the characteristics of successful participatory upgrading schemes.
5.1.1 Lack of historical hindsight
We saw that the use of self-help in housing policies and urban poverty reduction has a much
longer history than depicted by the mainstream literature used by some key urban aid agencies.
By the early 1950s, planners, policymakers and academics had therefore already built a sound
technical knowledge on what worked to improve the housing and living conditions of low-
income urban dwellers. This knowledge was reinforced by further lessons from the 1950s and
1960s. Logically, by the end of the UN First Development Decade, it is the issue of how to pro-
mote the long term adoption of these proven technical practices that should have been on the
forefront of the agendas of aid agencies.
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However, that issue was sidelined in the 1970s when the World Bank took over the leadership of
urban operations. The Bank largely ignored past experience and reinvented technical lessons on
participatory upgrading without reflecting on what determined their adoption by the governments
receiving the advice. In the 1980s, when aid agencies stumbled again onto the question of how to
scale-up small upgrading programs, rather than trying to answer some of these institutional is-
sues, they turned toward another development model of policy support, the SAPs.
We can first explain this lack of interest for the history of tested practices by reviewing the low
visibility of some of the pre-1970 writings. The UN was in fact not efficient in pushing for the
dissemination of lessons from its own projects or from these of the other urban agencies. During
the 1960s, while it repeatedly called for the creation of centers to research and exchange knowl-
edge on low-cost housing techniques (see United Nations, 1961b, 1966), it did not manage to
create any such center. Some of the early lessons were either not widely disseminated because
they were in reports that belonged to the governments for whom they had been produced. In fact,
until the mid-1990s, many reports from the World Bank and the UN were considered confiden-
tial, to be shared only between the aid agency and the loan/grant-recipient government. This in-
cluded project evaluations that were supposed to help improve later practices. It was only in the
1980s that some lessons on urban projects from the 1950s and 1960s were reprinted, such as the
work conducted by Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger for the UN in the 1950s and 60s
(for instance, in dedicated volumes of Habitat International 1980: 5(1-2) and 1988: 12(3)).
Further, some practices of participatory upgrading may just not have been considered by interna-
tional agencies as they did not seemingly relate to the developing countries of the time. They
covered, for instance, the post-World War I and II reconstruction experiences in Europe. Many
were not published in English, which further limited their use by mainly US-based agencies.
Second, the type of literature used by development practitioners also explains the lack of histori-
cal savvy in their reflections. By default, their analyses of projects and policies tend to consider
the current approaches of their own agency as cutting-edge, thus not looking beyond these views.
The incremental knowledge they produce is often based on quantitative analyses that provide a
limited capability for learning from the past (quantitative studies of poverty tend to be snapshots,
which can hardly compare with past data, because of evolving methodologies). At the Bank, this
lack of memory and disregard for lessons from other development agencies was in fact clearly
visible from its first main analysis of urban issues (1972), which repeatedly-and erroneously-
mentioned the lack of academic and practical expertise in the field of housing (pp. 6, 35, 56).
Similarly, in 1974, its policy paper presenting sites and services as a main solution to housing
problems (World Bank, 1974) made no reference other than to the World Bank's work, started
two years earlier. We however showed that the similar Puerto Rico Ponce program of "slums up-
grading and land and utilities" had been used as an international model starting in the 1940s.
Their literature is often more practical than theoretical and avoids taking critical views of pro-
jects or policies underway. The teams who have run projects for years (and at times built careers
on them) have entrenched interests in showing positive results and by the time research reports
become policy documents, they are cleared of facts that may embarrass aid agencies or govern-
ments. These documents are also often self-referencing, with each agency quoting its own work,
which does not promote critical thought or historical views going beyond the latest development
fad. But overall, although both the UN and the World Bank conduct quality research, their results
are rarely used in designing projects. There remains a wide gap between research, policy, and
project design and the actual implementation of recommendations.
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However, knowledge is not bound only to "the literature," and a human factor should have been
part of the dissemination of past practice. We showed that a relatively small and cohesive group
of experts ran the urban housing programs of international development agencies from the 1940s
to the 1960s. Early on, the British Colonial Office and the US Government had a relatively bal-
anced view of the elements needed to improve urban living conditions (including participation,
markets, and government) and actively worked together. They passed these lessons to the UN
during the 1960s, and the organization built upon them. In fact, we noted how their leaders, At-
kinson, Crane, and Weissman, had coherent and complementary approaches to housing policies.
From the early 1970s though, when the World Bank took the leadership of urban housing from
the UN, it did not take along any of the earlier lessons and instead set out to re-discover them. By
the mid 1980s, independent of the results from its own lessons on participatory upgrading, it then
changed its approach again to adopt a market-based development discourse. This leads us to look
beyond lessons from experience and access to knowledge to other forces that influence the shifts
of policies in aid agencies.
5.1.2 Conflict of frames, power struggles, and role of development fads
While until the late 1960s the dominant aid agencies shared relatively similar views of the goals
and means of development, when the World Bank arrived on the urban scene, it brought a differ-
ent approach. Diverging views about development, and changes in the balance of power between
aid agencies since then help explain the drive away from a focus on participation, and from the
project-approach in favor of macro-level policy adjustments.
a. United Nations: the challenge ofjointly promoting self-help and central planning
Since 1959, the UN has passed numerous resolutions to help reduce urban poverty by assisting
governments in designing pilots for participatory upgrading, while also preparing national devel-
opment plans supportive of low-income housing (United Nations, 1959a, 1960, 1961a, 1965).
However, as time went by, the initial aim of promoting human development through the slow
formation and autonomous replication of self-help housing groups lost prevalence under the
pressure to find large-scale responses to the problems of an ever-growing urban population. In
practice, the double-track approach of participation within State control waned in favor of large-
scale rationalized planning, the development of prefabricated housing technologies, and the
training of municipalities in the planning techniques of developed countries.
By the end of the First Development Decade, the UN then had to recognize that national devel-
opment plans rarely considered urbanization and that limited progress had been made in building
housing and reducing urban poverty (e.g., only two to three acceptable new dwellings had been
built per 1,000 inhabitants each year, in contrast to an initial goal of ten per 1,000.) In its direc-
tions on urbanization for the 1970s, the UN thus had to reiterate a call to develop urban strategies
that would cover physical, economic, and social issues, as well as set up housing-finance agen-
cies. Again, it urged states and aid agencies to use not one, but a series of approaches to improve
the construction industry, develop saving and credit mechanisms, and expand the building of
low-cost housing through public, private, and self-help programs (United Nations, 1969, 1970).
In 1972, seizing upon the opportunity offered by the World Bank's new interest in urban hous-
ing, the UN then suggested that the Bank provide a large share of the seed funding needed by
governments to develop domestic housing finance systems (United Nations, 1972). By doing so,
it acknowledged its lack of financial capacity and political leverage to get physical projects im-
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plemented, and it turned over to the Bank the task of concretely tackling urban housing and ur-
ban poverty issues. After that withdrawal from the front scene, and even though the ideas it de-
fended have remained consistent since, it never regained a strong influence over the policies and
projects of governments and could only follow the trends set by the World Bank.29
b. World Bank: understanding development through an economic frame
The World Bank was conceived in 1944 to finance economic development, with the view that
growth through commerce, industry, and agricultural production would lay the foundation for
lasting peace and democracy. During the 1950s, its economists believed in the intervention of the
state. They considered development a top-down, supply-led process in which the Bank would
lend to governments to finance their economic infrastructure. States would in turn prepare and
implement national development plans to promote industrialization, modernization, and eco-
nomic growth. The wealth accumulated would trickle down to benefit all, and the Bank saw no
need for projects to redistribute the results of growth (Zanetta, 2001). It was only in 1976 that the
Bank acknowledged that "poverty reduction," as understood in terms of fair redistribution and
not just economic growth, was in fact a goal of development (see World Bank, 1977: 16).
The Bank's support for self-help in housing projects-though apparently influenced by Turner's
people-centered views of development-was based more on the grounds of economic efficiency
than of social equity (Harris, 2003). While Turner advocated for participation as a goal of politi-
cal liberation from the disabling control of central planning (e.g., in Turner, 1969), participation
in the Bank self-help programs was essentially instrumental to rationalize the use of existing re-
sources. It was to use the capacity of beneficiaries to pay for the project rather than to give them
power of decision in the local planning process. In a 1980 review of its housing strategy, the
Bank justified urban participation a posteriori mostly from an economic perspective:
Without community participation-or consultation with potential residents of new sites-it
is unlikely that cost can be recovered. [..]"The greatest effort possible has been made to
ensure that beneficiaries will pay for the services that they receive because requiring that
they do so has been judged a critical factor in ensuring the replicability of low-cost solu-
tions to the problem ofproviding shelter (Churchill et al., 1980:12).
We should note that if the Bank did not value the notion of political empowerment of the poor at
first, it did recognize it later (see Paul, 1986), but always remained hesitant about how to include
it in practice in its projects. As an example, by the mid-1990s, acknowledging the negative im-
pacts structural adjustments had on the poor, and based on extensive research on the importance
of giving the poor a voice in the local planning process (see Isham et al., 1994), it launched so-
cial funds. These were to support small development projects led by the recipient communities.
However, the "participatory approach" soon fell in the same trap of instrumentalizing recipients
who, this time, were delegated the administrative burden of running complex Bank procedures
(see Ellerman, 2001; Tendler & Serrano, 1999). Again, starting in the late 1990s, the Bank did
show its recognition of the importance of participation and this time even of "empowerment" (in
Yusuf & World Bank, 1999), but it remained uncertain about how to promote it in practice.
29 It reclaimed some clout by 1997 when UN-Habitat took over the Urban Management Program to support govern-
ments in implementing the Habitat Agenda. It still suffers from a lack of resources and remains dependent on fund-
ing agencies to implement its recommendations (see United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2003c).
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c. The role of development fads: Structural Adjustments
Independent from why aid agencies initially supported participatory upgrading, after the first
decade of Bank investment there were positive assessments of the approach, both from commu-
nity planners and from economists, who underscored the potentials of participatory housing pro-
jects-especially in situ upgrading-to become main tools of urban poverty reduction in the
long-term. These projects were the bases needed to enable recipients-whether communities or
local governments-to take over their own development process with minimal external support.
In fact, key urban specialists within the Bank (e.g., Cohen, 1983; Keare & Parris, 1982) were as
positive as non-Bank analysts (e.g., Laquian, 1983b; Payne, 1984; Swan et al., 1983; Yap, 1984)
regarding the merits of participation in housing programs. Their evaluations mentioned that
many of the higher-than-expected costs and inefficiencies observed were due more to the Bank's
project implementation procedures than to the characteristics of self-help. Even the Bank's re-
views and recommendations, based on the economic costs and benefits of participatory ap-
proaches (see Buckley & Mayo, 1988; Mayo & Gross, 1985), supported the use of upgrading,
sites and services, and advocating for the improvement of project implementation mechanisms
rather than for the abandonment of the approach.
The conclusions of the detailed evaluation [of the El Salvador, Philippines, Senegal and Zambia
projects] have confirmed that the experiment embodied in the first generation of Bank-supported
urban shelter projects has been remarkably successful. The validity of the progressive develop-
ment model has been established. Self-help construction methods have been relatively efficient.
The impacts of projects on the housing stock have been generally greater than anticipated. The
projects have been affordable-and generally accessible-to the target populations. Those meas-
urements which have been concluded indicate that the projects' impacts on the socio-economic
conditions of participants have been in the directions expected. And, notably, the projects have
not had negative impacts on expenditures for food and other basic necessities. [...]
An analysis of projects' successes and shortcomings supports recommendations that future pro-
jects endeavor to push standards and costs still lower, include explicit provisions and opportuni-
ties for rental arrangements and incorporate credit provisions more nearly tailored to the needs of
targeted families. (excerpts from Keare & Parris, 1982)
The disengagement from participatory urban upgrading was only weakly related to findings on
their appropriateness. Rather than lessons from project results, it is an overall change in the de-
velopment paradigm that motivated the reorientation of development aid. Following the fall of
Communism, neoclassical economists promoting the role of markets were taking the upper hand
in the International Finance Institutions. The Bank followed their views and urban policies be-
came single-handedly influenced by the structural adjustment paradigm. 30
Coupled with a heavy inertia to learn from practice and with a tendency to follow pressures from
its board of directors, the lessons from experience did not result in breakthrough thinking or in
much change in practice. They merely reinforced old models discarding the value of states and of
micro-scale efforts, and resulted in the premature abandonment of participatory upgrading with-
out ever fully supporting it according to documented good practices.
30 This view is in line with the demonstration McCarney made (1987) of how policy fads, rather than the evaluation
of facts, had specifically directed the Bank's divestment from sites and services projects.
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5.1.3 Mismatch between values and procedures of development aid
Aside from lessons derived from experience, disciplinary frames, and broad ideology shifts, a
large part of how decisions are actually "made" is through their implementation. Both for aid
agencies and for governments, existing administrative structures and the viscosity of entrenched
practices are strong determinants in redefining the meaning of participation in practice.
a. An emphasis on sites and services rather than in situ upgrading
One element to understand the Bank's divestment from participatory urban projects is that its
economic analyses of costs and benefits assessed the activities that had been convenient for the
Bank and governments to undertake rather than the ones that epitomized participatory upgrading.
The early experience of successful programs to improve urban living conditions had emphasized
the role of in situ upgrading (Crane, Arneson et al., 1944; United Nations, 1964a; United Nations
Mission on Tropical Housing, 1952). However, the Bank and recipient governments invested
mainly in sites and services projects. From 1972 to 1987, these represented 58.8% of the new
loans, while slum upgrading projects were only 8.2% (see footnote 11). This was partly because
the characteristics of sites and service better matched the operational procedures of the Bank's
and of governments' bureaucracies than those of in situ upgrading. They were large-scale, stan-
dardized, and seemingly easier to control than the messy incremental improvement of slums.
Sites and services were, however, less adapted to reduce poverty than in situ upgrading. They
created new settlements, often far from city centers, which disrupted rather than strengthened the
social infrastructures and livelihoods of communities. They were not very open to popular par-
ticipation, aside from cost-recovery. They often employed engineers to design the large settle-
ments and provided work to outside contractors to build standardized housing schemes rather
than using and strengthening the capacities of local community members. They were therefore
costlier than upgrading, while not supporting local capacities to the fullest extent possible.
Their inadequacy was further exacerbated by the unwillingness of many governments to adopt
the minimalist types of schemes that were affordable to the poor. A proven approach to offering
affordable sites was to provide empty plots with "wet cores" (a pit latrine and access to water,
usually shared between several families). People would construct their shelters with material re-
cycled from their old houses and would consolidate their houses over time, when they could af-
ford to buy bricks and mortar. However, politicians who did not want to be viewed as sponsoring
"villages of toilets" or the settling of "planned slums" outside cities tended to modify the projects
to produce more elaborated sites than initially planned and to build houses typically overpriced
for the poor. Politicians also had other yardsticks other than merely proven technical practices to
decide on project beneficiaries. Prior to elections, they would use projects as political show-
pieces to raise their constituents' expectations of the availability of public housing, would reward
allegiances, or would subsidize housing to civil servants rather than try to reach the urban poor.
Many of the housing schemes implemented hence widely differed from their initial objectives of
supporting low-income communities to control their development processes and to revive their
local economies. The sites-and-services were of higher standards than what the poor could af-
ford, and were accordingly slow to occupy, costly to administer, and had low cost-recovery rates.
Although they provided security of tenure, they often fell short of extending services, were situ-
ated far from employment opportunities, and were unable to attract or retain the poorer who, be-
cause of distance to jobs or services, would often resell or abandon their plots (Laquian, 1976).
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b. Rigid procedures vs. the need for adaptation
With the preference for large-scale standardized projects came procedural requirement that were
also incompatible with grassroots participation. The huge size of the Bank's early urban self-help
projects (averaging $76 millions each from 1972 to 1986) required recipients to have the capaci-
ties to spend large resources while managing complex financial procedures. This was impossible
for relatively informal community-based organizations. The Bank favored working through well-
staffed implementation units and large contractors, rather than through CSOs, which defeated
much of the project's intention. It provided limited employment to local dwellers and took re-
sponsibility away from local communities, thus failing to commit residents to the maintenance of
the realization that did not really "belong" to them. It did not give them the chance to gain the
experience necessary to plan and implement further collective action by themselves.
In fact, since the Bank's creation until the second part of the 1990s, all projects it supported fol-
lowed a formal procedure-or project cycle--of six sequential steps: (i) the identification of a
development activity to undertake; (ii) the preparation of the project's technical, financial, and
institutional aspects; (iii) the appraisal of these arrangements, (iv) the negotiations of measures to
implement the project and the approval of a loan agreement, (v) the implementation of the pro-
ject by the borrower supervised by the Bank, and (vi) the evaluation of the project (Baum, 1978).
This rigid cycle was grounded in an engineering tradition of infrastructure works, and a similar
approach percolated from the large-scale projects down to community-level activities. There was
scarce space in that cycle to integrate the participation of beneficiaries. 31
Other major aid agencies have generally adopted a similar approach, which follows standardized
procedures to manage projects and to report on their achievements. These procedures are yet of-
ten constrained by needs internal to the agency. The Bank, for instance, is a credit institution be-
fore anything else. Project managers process loans and the "timely disbursement" of funds is a
key point both in their personal evaluation and in measuring the success of projects.32 This ap-
proach of efficiency in project management trickles down to the procedures used for small, sup-
posedly community-led projects (for examples of procedures, see Campbell, 1985). They tend to
be oriented toward ensuring the timely disbursement of funds according to an initial schedule
and to following pro forma reporting rather than to adapting to the complexity of implementing
small-scale programs. This is in sharp contrast to the needs for participatory upgrading to be lo-
cally designed and led, to be flexible, and to require a minimum of regulations and administra-
tive procedures, while encouraging a maximum of local participation in the planning process.
Community participation thus faced important barriers for the aid technocrats and politicians to
adopt it on a large scale. Communities, government, and aid agencies constantly faced institu-
tional barriers in adapting to goals and procedures that seemed to oppose each other. These re-
sulted in sites and services projects "redesigned" through implementation to accommodate the
31 It is only by the mid 1990s that the Bank acknowledged some limitations of its project-cycle in ensuring that loans
actually served a development end. It then recognized that it did not involve the genuine participation of borrowers
and therefore their commitment to necessary reforms; that it did not consider risks external to the programs or pro-
jects; that it promoted insufficient training; and that it did not allow project designs to adapt rapidly to changing
conditions during their implementation (Picciotto & Weaving, 1994).
32 Since it takes years to evaluate the development impacts of projects, the main indicators of achievement for man-
agers is the extent to which they meet initial project objectives in terms of disbursement (spending the money ac-
cording to initial schedules), and of the delivery of concrete realizations (e.g., buildings, or infrastructure), much
favored to soft activities (e.g., community organizing or policy work), which leave little quantifiable traces.
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modus operandi of aid agencies' standardized large-scale projects, of government bureaucracies,
and of short-term political aims. The projects then often ended not reaching the intended benefi-
ciaries (Bamberger et al., 1982; Cohen, 1983; Keare & Parris, 1982; Laquian, 1976).
What made self-help projects successful-informality, flexibility, and political support in favor
of disenfranchised people-was in fact not only opposed to the Bank's operating procedures, but
to the values and views of efficiency that underlay them. The Bank considered the standardiza-
tion of projects as a key to their later replication on a large scale and was concerned about devel-
oping and applying sound managerial procedures.
Meanwhile, there was little concern in the cycle about the institutional environment in which
projects took place. The responsibility to sustain projects over time was that of the borrowing
governments or public agencies, not of the lender. There was, therefore, no explicit analysis and
planning of how to accommodate political factors-such as elections or the imbalance of power
between illegal squatters and municipalities-to promote lasting institutional change so that
practices could become part of a mainstream approach to public management in the long term.
On the international scene, we just showed how a conflict of views over the meaning of devel-
opment over-shadowed the relevance of lessons from experience. This, in turn, points to two di-
lemmas with regard to the meaning of participation in urban poverty reduction. The first is
conceptual. It opposes two understandings of the nature of urban poverty and its responses as
economic vs. social issues. Economists perceive poverty in terms of income or consumption lev-
els and seek solutions that should result in higher income or consumption. Social and political
approaches instead consider poverty as a situation of exclusion and promote solutions of a politi-
cal nature to give a voice to people. In practice, this conceptual opposition translates in constant
struggles between agencies promoting technical fixes vs. agencies supporting political enable-
ment. They each define participation in different terms, though they rarely recognize that. This
opposition forms the basis of the second dilemma, which analyzing the Cambodian case will
clarify. In countries where non-elected, foreign agencies have an important say in the develop-
ment of policies, there is an intrinsic opposition between solutions that follow the rational logic
of external agencies vs. others that respond to the local forces of political bargaining.
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5.2 Explaining the policy trajectory in Phnom Penh
In the Phnom Penh story, why did a strategy based on practices that had established their value
during the Project's pilot phase fail to scale up and to become a mainstream approach to poverty
reduction in its second period? We answer this question starting with the most visible reasons,
then moving to the least intuitive. First, a change of the environment in which activities un-
folded; second, the inability of the participatory strategy to make up for the power differences
between the municipality and representatives of the poor; and third, the inconsistent support of
key agencies to local actors.
5.2.1 Uncontrollable changes in the policy environment
During the Project's initial phase, despite difficulties working with the municipality, UN-Habitat
had been able to capture a good share of the MPP's attention as there was no "competing" activ-
ity in the city. The infrastructure projects in the pipeline for years had been suspended, awaiting
the return of political stability. In turn, the lack of infrastructure and the political volatility had
kept foreign investors at bay. But, by the start of the second phase competition had moved in.
Political stability had returned following the 1998 general elections, and with it foreign investors
were gradually coming back to invest in the garment and tourism industries around Phnom Penh.
At the same time, the MPP was regaining some power of decision, as its Governor had been con-
firmed by the Prime Minister and five Vice-Governors had been appointed. The Governor
wanted to beautify the city, which involved clearing many areas where the urban poor lived. To
attract investors, he had then obtained loans to rebuild the road network, install a citywide drain-
age system, and expand coverage of the municipal power, water, and waste management ser-
vices.
As the second phase of the Project progressed, several programs were launched to physically re-
develop the capital. The ADB built roads, drainage systems, and dikes; the World Bank im-
proved the water supply; and the French bilateral cooperation agency helped create a master plan
to guide the city's growth.
Unfortunately, these projects had no link with the pro-poor system of governance that UN-
Habitat was trying to set up. Though some infrastructure improvements programs were directly
displacing informal communities, they did not collaborate with the Project or with the CSOs sup-
porting communities subject to relocation. The ADB did resettle families living on the dikes it
was rehabilitating, but this was conducted with no connection to the other resettlements. More-
over, the relocation guidelines that the ADB used involved high financial compensation that no
municipal project could match. It thus conducted relocations that seemed to work, but that could
not be replicated, and that further confused the MPP as to why the UN did not want to use mas-
sive relocation. The master plan project, though run from within the MPP by its Bureau of Urban
Affairs, performed no active coordination with the UPRU and its poverty reduction plans. It then
missed the opportunity to help plan for the development of low-income housing areas in and
around the capital. Meanwhile, its top-down process of decision-making strengthened the view
that technocrats and politicians alone were to decide how the city could develop. As for World
Bank projects, their main concern in terms of "participation" related to cost-sharing. The only
time their teams contacted the CSOs working with the urban poor was to ask them for support to
"convince" families living above water lines that had to be rehabilitated to dismantle their shel-
ters and move away (a support they did not obtain...).
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To the Governor, these development projects were important to rebuild Phnom Penh's attrac-
tiveness. For all levels of municipal staff, they bore promises of salary supplements and informal
commissions on construction contracts. (It was common practice for aid agencies to supplement
the very low salaries of civil servants working on their projects. These agencies then often com-
peted for the allegiance of staff members by offering the most attractive supplements.) These in-
frastructure activities naturally gained more of the Municipality's attention than work on
upgrading projects, and they relegated poverty reduction to a secondary priority.
Within this rapidly changing environment, the UPRS relied on families having security over the
land and dwelling they occupied. The Project had indeed counted on the MPP to grant security of
tenure and rights to service to the urban poor, following the Prime Minister's engagement of
1999. Yet, the Governor showed no interest in regularizing tenure. Meanwhile, the growth of the
tourism industry further threatened the settlements located along the riverside, on land that had
taken high commercial value. Through all types of commissions, investors could enlist the sup-
port of central government officials and of the police to acquire and clear land, independent of
whether people lived on it or of its legal status. Since this was State-public land, the MPP could
legally reclaim it without compensating displaced dwellers. It would still breach its UPRS
agreements, but this would be sanctioned by a National Law that overruled municipal engage-
ments.
The MPP in fact conveniently used the lack of legal framework and the ambiguity of interpreting
land rights to its advantage. Even the 1999 declaration from the Prime Minister on recognizing
the legitimate existence of squatters-a political commitment the Project used to support its ac-
tivities-was not formalized legally. There was, therefore, no legal engagement to provide rights
of tenure to informal settlements nor government funding to their upgrading. This meant that set-
tlements initially upgraded could easily be destroyed and their inhabitants displaced, if authori-
ties wanted to do so, and that most upgrading activities depended on donor support. It gave the
MPP considerable leeway to justify the removal of some communities.
Paradoxically, the return to peace and the political "stabilization" of the country had perverse
effects in terms of the quality of urban governance. The investments they attracted were more
important to the municipality than its policy engagements to the poor. Meanwhile, although the
MPP had not gained much decisional autonomy from the central government as an organization
(still being unable to raise funds on its own) at a personal level, its top officials had gained some
financial self-sufficiency through the salary supplements and the rents they extracted from the
large infrastructure and the commercial development projects. The main decision makers at the
MPP therefore did not financially depend on the Project, and UN-Habitat had little financial lev-
erage to entice them to deliver on their UPRS commitments.
5.2.2 Constraints to decentralization
The Project had aimed to experiment a mechanism of participatory planning for local develop-
ment activities between communities, CSOs and municipal authorities. It was to be coordinated
by CDMCs at the Khan level, and later further decentralized to the Sangkat level. Interactions
between these levels and the centrally located Urban Poverty Reduction Unit were supposed to
produce a pro-poor system of decentralized urban governance. However, the changes confronted
a power structure favoring a top-down decision style ruled by an ingrained code of clientelism.
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a. Lack of central commitment to decentralization
Strengthening the abilities of local authorities was part of SEILA, a countrywide program training
officials from the national to the district levels to plan for the best use of foreign aid, and to be
responsive to the need of their local constituencies. In rural areas, SEILA had started such decen-
tralization, starting in 1996, and had partly achieved devolved planning authority to Commune
Development Committees, equivalent to the CDMCs.33 Consistent with that approach, the Project
was the first urban attempt at formally involving citizens in the local planning process.
However, Phnom Penh being the national center of political and economic power, decentraliza-
tion had more at stake there than merely delegating a technocratic power of decision. For high-
level municipal officials, letting go of the ability to decide meant losing a sizeable share of the
rents they extracted from investors and from the public to issue authorizations and privileges.
At the central level of the MPP, there was a strong resistance to letting go of decision-making
power and to adopting a work ethic based on merit, the delivery of quality services, and the re-
spect of the law. Appointments in the civil service were not based on skills, nor on the results of
votes, but on affiliation to political parties and on the ability to buy a post. Once in the position,
officials had to recover their initial outlay through earnings from their discretionary use of
power.
In a system where everyone had to extract rents from the less powerful to pay the higher ups, the
Governor himself had to pay off the post he had obtained from the Prime Minister by regularly
contributing to fund the CPP's operations that maintained Hun Sen in power. He then strictly
controlled the entire municipal administration, including the Chiefs of Khans and Sangkats
through his ability to grant or withdraw favors. As all lower levels under them, the UPRU team
members, headed by the MPP Chief of Cabinet, thus believed that they were to follow the Gov-
ernor's orders to the letter. They did not feel bound to any formal "outside" policy agreements or
to any of the UN procedures that ran the Project, especially its rules for budgeting, procurement,
and financial management. In terms of planning process, "participation," "transparency," and
"good governance"-elements that were the core of the Project-were as well only secondary to
what the Governor could decide on the spur of a moment (such as the arson of Block Tampa). To
him, the UPRS, as most other written plans, regulations, and policies endorsed by the MPP, was
little more than a way to keep foreign aid agencies content and funds flowing in.
In such logic, the "burn-and-displace" approach was a convenient way for the MPP to bypass the
participatory policymaking process-which they felt was donor-led-and to return the relation
of power in its favor while officially keeping face. In the eye of the majority of (non-poor) urban
dwellers, the MPP's response to "accidental" fires indeed looked appropriate and well-intenti-
oned. According to the official announcements, fires had made thousands of families homeless
and the MPP promptly provided them free resettlement, allegedly with housing and access to
services. Meanwhile, the process was clearing some public areas for the redevelopment and
beautification of the city. Against this presentation of reality, well-reproduced in newspapers,
who could justify delaying aid based on vague principles of participation while the MPP-as
representative of "the people"-was acting in the best public interest?
3 Pagaran (2001) has analyzed the relevance and success of SEILA.
34 Indeed, he also had had to pay off the opposing FUNCINPEC party, who should have placed one of its own senior
members at the head of Phnom Penh, one of the most lucrative positions as a Governor in the country.
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b. Power imbalance between public policy actors
At the level of local authorities, in response to delays in the UN Project, ACHR had taken over
the creation of the CDMCs. In a bold move, it inaugurated CDMCs in the city's seven Khans in a
single week while the Project had initially planned on their gradual piloting. Rather than adopt-
ing a phased approach to test and refine its support mechanism, during the inaugurations ACHR
promoted the view that the CDMCs should not depend on standardized rules and regulations, but
rather design their own operating procedures in a cooperative, learning-by-doing approach.
However, this flexible participatory approach to planning faced the rigid decision-making proc-
ess officials were used to, and did not account for a huge power unbalance between "partners."
When the CDMCs operated, there was little of the expected arm's length relation between local
actors. In an authoritative structure of governance, chiefs of Khan always dominated. They re-
fused to attend CDMCs unless they chaired them, though they knew that the control they exer-
cised over the meetings prevented candid exchanges with CSOs, who were often trying to defend
communities oppressed by authorities. Then, discussing the social problems or lack of access to
public services of poor communities, and finding ways to provide locally adapted solutions made
little sense to Khan chiefs. It was not an issue of training, but one of entrenched habits. Patronage
and dependence made rational sense to them; the free extension of public service did not.
More important than technical or financial issues, a deep clash of beliefs over the role of public
authorities prevented the devolution of power from occurring. Promoting the participation of the
poor in the city's planning process relied on a consensual delegation of decision-making power
from central to local authorities and to communities, but Khans and Sangkats had prevailing val-
ues, goals, and methods opposite to the ones promoted by the Project. They ruled through discre-
tion and held power thanks to political patronage. The view of delivering services to all in a fair
and transparent manner threatened that discretionary power which was the main attraction of
their jobs. Although UN-Habitat sent many local officials for awareness trips to neighboring
countries to witness the benefits of empowering the poor to solve their own problems, very few
of them ever applied the lessons they had learned once returned to their fiefdoms.3 5 Delegating
any decision power down to the poor themselves was the utmost challenge in a regime where
few citizens dared to openly claim any right to change an engrained system of patronage.
That unbalance of power between "the poor" and municipal authorities is a key element in ex-
plaining the inability of a participatory approach to development to take hold in the city. It
should not, however, have come as much of a surprise to any of the actors. Even for agencies not
privy to the daily operations of the municipality, the analyses produced by the end of the Pro-
ject's pilot phase had pointed to these issues. Nationwide, a reason for the heavy presence of UN
agencies and for the existence of a local civil society was, in fact, to weigh in favor of the poor in
their relations with authorities. In Phnom Penh, this is why UN-Habitat and DFID had wanted to
include external supervision in their Project. Why then did the UN or civil society fail to weigh
in more to redress the imbalance of power? The next section looks into the influence that the ir-
resolute support from aid agencies and the CSOs had over the implementation of the poverty re-
duction strategy.
3 A notable exception was the head of the Bureau of Urban Affairs, who, when he returned from a short training
course at MIT, helped link some of the city's embellishment projects he was working on with the social and eco-
nomic development of the squatter communities on the sites.
126
5.2.3 Diverging views and weak support from facilitating agencies
a. Dissentions among UN agencies
The evaluation of the Project's first phase made clear that the MPP needed outside support to
design appropriate project and policies, to enforce the respect of basic human rights, and to limit
corruption during implementation (see Arghiros et al., 1998). UN-Habitat and DFID had wanted
a senior international advisor to provide such support. UNDP had yet strongly opposed this, as it
wanted the Project to adopt the same approach of national execution as SEILA.
Furthermore, UN-Habitat and DFID believed that the Project's goals were as much to promote
the rights of squatters to be recognized as citizens as to help them concretely improve their living
conditions through building drains, toilets, and roads. They therefore supported the fact that the
STA should defend the cause of squatters, even when this involved confronting the MPP. In this
again, UNDP had a different view. It coordinated a range of programs nationwide and did not
want to jeopardize already tense relations with the Government for a single project. Despite sup-
porting human rights, it was trying to maintain cordial relations with the MPP and did not want
implementation "details" to prevent the Project from being nationally executed.
Initially, UNDP therefore did not want to take a frontal approach against the MPP about the re-
spect of rights and the importance of reducing corruption. To that end, in 1999, it first vetoed the
publication of the poverty analysis that pointed out how the roots of persistent poverty in Phnom
Penh were corruption and human rights abuses, and wanted to downplay it in the new phase.
During the Project's second phase, it then delayed the hiring of its STA, and later dragged its feet
reacting to the burning of the settlements, and to the violent displacement of their inhabitants.
During its implementation, the Project thus did not receive the support it expected from UNDP in
pressuring the government against human right abuses, corruption, and bad governance. UNDP
neither helped strengthen the decentralization of power. This was in part because it thought the
SEILA model should simply be applied in Phnom Penh, with no need for a separate agency (i.e.,
UN-Habitat) to support the process. It hence never provided the UN Volunteers expected to sup-
port the CDMCs, since after the 2002 local election, it wanted power to be delegated to the
Sangkats rather than to the Khans and favored mass-training (there were 76 Sangkats) over hand-
holding (the way it was planned to support the seven Khans).
Since UN-Habitat was under the control of UNDP, which represented the UN in front of the
Cambodian Government, its role then became limited to that of providing technical answers to
emergency needs as they arose, rather than of enabling the Project to develop long-term support
to communities claiming their rights to receive public services, like any other citizen.
Underlying these tensions, again was a difference in power between agencies. In its role as coor-
dinator of UN projects, UNDP considered UN-Habitat as merely a technical assistant and DFID
as a funding agency. It did not value their experience in understanding the local context of im-
plementation and in contributing to adapt the project to evolving conditions. In that line, UNDP
insisted on "National Execution" more for an internal reason than as the result of proven capaci-
ties from the MPP. As proof of the success of the transfer of power from the UN to the local pol-
ity, it wanted to show that it could oversee programs directly administered by local governments
without "technical" intermediary agencies. It also failed to conceive that it was legitimate for
these agencies to take a political stand against the government, which was the turf of UNDP.
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These inter-agency disputes had a very detrimental impact on the Project's activities and on its
ability to improve the local governance structure. UNDP wanted to control the procedures of the
project, but did not want to get involved in applying the political pressure needed at specific
times. This led it to ignore opportunities when it could have influenced the municipality in reori-
enting its activities towards the UPRS' initial goals.
For instance, this happened after the fire of Block Tampa and the publication of criticisms on the
relocation process. Facing a mounting public outcry, the MPP was showing signs that it could
shift its approach away from forced relocation. In fact, it started negotiating with the leaders of
Block Tampa and opened talks with private investors on land sharing deals that would avoid the
eviction of residents. Until then, although it had been aware of the nature of the fires, UNDP had
not publicly acknowledged their deliberate nature and the fact they grossly breached the UPRS.
It was concerned about how to get back on track with the Project's process of participatory in
situ upgrading and decentralization. Seizing the opportunity of the MPP potentially changing its
approach, UNDP could have proposed ways to redirect some of the project's objective (since the
environment had greatly changed from the project's inception), without too harshly blaming the
MPP for its past actions. Instead, to control the execution of the Project and limit the misuse of
funds, it took a bureaucratic lens to its operations and decided to refuse to pay for any activity or
spending that departed from the set of activities initially agreed for the Project. This way, UNDP
protected itself from underwriting any wrongdoing while never having to confront the MPP
about its conspicuous abuses. In practice, after initially pushing for the project to be conducted
without foreign oversight, UNDP was now keeping control over most decisions on the allocation
of resources, taking away the formal power of policy decision-making from the MPP. It did so
without facing any accountability for results.
Paradoxically then, removing the STA six months before the Project's end and pushing for dis-
bursement of the remaining fund (an internal objective) opened the door to massive corruption.
However, for UNDP, by using a technical agency such as UN-Habitat as a fuse between its nor-
mative prescriptions of national execution and their actual implementation placed itself out of
criticism's reach. It could not be held accountable for the relevance of its recommendations. If
things did not work out, it could (and did) blame UN-Habitat for its weak technical assistance.
b. Civil society's limitations in promoting participation
The ability of civil society to promote genuine participation of the poor in improving their own
lives faced two main constraints. One was the exclusion of the poorest from the community or-
ganizing process, and the second was the CSOs' overall lack of vision as to their long-term roles.
In the Project's first phase, the communities that had displayed the courage to confront the au-
thorities and the ability to propose and implement local development activities were all run by
articulate leaders. They were self-selected groups who had the most elements for the success of
the projects they implemented: a relative stability, the ability to organize, and strong leadership.
In its second phase, targeting was broader, more systematic, and intended to include the poorest.
The poorest communities, however, were likely devoid of strong leadership, of a sense of cohe-
siveness, and of the ability to participate in collective action.
Further, there was an intrinsic opposition between the intended targeting and the prevalent sys-
tem of community "organization." Most NGOs had adopted ACHR's approach of strengthening
the organization of families for collective action through the creation of saving groups that would
federate people around a joint responsibility. Their savings would then serve as a community
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contribution in proposals submitted for funding to external agencies. Yet, defining the "commu-
nity" according to families' abilities to save meant excluding those who could not set money
aside. Community-based activities thus tended to exclude the poorest.
Besides, when conducted too quickly, "organizing" communities merely meant creating commit-
tees responsible for decisions on behalf of others. Rather than giving a voice to all, this strength-
ened the power of a few prominent individuals in the settlements. While at times, these were
genuine leaders ready to fight for a common good, they could also be merely the most apt survi-
vors, with little inclination toward altruism. The saving-centered approach thus mainly worked in
settlements that had dedicated leaders and existing mutual-help networks. That is, saving groups
would strengthen existing support mechanisms, but did not create new ones from scratch.
Box 5-1: Vulnerability of CBOs operating on a shoe string
CBOs in poor settlements had no funding. They ran meetings in the open air or in borrowed space and
counted on supportive NGOs for basic stationary and some shelf-space to keep their records.
Members were all slum dwellers with very low-paying jobs. They supplemented their meager incomes(further reduced by the time spent on community-organizing activities) with the fees NGOs distributed to
people attending workshops and trainings. They also directly benefited from the upgrading projects they
could bring to their communities, which often served well their own interests. (Improved pathways and
water or sanitation networks would almost always reach the houses of community leaders first.)
Some CBOs charged fees to cover the administrative costs of their activities: a percentage of community
contracts on the improvement projects or an added point of interest on the micro-finance schemes. But
overall, they had little more resources than the goodwill of a few dedicated members, personally gaining
very little from the constant fights they had to keep up against municipal officials and private investors.
In any case, trust could not come easily among people who often competed for scarce space and
resources, had gone through a civil war that had destroyed much of existing social networks, and
were used to a system of survival based on patronage and short-term gains. There was a deep dis-
trust in government and often little confidence in civil society and in UN projects.
Building trust in cooperation and participation was necessary to enable mutual help, but it
needed time and an enduring commitment from external agencies. Aside from training (in com-
munity mobilization, literacy, or marketable skills) and from access to resources (credit and
technical assistance), the most important method to strengthen the CBOs and people's participa-
tion was demonstration, showing them that they could make a difference.
A problem though was that UN agencies delayed the start of the Project's second phase and later
devoted most of their efforts to relocating fire victims. Thus there was little if any demonstration
of what people could achieve by working together. Besides, since aid agencies were all on the
resettlement sites, they had little time to meaningfully train the CBOs in the city. Without strong
support, the CBOs in turn were inefficient at supporting communities to resist abuses and at re-
sponding to emergencies in a way that integrated the poorest. In front of the inability of the UN
and of NGOs to support them, communities then reverted to a system of patronage that benefited
the cunning and excluded the poorest (with the sale of saving books for instance).
Despite their overall dedication, the NGOs supporting the urban poor in Phnom Penh were then
unable to mount a common front to resist the forceful actions of the MPP or to propose long-
term directions for poverty reduction. Their dependence on external funding made it difficult to
develop clear focus and long-term missions, and starting with their creation in the mid-1990s,
they mainly responded to directions set by the UN and other funding agencies.
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5.3 Policy trajectories, barriers to adoption, and dilemmas
From these analyses of the international and local policy processes, we now draw the missing
elements to answer our initial research questions. We first look at the pattern of adoption and
abandonment of participatory upgrading approaches, then explain the barriers to their adoption,
and finally extract the underlying dilemmas that have constrained their evolution.
5.3.1 Trajectories: proven ideas that do not take roots
Both at the macro and micro levels of our policy stories, the ideas and practices of participatory
urban upgrading have followed relatively similar trajectories. First, agencies experimented with a
simple idea of working in partnership with poor urban populations to improve their housing and
living conditions. This demonstrated how to make best use of local capacities by complementing
them with outside technical expertise and limited funding, and by helping people organize for
collective action so they could later have a larger role in planning for the improvement of their
own lives. Second, lessons from the experiments were formalized and policy directions were
prepared to facilitate their implementation on a large scale. At the international level, aid agen-
cies adopted declarations to promote the participation of the urban poor in participatory upgrad-
ing projects; at the municipal level, city governments prepared participatory poverty reduction
strategies. Third, larger projects were undertaken to help the small experiments to scale-up and
reach a larger number of urban poor. These were to involve aid agencies, local government, and
beneficiaries, with a gradual dispersal of power to the lower levels of government, and the crea-
tion of partnerships between the recipient governments and local beneficiaries associations.
The adoption of the approach also seems to follow a similar curve: initially, recipients were quite
open to the new approach and pilot projects seemed to achieve their goals of demonstrating the
relevance of the approach. Yet, the scaling-up of the approach faced difficulties. We have shown
that these difficulties were not as much in technical or financial terms though, as in the inability
to implement a system of decentralized, autonomous planning on a large scale. We then saw
how-through they never refuted the appropriateness of participatory upgrading-the govern-
ments or aid agencies who were promoting it seemed to have abandoned the idea of using it on a
large scale instead turned toward a more classic approach of development oriented toward the
creation of growth on a macro scale, with the hope that it would benefit all.
Figure 5-1: Parallel policy trajectories in urban upgrading stories
Scaling up Abandonment of
Adoption of formal policy participatory upgrading
Experimentation
Habitat Decla- was not mainstrearned
ration (1976) internationally
world Bank upgrading projects (1972-1986) Structural adjustments and
turn to the market (1987-)
urban disengagement
(forgotten expe- Phnom Penh project
rience 1930s-1960s) phase two (2000-2004)
Urban Poverty Failure of UPRS
Reduction no nationwide approach
Strategy (1999)
Phnom Penh project
phase one (1996-1999)
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5.3.2 Barriers to adoption: the lack of local embeddedness
a. Technical aid often obscures political aspects of policy adoption
We have seen that political issues, more often than technology and resources, are main barriers
to improving the conditions of the urban poor. In fact, there have always been important political
components to participatory upgrading. At the global scale, it was initially a way for aid agencies
to help newly independent nations develop peacefully and avoid the seizing of power by authori-
tarian regimes. In turn, however, this meant that for some of the most authoritarian receiving
governments, participation challenged existing relations of power in favor of officials.
We showed how development agencies tend to fail to explicitly account for the political compo-
nents that shape the relations between different policy actors. Despite the limitations of rational
models to understand and shape policy processes, they are still in widespread use. Although their
assistance programs are implemented in countries that have existing ways (formal and informal)
to make decisions, many of their projects are designed with little regard for how they fit into lo-
cal policymaking and institutional evolution processes.
Theories of public policies highlight the importance of considering not just the technical or ra-
tional merit of an idea, but also the ability of its supporters to lead it through complex political
processes before it can become an accepted public policy and get translated into concrete pro-
grams (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993). In theory, designing locally relevant public policies
therefore requires understanding how existing policy institutions function and how they evolved
to their present stage so as to adapt new policy ideas to the context in which they will develop.
In the practice of development aid though, international agencies supporting governments of
poor countries focus more on providing funding and technical fixes than on understanding local
histories and how to influence long-term local policy processes. Few acknowledge the impor-
tance of understanding institutional change and of embedding new projects and policies in exist-
ing institutions so that the ideas and values they promote can take root and grow. They mainly
assume that good ideas will be automatically adopted and that their role as outside agencies does
not allow them to intervene deeply in local political processes. Ignoring existing mechanisms and
pretending to replace them with value-free technical approaches yet does not allow them to fully
grasp the components of the processes and then design public policies with long term influences.
Urban housing is a case in point of a political issue too often treated as a technical one. The tech-
nical components of urban poverty reduction are to improve shelter and living conditions, pro-
vide better access to services, and promote local economic development. Maybe in settings
where policymakers use lessons from projects and where beneficiaries have a strong voice in the
political dialogue, technical support from aid agencies is all that is needed. But where poverty
results from the social and political exclusion of some from the rest of society, a main compo-
nent of poverty reduction is to give them a voice. They can later exercise that voice to ensure that
improvements outlast the duration of pilot projects. Such "empowerment" starts with recognizing
the potential of people to improve their own living conditions and prospects, and follows with
helping them gain the same rights of access to public services and accountability as other citi-
zens. In most cases, action involves influencing the attitudes of government officials and chang-
ing the structures of projects from an approach of controlling to one of empowering people. This
requires time, flexibility, and long-term commitment from the agents of change. Unfortunately,
these are not the characteristics of some of the larger aid agencies who have global influence.
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b. Power differentials not accounted for in the policies
Accordingly, both in our global and local cases, development agencies were not able to fully ac-
count for and engage in the political dynamics of implementation. Their plans were technical,
organizational, and financial, but did not address the role of local political forces in the accep-
tance of new ideas. Project documents did not either explicitly acknowledge that power relations
between funding agencies and governments, as well as between authorities and beneficiaries,
were important in the implementation of projects, and that project staff would have to adapt the
initial policies to meet the unfolding needs. We see three main reasons for that reluctance:
First, this would require a detailed understanding of the political dynamics at the different levels
of government involved in the policies and projects, and of the power relations between the play-
ers involved in implementation. This is difficult for aid providers to achieve (though not impos-
sible) while maintaining enough distance from local politics to avoid conflicts of interest. In
addition, this requires that the aid agency be physically close to the daily operations of its pro-
jects, both to understand and to influence the relations between agents at different levels of
power (e.g., the urban poor, civil society organizations, government, and the private sector). In
fact, a large part of an upgrading project's success is due to building trust between otherwise op-
posed partners, a relation that is built over time through daily interactions and joint problem-
solving. However, many functionaries of international aid agencies view their role as mainly
technical-as economists, project managers, or administrators. They also pass on such knowl-
edge more often through formal training than through hands-on demonstration, and they like to
keep some distance between their role and that of the implementers. Many tend to think that po-
litical analyses are mainly required in war situations, and do not believe that "rational" plans
need to be adapted to evolving local circumstances. For both safety and convenience, few are
willing to engage in political struggle, even on behalf of the beneficiaries they are to serve.
Second, within the hierarchy of the aid agencies, adapting to local evolving circumstances would
mean that project implementation units be entrusted with the right to respond in a timely manner
to change with a minimum of centralized control. Yet, as we saw in the Cambodian case, there
are entrenched interests within international organizations and disputes between their policy vs.
technical sections (e.g., UNDP and UN-Habitat) that prevent the delegation of power. Some cen-
tral policy agencies-UNDP in our case-are unwilling to decentralize any control, as they
could be held responsible for any discrepancy between reality and "the plan," which they feel
accountable to at their own headquarters. In their roles as coordinators of aid for a country, they
also want to receive credit for any achievement, and hence downplay the role of technical agen-
cies and their staff as merely technical implementers.
Third, in part because of the short time frames of many of their appointments in specific coun-
tries (often less than three years) or on specific projects, their staff's views of accountability is
rarely focused on the end beneficiaries of projects-i.e., to know whether the urban poor are bet-
ter housed or have gained autonomy in planning for themselves-but rather to their own plan-
ning processes-e.g., to know whether the number of wells or kilometers of roads initially
planned have been built.
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5.3.3 Underlying dilemmas on knowledge and participation
a. Different views on what represents relevant knowledge
At the early stage of the policy trajectory (during experimentation with ideas) upgrading pro-
grams are usually based on "integrated" approaches to local development, and are centered on
strengthening local capacities for collective action. They combine physical upgrading with the
development of local economic activities and of community organizations. They also often push
authorities to recognize certain rights for informal settlement dwellers. Successful projects thus
have multi-faceted approaches with strong social, economic, and political components.
The knowledge useful to plan and run small-scale participatory upgrading projects is typically
based on qualitative community profiles that analyze the different elements of local living condi-
tions with the people themselves, including the state of housing and infrastructure; the economic
and social situations; local ways to cope with problems; and the history of local institutions and
decision-making processes. Such an approach provides a composite picture of the situation over
time and of the potential to provide solutions that make best use of local capacities.
But when pilot projects are scaled-up to a large number of settlements, community profiles are
replaced with technical blue-drafts and master plans for physical improvement. The new picture
that emerges of urban poverty and housing redefines the issues in macro terms of technical, regu-
latory, and financial issues. It prioritizes intervention in ways that often overshadow social com-
ponents, and that transfers the power of analysis and action to experts outside the communities.
In terms of knowledge that matters, more quantifiable hard facts often become indicators of de-
velopment, such as the kilometers of street paved or the number of houses connected to utilities
grids. The social and political impacts of community organization are then downplayed, rele-
gated to the role of indirect results instead of the roots of successful projects.
The large projects are then often led by managers, engineers, and physical planners trying to ra-
tionalize the use of resources to provide services in a way they consider efficient. To do so, they
must abide by the rules of funding agencies, who are more concerned about economies of scale,
operating procedures, and disbursements schedules than about the non-measurable and time-
consuming empowerment of disenfranchised communities. The programs often become large
infrastructure projects, in which community participation is merely thought of in terms of contri-
butions to cost-recovery. Hence, along with the change of scale, there is a profound change in the
knowledge used and in the perception of the issues at hand.
Scaling-up tends to standardize responses as well, with further detrimental effects on the local
relevance of projects. Aid agencies draw manuals from successful projects, but instead of em-
phasizing lessons as tools to understand local situations and enabling communities to design lo-
cally adapted responses, the larger projects tend to only propose menus of ready-made solutions.
In the scaled-up approaches, the focus then changes from one of understanding and adapting to
local conditions to one of applying preconceived answers. It shifts from an approach of enabling
communities to develop their own capacities to solve problems to one where an external agent
provides answers. In that approach, the external agents (whether public officials, technical and
funding agencies, or NGOs) tend to assume that the problems are fully articulated in their menus
of issues and procedures and that they are only in charge of finding pre-fabricated solutions to
well-defined problems.
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Yet, in many cases, the problems cannot be considered as given, as each agent has a different
way of framing them. In Phnom Penh for instance, even if the living conditions in squatter set-
tlements can be described in physical terms from an objective point of view, in practice each ac-
tor of the UPRS had a different understanding of their causes and of how to address them. NGOs
would see a violation of people's basic rights, while the municipality would see the situation as a
breach of the city's regulations. More generally, participants in the policy process reconstruct or
express reality through their own frames and not all have the same approach to what can be con-
sidered a "given" problem. What some see as technical, others see as political or financial.
The standardized processes of large projects however, rarely allow these different views to be
fully expressed and included in a shared vision. Policy and project designs often result from the
vision of the dominant agent (in our cases, the World Bank or the UN), and though the final vi-
sion embodied in official documents may not be fully acceptable to all parties, some (in our
cases governments) have little influence in shaping them. They then pay lip service to the official
policy by endorsing it, but re-interpret it in their favor during the implementation of projects.
A reason for their inability to transfer the power of decision-making might then come from the
fact that some aid agencies lend only superficial attention to local knowledge. In the "participa-
tory" way of planning they use, they may not really learn from local approaches. This is both at
the micro-level of developing upgrading projects that can include the poor, or at the larger level
of helping local government develop strategies that can actually be implemented, i.e. that ac-
count for local political factors. In our Phnom Penh story for instance, ACHR focused on educat-
ing communities to its own understanding of participation-i.e., through membership in savings
groups-but did not seek to build upon the ways people already had to make collective decisions
and to include or exclude the poorest in the process. Similarly, the UPRS was perceived by the
MPP as a framework that made sense conceptually, but that had few links with the actual will-
ingness of the government to tackle urban poverty. It had endorsed the Urban Poverty Reduction
Strategy more for convenience than for any commitment to implement it. In the terms of Mosse
(2001), this results in participatory planning processes that are understood more as "rituals to fol-
low" than as ways to empower local constituencies to design and implement their own policies.
b. Oppositions on the nature of participation
We then saw that one reason for the non-adoption of projects which had demonstrated their po-
tentials has to do with conflicts between actors. While some of the conflicts are based on con-
crete cases--of eviction, the non-delivery of services, racketeering, or the violation of city
codes-others are in fact due to these different frames that agents use to interpret reality. These
conflicts are deeply ingrained in a priori beliefs, and tend to be much more difficult to reconcile
than disputes over concrete issues (see Schon & Rein, 1994).
The most important of these deep conflicts for our purpose-and maybe the least explicitly
voiced in the policies and programs for participatory upgrading--deals with the diverging views
of what "participation" means to each type of policy actor.
Starting from the micro case of the UPRS in Phnom Penh, we saw the limited collaboration and,
indeed the numerous conflicts, between partners. Even simple upgrading projects involved mul-
tiple agents. Some were elected, other self-appointed, some skilled and well-financed, other not.
All had different views on the situations they faced, on how to address them, and on who had the
legitimacy to take and implement decisions on behalf of "the poor." There were therefore multi-
ple approaches to framing realities and to presenting the problems and their solutions:
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For municipal authorities, urban poverty was an unacceptable disorder and many officials
rejected the rights of the urban poor to access public services by labeling them illegal dwellers or
anarchists. In that view, the poor were seen as responsible for their own conditions. Authorities
considered that their own action to provide them with any support was not because of any basic
rights these people would have, or because of any municipal duty to support them, but merely
out of benevolence. This in turn justified demanding obedience and "contributions" from the
poor as well as from the agencies working with them. Through this frame, "participation" was
ultimately perceived as people "taking part" in programs run by the municipality even when they
were not pro-poor. UN-Habitat-drafted UPRS was thus resisted not by refusing to sign it, but
rather by redefining it in practice according to the prevailing understanding of the "natural" rela-
tion between people in power and "the poor." 36 Even now, this enables the MPP to-quite
proudly-hail its poverty reduction efforts as both successful and participatory, while other defi-
nitions would hold that their approach was little more than ruthless manipulation.
The proponents of the value of existing informal coping mechanisms (the CSOs or UN-
Habitat) of course perceived the situations differently. Often ignorant of the official rules and
regulations (or considering them irrelevant), they advocated for building upon informal practices
to develop self-help mechanisms. They viewed the local stories of resilience as proof that, with
proper support, the people themselves could do much to improve their living conditions.
Then the undecided, and at time ambiguous external actor, UNDP intended to support
both the government and the poor communities, but without taking any definite stance. UNDP's
vision of reality was framed through formal procedures, which themselves followed development
fads dictated by headquarters. They rarely wanted to take the side of communities if it meant
criticizing the government, but nor did they want to openly influence the government's political
decisions since officially they supported requests from the government.
With limited common understandings, mandates, and planning time frames, the interactions of
theses agents were often conflict-ridden: CSOs fought one another over their turfs and distrusted
external oversight; local officials claimed to be the sole legitimate policymakers and refused in-
terference; and UNDP was detached from local realities and sluggish in responding to the chang-
ing needs of projects, while hardly ever taking sides in local disputes. The range of approaches,
the power struggles, and the resulting weak collaboration between these agencies limited their
candid exchange of views and practices. The lessons learnt from running their pilot projects then
failed to transform into long-term collaborative strategies for urban poverty reduction.
The opposing frames that local actors use to interpret reality and to respond to urban poverty are
the elements of the first dilemma that explains the lack of adoption of participatory upgrading:
the understanding of participation as taking part of a centrally-decided plan vs. that of actuall
shaping local development practices. While municipalities emphasized the role of the state and
of legality as the main agents of planning (even when they did not themselves follow the Rule of
Law), community supporters hailed the importance of action and local knowledge. The first ap-
proach was based on a de jure understanding of appropriateness, the second on valuing practical,
defacto coping mechanisms. They rarely seem reconciled in large-scale, standardized projects.
36 As in some earlier attempts to placate an external model of democracy in Cambodia, such as during the 1993 gen-
eral elections where "democratic" elections did not make much of a change in the relations of clientelism between
the people and their leaders (see for instance Hughes, 2001a; Hughes, 2001b, 2002; Roberts, 1994, 2002).
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At the scale of the international policy debate among development agencies, we saw that there
had also been a marked divide over time between agencies proponents of centralized state plan-
ning, of economic growth and market enablement, or of grassroots movements. Aid agencies
tended to consider each view exclusive of the other, and over time the politically (or financially)
prevalent one would impose its model on recipient governments who had little influence in the
dialogue, aside from that of dragging their feet.37
A key issue to understanding the discrepancy between the concepts promoting "participatory"
urban upgrading and their actual implementation is recognizing their diverging understanding of
the nature of poverty and of the meaning of poverty reduction-as an economic vs. a social is-
sue-and hence of the role of participation in urban upgrading.
The historical analysis and case study showed how the term "participation" is interpreted differ-
ently by the agencies using it in their urban programs. Economists understood participation in-
strumentally as a means to lower the costs of upgrading programs and to re-invigorate local
economies by employing local dwellers on construction projects. Meanwhile, community plan-
ners saw it as an end in itself as they stressed the value of enabling groups of citizens to design
and implement local improvement projects with only limited support from outside. The govern-
ment perceived it as a way to implement their decisions with minimal discomfort. This is the
second recurring dilemma in our policy story: the opposition to participation seen as an eco-
nomic contribution to lower the cost of project vs. its understanding as an element of human de-
velopment.
As Figure 5-2 displays, there are two important paradoxes in the understanding of the concepts
of participation used in upgrading policies. These are rarely acknowledged in either the design or
the evaluation of participatory urban upgrading programs.
Figure 5-2: Two dilemmas on how practice alters the meanings of participation
Lesson- or aid-providers Defining participation Lesson- or aid-recipients
(International development agencies) (in Phnom Penh)
in theory in practice government communities
UN: Enabling local 1. Empowerment
autonomy 0 2. Partnership
S3. Conciliation
World Bank: partici- rA 4. Dissimulation
pation: a means to 5. Diplomacy Used foreign
cover costs 6. Informing funds to imple- Were used
ment own views rather than7. ConspiracyIIemord
,8. Self-management
International dilemma: Partici- Local dilemma: Participation as
pation as economic contribution vs. implementing government policies
an element of human development vs. influencing policies
3 It has been widely documented how lasting development is never the result of a single approach, either from
grassroots movements, central governments, or markets alone (e.g., in Sanyal, 1994a; Sanyal, 1994b, 1999). Lasting
improvements require the capacity and willingness of government, civil society, the private sector, and aid agencies
to participate in public dialogues and realizations.
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion: contribution, limitations, and perspectives
Over time, the participation of the urban poor in low-cost, technically simple projects to gradu-
ally improve their living conditions has been demonstrated as a core element of poverty reduc-
tion programs, both in developed and under-developed nations. It makes use of locally available
resources and empowers beneficiaries to solve future problems with limited outside assistance.
In its latest Global Report on Human Settlements, UN-Habitat again emphasized that finding du-
rable solutions to urban poverty implies leveraging local resources and involving residents
through facilitating the gradual upgrading of slums via self- and mutual-help (United Nations
Human Settlements Programme, 2005). Today, however, despite the engagement of most nations
in the work to combat urban poverty as part of achieving Millennium Development Goals, the
poverty reduction strategies supported by international development agencies remain surpris-
ingly oblivious to real urban issues and are vague as to what participation means in practice.
This work explored some reasons for the discrepancies between the policies announced and the
programs implemented in practice. It sought to understand why it seemed so difficult for aid
agencies and local governments to durably adopt participatory approaches to urban upgrading.
This concluding chapter summarizes our main findings and their possible use, their limitations,
and perspectives for further research.
6.1 Lessons: roles of frames, power, and institutions in policy adoption
6.1.1 Weak links between knowledge, policies, and practice
Our historical review of participation in urban upgrading documented that proven solutions to
urban poverty have not drastically changed over time and that institutional hurdles, rather than
technical or financial ones, often prevented the adoption of otherwise tested, successful practices.
It also showed that there seemed to be weak links between the evolution of knowledge, the poli-
cies supported by international aid agencies, and their implementation by governments.
We tested and refined these assumptions using the narrative analysis of a strategy for participa-
tory urban upgrading in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Indeed, this case showed how in practice, the
activities implemented drastically differed from the initial official policies and from the results
were formally publicized. It also pointed out that, in our specific case, the municipal government
hardly seemed to learn from documented lessons in directing its projects for the poor. The pro-
grams it implemented were directed much more by a complex and informal system of patronage
between powerful investors, politicians, local authorities, and ultimately civil society representa-
tives than by any of the policy documents agreed upon with the agencies funding the programs.
Following the macro-level historical study and the micro-level policy analysis, Chapter Five an-
swered the research question of how agencies designing and implementing policies for urban
poverty reduction learn from experience. It explained how early promises of pilot projects were
not sustained once approaches were formalized into strategies and later subjected to the forces of
implementing large, standardized projects. It then showed how some aid agencies based their
recommendations more on dogmas than on lessons from practice, and that power relationships
between aid agencies influenced the prevailing development paradigm. This highlighted how the
policy trajectory in Cambodia resembled the larger evolution of international aid. Both were con-
structed from an official policy, redefined through implementation by the institutional character-
istics of its actors, by their power struggles, and by the vagaries in support from aid agencies.
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6.1.2 Conflicting frames as barriers to learning
To understand how international aid policies evolved, we questioned the mainstream explanation
of how the concepts of urban poverty reduction developed. According to that accepted view,
there have been marked discontinuities between periods of international support to public hous-
ing, to self-help, and later to the enablement of urban economies and housing markets. Our re-
search showed otherwise. Though development agencies promoted a strong role for the state in
national planning from the 1960s, they did not advocated for governments to produce public
housing by itself. Rather, they promoted the joint support of government planning for the deliv-
ery of infrastructure and services with aided self-help programs for the poor; the development of
more effective housing markets served the middle-class population.
Unfortunately, lessons from that period were not made widely available. When the World Bank
launched a massive effort in participatory upgrading starting in 1972, it did not build upon earlier
knowledge. Rather, it undertook the reinvention and refinement of technical practices for partici-
patory upgrading, but ignored two important institutional aspects that were called to attention
repeatedly in the 1960s. One was that participation had a strong political component, as it gave a
voice to disenfranchised populations. Supporting participation thus meant taking a stance for so-
cial groups that were either oppressed or ignored by municipal authorities. The second issue was
to figure how to scale-up projects so they would reach a significant population and so that par-
ticipatory upgrading would become a mainstream approach to urban poverty reduction.
Adding to the first surprise of reinventing technical practice and not delving into institutional is-
sues, a second one came by the mid-1980s with the gradual abandonment of participatory urban
upgrading and its replacement with a blackboard model of development through structural ad-
justments. After the failure of that approach to make a significant dent on urban poverty, and de-
spite the renewed international calls to adopt participation in development, we have then seen
that participatory approaches to urban housing were largely left out of the development agenda.
The analysis then helped uncover three main issues that prevented the agencies from promoting
international housing assistance learned from experience over time and thus adopting a more
continuous use of these proven practices. First, agencies experienced a conflict of frames over
the meaning of "development"-human-centered vs. growth-led-and therefore over the impor-
tance of "participation"-as an end vs. a means of development. Second, the lack of considera-
tion for local institutions (i.e., entrenched ways of doing) and for politics in understanding why
and how new approaches could be absorbed, or instead resisted. And third, agencies showed an
apparent lack of consistency in policy direction over time, with the abandonment of proven par-
ticipatory practices and the superficial adoption of single-sided market-based approaches to de-
velopment, when history had shown that both were needed together.
Underlying the three issues, we noted the filtering of reality and of lessons from practice through
the lenses of the agencies implementing the public polices and programs.
For aid agencies, these lenses are administrative and technical: While successful partici-
patory upgrading relies on the relatively informal organization of communities and on small-
scale projects run mainly by agents with little formal training, large agencies prefer to adopt
standardized procedures and favor large-scale approaches to development. Yet, by treating pov-
erty issues as mainly technical or financial ones, and by discounting their political components,
they fail to give a voice to disenfranchised people or to recognize that local governments have
their own priorities in allocating resources among the population or in adopting policy advice.
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For governments, the lenses are administrative and political: bureaucracies do not change
their ways of doing overnight, especially under the influence of foreign ideas. Public agencies
moreover have their own political logic and priorities as to whom they ought to reward and how.
They have aims other than solely supporting the poor and need to please their more influential
constituency, who in Phnom Penh was composed of the middle class, civil servants, and large
investors. They also need to assert their independence from external political interference and to
be seen as in charge of the public welfare, a task they can hardly delegate to barefoot planners.
6.1.3 The role of entrenched power relations in redefining participation
Examining in depth the case of urban poverty reduction policies in Phnom Penh allowed to un-
derstand some of the implementation issues that, in turn explained the adoption and abandon-
ment of practices that had proven their worth. It shed light on the role of rationality vs. power
relations in shaping and implementing priorities, that of time in absorbing ideas, and that of elec-
ted vs. self-appointed players in deciding of public policies in a weak, but still sovereign nation.
In the case of Phnom Penh, we saw how the formally structured organizations in both govern-
ment and civil society (CBOs as well as CDMCs) often represented the strongest, how difficult it
was to placate participatory democracy on a social structure used to top-down decision-making,
and how the aid agencies own administrative frames redefined participation when they needed to
follow procedures derived from the own institutional needs. Meanwhile, we explained the dy-
namics and rationale of the local participatory development process at the community level and
how it went at times against the goal of poverty reduction by excluding the poorest.
In Phnom Penh, public policy resulted in large part from implementation and conflictual collabo-
ration. During implementation, participation evolved from one in which people were to decide
on their own improvement process into one where they were merely co-opted to "take part" in
projects decided and run single-handedly by the municipality, even when the projects were not in
the best interests of the people.
This narrative highlighted that poverty reduction is as much related to the political empowerment
of the poor as it is to their having access to decent living conditions and income. It showed that
without locking in the rights of poor urban dwellers, they had no entitlements and remained de-
pendent on the political whims of their leaders and on the changing moods of aid agencies. It
emphasized the superficiality of presenting assistance to participatory mode of development as
an apolitical, merely technical or financial activity, and pointed to the importance of understand-
ing success in poverty reduction in terms of the "rights" people acquire over time.
More broadly in both the local and global cases, we saw that policy making for urban upgrading
is an incremental and dialectic process in which all stages of formulation, implementation, and
analysis depend both on rationality and on power struggles. Policies are often modified as they
are implemented and their initial intentions are reformulated either during implementation or
when the impacts of policies are evaluated. This tells us that the context (local or international)
in which policies evolve matters. It also shows that to craft or influence public policy, aside from
creating technically sound ideas, one needs to understand the actors and what influence their be-
haviors from within, as well as the environmental forces that affect the implementation of poli-
cies. Policy directions and changes are then due to a series of influences in which ideas, people,
timing, political pressures, implementation issues, and differing perceptions of realities collide to
produce what can only later be perceived as a "policy path" rather than preconceived, formal
blueprints. It is more implementation that shapes policies than the other way around.
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6.2 Limitation of the findings
6.2.1 Influence of our own frame
We repeatedly emphasized that policies and their results are perceived differently by actors with
different frames. Our own analysis itself reflects our frame as a community planner interested in
working on behalf of slum dwellers, rather than for any specific agency. This undeniably marks
the analysis, even if this one is based on extensive triangulation of findings. Any bias resulting
from that frame though (e.g., notes of cynicism on how some agencies are more concerned with
their internal processes than with the needs of beneficiaries) has been consistently applied across
the analysis, and we tried to extend no judgment regarding the behaviors of any specific agent.
Though we stand by our findings and interpretation, we also fully accept that someone with a
different frame could have interpreted the same findings differently. A macro economist may
still believe that in the long term, efficient markets have more leverage power to improve the life
of the urban poor than recognizing their voices. A physical town planner could have emphasized
the apparent drastic improvement of Phnom Penh over the last decade.
6.2.2 Scope of the findings
The Cambodian case was particularly telling as it represents extreme conditions of some key
elements that explained the adoption-or lack thereof-of good practices: complex political in-
stitutions with high cultural barriers to understanding them; the prevalent role of power relations
in a polity run by clientelism and predation; and volatile and uncoordinated-but yet all-
powerful-foreign aid. It explains the roles of the local governance structure, of foreign interfer-
ence, and of power struggles in shaping public decisions and their implementation, and how po-
litical issues can supersede the relevance of participatory practices that experience had proven
central to success. It also helps in understanding why these issues are rarely made explicit in pol-
icy design.
Overall, the findings from the Phnom Penh case paralleled that of the international policy story,
supporting our view that they are not just an epiphenomenon of the country's turbulent past.
Moreover, some of the main findings match another case we researched for two years, but did
not present in this work, relatively well. It was the policy story of participatory urban upgrading
in Zambia, where policies and projects similar to these of the UPRS were launched by the World
Bank in 1974. Though the context was different (a peaceful country with an educated popula-
tion) and violence absent, the disabling influence of political power, petty corruption, centralized
control, and unclear directions from aid agencies resulted in a similar policy trajectory of initial
enthusiasm and later abandonment of the approach, despite its proven merit.
We should reiterate a caveat to avoid over-generalizing: different degrees of participation in up-
grading programs have been achieved in many countries, but the positive experiences often de-
pended on the existence of a basic degree of representative democracy. The state we were
interested in, Cambodia, is characterized by a very tenuous democracy. Though we would not
suggest that lessons can be too systematically applied, we believe that the results can be of inter-
est to understand policy trajectories in relatively similar settings of very poor countries with high
power differences, weak democratic traditions, and a significant dependence on foreign technical
aid.
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6.3 Implications of results for further work
6.3.1 Directions for practitioners
This work intended to analyze a process of policy evolution and not to demonstrate the relevance
of participation, or to craft recipes of participatory polices and programs that could be scaled-up
and sustained over time. Nevertheless, our interest in understanding the forces that shape the di-
rection of policies and their practice is ultimately to help better account for them during the de-
sign and implementation of poverty reduction policies. Hence, we turn some of the findings into
directions for reflection in preparing participatory upgrading programs.
First, we should mention that the difficulties of scaling-up successful practices of urban upgrad-
ing are common to those encountered by most social projects (on which, see Schorr, 1997:3-21).
To be effective, both upgrading and social programs need to provide comprehensive solutions to
multi-faceted issues, to be flexible, responsive, and persevering. Their staffs need to be skillful as
professionals but also personally committed to transferring their capacities to local communities.
Their beneficiaries also need to share a common belief that they can collaboratively achieve their
goals in the long term, despite uncertainties and difficulties in doing so. These attributes of suc-
cess however, are difficult to replicate on a large scale and to move from the realm of the volun-
tary sector to that of the public service. The need for comprehensive solutions conflicts with the
specialized technical approaches of many professionals such as engineers, economists, or physi-
cal planners. The requirement for flexibility further conflicts with the technical and bureaucratic
standardization process expected to achieve economies of scale. Lastly, while personal commit-
ment can be expected from community organizers or social workers, it is rarely valued among
civil servants and aid professionals, who may construe it as a conflict of interest.
On these bases, three keys lessons from this work could helpfully orient practitioners in design-
ing policies that could be adopted and sustained. First, they need to understand the dynamics of
institutional learning of the different local actors and to adapt the implementation mechanisms of
policies and projects to fit them. These cannot be dictated by outside agencies, even if based on
technically sound practices. Second, power relations between local actors need to be understood
and accounted for in the design and implementation of policies and projects. They are central to
the adoption or rejection of new practices, even in countries where there does not seem to be a
strict system of policymaking. Third, they need to engage in finding ways to implement existing
policies and recommendations. The constant reinvention of technical responses to urban poverty
and the lack of engagement from aid agencies to support politically disempowered populations
are counterproductive to long-term reduction of urban poverty.
As for a specific focus on participation, these lessons support points made by Cooke & Kothari
(2001), who document how many development organizations integrate "participation" into their
operations without fully reflecting on what it means and what they want to achieve with it. These
agencies end up using sets of tools and techniques more as procedures to follow than as ways to
give participants an active voice in their planning processes. Rather, based on Cooke & Kothari's
findings, as well as our own, in order to enable local autonomy we advocate first, paying atten-
tion to local knowledge so as to genuinely build it into the program; second, understanding local
social structures and their possible mismatch with those promoted by development organizations;
and third, considering the relations of power between participants in the decision-making proc-
ess, rather than merely providing opportunities to the more powerful. Without an ex ante recog-
nition of the issues, it is unlikely that the poor can be heard in the long term.
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6.3.2 Directions for future research
From this work, we see two directions for further research: one on the conflicts between the par-
ticipatory process of governance and those of representative democracy, and the other on finding
approaches to scale-up participatory upgrading programs without losing their original qualities.
The first relates to the role of the different actors in the participatory process and their legitimacy
in pushing their agendas. The case of Cambodia has highlighted how, in a country dependent on
foreign aid with a weak local culture of representative democracy, there were many opportunities
for non-elected actors to influence the way local polices were decided and implemented. Aside
from the local government, these agents included foreign and local civil-society organizations,
aid agencies, and the private sector. Putting aside the private sector (whose motives are not ini-
tially to benefit the public good), how can these policy agents reconcile their interference in the
local process of decision-making with their intrinsic goal of developing local autonomous de-
mocracies? That is, by trying to promote the voice of the poorest in the local policy process, to
what extent do they interfere with existing decision-making mechanisms that may act on behalf
of a majority and hence be more locally acceptable than outside models trying to give a louder
voice to the disenfranchised? How can these agents then help existing political processes to be
both representative of all and inclusive of the voiceless?
The second direction for further research is more practical. How can we integrate local knowl-
edge and flexibility into community-led projects that have the potential to replicate autono-
mously? In 1953, Burchard wisely viewed the role of development aid as one of enabling people
"to do their own work their own ways," a process in which experts should "be educators, not
teachers" (see p. 48). The idea was to help improve local practices with local resources, not to
impose outside models. However, we showed how aid agencies typically approach scaling-up
good ideas: first, they pilot small-scale projects or learn from existing informal coping mecha-
nisms. From these, they draw lessons on good practices. To scale up, they then standardize ap-
proaches and seek economies of scale and produce manuals to run projects. Yet, we pointed out
that the way these agencies, or other bureaucracies, then used these lessons betrayed their initial
intentions. The manuals tended to be used as blueprints. So doing, they tended to obfuscate the
fact that they were supposed to adapt to local capacities and to enable people to improve their
conditions in large part by incrementally building upon their existing coping mechanisms. They
ended up dictating solutions rather than enabling local ones to grow.
For a long time, there have been other mechanisms to support and help scale up small projects.
For instance, for 20 years, the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights and other slum dweller advo-
cacy associations in Asia and Africa have set up networks of communities to exchange lessons
on planning, construction, and management techniques, as well as on the gains that they could
expect from collective action. They embody the model of autonomous replication promoted by
Crane starting in the 1950s, in which good practices spread through networks and are not de-
pendent on centralization or standardization of knowledge. These function very much on their
own, with little linkage to formal aid agencies to leverage resources on a large scale and spread
their activities. Our interest-through action as much as research-is to find ways to enable such
approaches to disseminate knowledge, practice, and belief on what is locally possible in a way
that can reach a significant number of small scale associations and that can be linked with the
efforts of aid agencies promoting poverty reduction on a global scale.
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Appendixes
Details of the urban projects funded by the World Bank between 1972 and 2003 are presented in
Table 6-1.
Table 6-2 presents a tabulated summary of the qualitative findings used to describe the state of
living conditions for people relocated in the suburbs of Phnom Penh between 2000 and 2003.
Detailed methods for data collection - including the selection of settlements surveyed, participa-
tory research methods used, guidelines for semi structured and structured interviews, and coding
of data, can be requested from the author (fallavie@fulbrightweb.org). They are too lengthy to
append to this document.
143

Table 6-1: World Bank supported urban projects (1972-2003)
Country Approval FY Loan amount in ra Dominant project type Outcome
Senegal
Turkey
Nicaragua
India
Zambia
Tanzania
Botswana
Indonesia
El Salvador
Jamaica
Lebanon
Kenya
Korea
Cote d'Ivoire
Indonesia
Philippines
Bolivia
Peru
Guatemala
Tanzania
Bolivia
El Salvador
India
India
Burkina Faso
Botswana
Kenya
Philippines
Thailand
Colombia
Mexico
Egypt
Morocco
India
Mali
Nigeria
Korea
Indonesia
Brazil
Brazil
Nicaragua
Colombia
Ecuador
Tunisia
Senegal
Lesotho
Mauritius
1972
1972
1973
1973
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1974
1975
1975
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1976
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1980
1980
1980
$27.59
$7.93
$65.32
$114.30
$59.92
$25.47
$8.99
$74.90
$25.47
$44.94
$3.74
$43.83
$41.09
$114.09
$136.14
$82.98
$0.88
$56.01
$68.72
$29.24
$41.43
$30.95
$58.48
$212.01
$18.66
$18.20
$113.75
$72.80
$19.57
$56.42
$37.54
$31.85
$40.95
$12.34
$25.19
$37.37
$136.45
$113.36
$195.23
$146.94
$46.18
$28.34
$65.08
$39.89
$0.96
$11.53
$28.84
Sites and Services
Housing Policy
Disaster
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Policy
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Slum upgrading
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Disaster
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Slum upgrading
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Slum upgrading
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Policy
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Disaster
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Slum upgrading
Sites and Services
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Unknown
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unknown
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Unknown
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Unknown
Successful
Successful
145
Country Approval FY Loan amount in real Dominant project type Outcomeprice 2001 (M of $)
Burundi
Indonesia
Philippines
Thailand
Panama
Jordan
India
Indonesia
Korea
Mexico
Morocco
India
Liberia
Korea
Bahamas, The
Ecuador
Brazil
Dominican
Republic
Tunisia
Yemen
Ethiopia
Cameroon
Kenya
Philippines
Haiti
Morocco
India
Pakistan
India
Madagascar
Gambia, The
Djibouti
Senegal
Zimbabwe
Malawi
Madagascar
Korea
Chile
Nigeria
Mexico
Brazil
Portugal
Jordan
India
India
Mali
Korea
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1982
1982
1982
1982
1982
1982
1982
1982
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1986
1986
$28.84
$10.00
$138.42
$55.75
$67.29
$40.37
$80.74
$75.61
$158.25
$288.37
$63.30
$43.96
$16.56
$165.58
$9.60
$59.11
$205.16
$42.06
$41.40
$24.84
$31.85
$31.85
$46.19
$106.71
$33.45
$95.56
$38.38
$25.48
$234.13
$19.66
$17.66
$7.68
$9.21
$66.03
$23.03
$23.03
$92.14
$122.85
$78.86
$223.19
$148.79
$37.20
$41.66
$0.29
$205.34
$40.76
$218.33
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Slum upgrading
Housing Policy
Slum upgrading
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Policy
Housing Policy
Housing Policy
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Policy
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Slum upgrading
Slum upgrading
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Policy
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Disaster
Sites and Services
Housing Policy
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Disaster
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Policy
Sites and Services
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Successful
Unknown
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
N/A
Successful
Unknown
Successful
Successful
Successful
Country Approval FY Loan aount in re Dominant project type Outcome
Indonesia
Mexico
India
Cote d'Ivoire
Thailand
Korea
Jordan
Tunisia
India
India
Ghana
Senegal
Lesotho
Philippines
Ecuador
Mexico
India
Bangladesh
Burundi
Zimbabwe
Rwanda
Mozambique
Brazil
Chile
Argentina
Morocco
Tunisia
Nepal
Guinea
Ghana
Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Brazil
Mexico
Morocco
Pakistan
Uganda
China
Korea
Papua New
Guinea
Vanuatu
Iran
Poland
Turkey
Venezuela
Mexico
1986
1986
1986
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1987
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1988
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
1992
$400.28
$582.22
$90.24
$177.98
$29.66
$211.88
$37.29
$42.66
$118.50
$211.88
$14.48
$62.83
$27.86
$218.53
$81.95
$409.74
$341.45
$65.01
$105.90
$105.24
$42.10
$78.93
$131.55
$263.09
$394.64
$53.03
$76.30
$54.59
$72.16
$88.62
$44.31
$50.89
$20.51
$126.60
$443.10
$101.91
$3.42
$35.06
$205.70
$122.15
$36.65
$4.15
$305.38
$238.47
$339.83
$47.69
$536.57
Housing Finance
Disaster
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Slum upgrading
Sites and Services
Housing Policy
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Disaster
Housing Policy
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Policy
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Sites and Services
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Disaster
Housing Finance
Disaster
Housing Policy
Housing Finance
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Unknown
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful
Unknown
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unknown
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
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Country Approval FY
Algeria
Argentina
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco
Lebanon
Swaziland
Indonesia
China
Indonesia
Albania
Armenia
Croatia
India
Russian Fed-
eration
Algeria
Mali
Ukraine
Lithuania
Russian Fed-
eration
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Caribbean
Region
Lebanon
Lebanon
Lebanon
Lebanon
Lebanon
Lebanon
Pakistan
Russian Fed-
eration
Mexico
Jordan
West Bank &
Gaza
Bangladesh
Cote d'Ivoire
China
Estonia
Albania
Moldova
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Turkey
West Bank
and Gaza
1992
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1995
1995
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
Loan amount in real
price 2001 (M of $)
$39.35
$197.97
$87.34
$232.91
$151.39
$203.79
$33.09
$155.16
$399.30
$198.51
$17.11
$31.94
$146.03
$280.65
$446.63
$56.95
$87.62
$18.62
$10.95
$328.57
$16.43
$0.44
$8.32
$8.98
$20.81
$27.38
$97.48
$54.76
$23.55
$33.30
$3.97
$21.48
$26.85
$3.44
$10.61
$30.77
$16.02
$10.61
$16.87
$18.04
$386.03
$4.24
Housing Policy
Disaster
Slum upgrading
Housing Policy
Housing Finance
Disaster
Housing Policy
Housing Policy
Housing Finance
Slum upgrading
Housing Policy
Disaster
Disaster
Disaster
Housing Policy
Disaster
Housing Policy
Housing Policy
Housing Policy
Housing Policy
Disaster
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Policy
Housing Policy
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Sites and Services
Disaster
Housing Finance
Slum upgrading
Housing Policy
Disaster
Disaster
Housing Finance
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Dominant project type Outcome
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
N/A
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
N/A
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
N/A
Successful
Successful
Unknown
Successful
Successful
Unknown
Unsuccessful
Successful
Unknown
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unknown
Country Approval FY Loan amount in re Dominant project type Outcome
Algeria
South Africa
Slovenia
Turkey
Argentina
Argentina
Peru
Venezuela
India
Sri Lanka
Korea
Georgia
Kyrgyz Re-
public
Colombia
Colombia
Algeria
Maldives
Mauritania
Philippines
Russian Fed-
eration
Mexico
China
Central Euro-
pean Region
Latvia
Algeria
Algeria
India
Colombia
Brazil
Iran
India
India
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
$159.14
$13.08
$15.69
$516.55
$52.31
$133.39
$39.75
$63.50
$13.50
$1.36
$55.66
$3.07
$9.64
$0.00
$230.14
$85.37
$0.00
$70.00
$4.79
$80.00
$16.00
$0.30
$50.00
$2.03
$5.50
$88.44
$541.97
$99.99
$46.00
$179.99
$99.99
$12.78
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Policy
Disaster
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Policy
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Policy
Housing Finance
Disaster
Disaster
Housing Finance
Housing Policy
Housing Policy
Housing Policy
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
Disaster
Sites and Services
Slum upgrading
Housing Policy
Disaster
Housing Finance
Housing Finance
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Unsuccessful
Unknown
Successful
Successful
Unknown
Unknown
Successful
Successful
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Successful
Unknown
Successful
Successful
N/A
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Successful
Unknown
Unknown

Table 6-2: Detailed impacts of relocation project on poverty in Phnom Penh
Source: primary data collected by authors between July 2001 and December 2002
Category Indicator of local Observations / facts from field data Lessons from impact of activi- Relevance to achieving UPRS
development ties objectives
A. Background data
I. Information on the demographics of most
low-income settlements remains vague and
partial. We have detailed data only for a limited
number of settlements in Phnom Penh
II. Although most resettlement sites are located
in areas physically less dangerous to live in
than some of the original settlements (away
from floods, sewer outlets, or waste dumps),
they do not have the services to ensure that
poor families can live there: they lack educa-
tion, health, water, sanitation services, and road
access.
III. Sites are located too far from employment
opportunities for poor families to have a job
while living on the sites.
IV. Because of location, the poor return to the
city to live in often worse conditions than in
their initial settlements. Only the better-off can
afford to wait the six to twelve months before
basic services are available on the sites.
1. Without demographics and
basic socioeconomic characteris-
tics of families, it is difficult to
know whether projects actually
reach the poor and what the im-
pacts of activities are.
2. To design appropriate activities
and mechanisms to reach a sig-
nificant number of urban poor, we
need to increase the use of simple
socioeconomic surveys, with at-
tention to including all dwellers,
and not only registered "commu-
nity members."
3. Resettlement projects do not
benefit the poorest half of the
population from the initial com-
munities because they cannot sur
vive on sites without basic
services that are located far from
job opportunities.
4. Proximity to employment op-
portunity is the priority to con-
sider in planning resettlement
sites.
(i) To measure the outreach of the
UPRS activities, more accurate
information on the number of fami-
lies and basic characteristics of
populations is necessary.
(ii) To better understand the impact
of activities on the poorest and
most vulnerable groups, we must
break down information at the fam-
ily level within the settlements - at
least in a selection of settlements if
not feasible for all.
(iii) Resettlements in the way they
have been conducted during "emer-
gencies" do not benefit the 50%
poorest of the initial victims. The
relocations thus do not contribute to
the UPRS aim of reaching low-
income populations and the poorest
within them. This is in great part
due to inadequate physical charac-
teristics and location of the sites.
5. Most resettlements are de-
signed in grids that include no
public space for communal life to
develop. This contributes to
weakening social interactions on
the sites.
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Al. Administrative
and demographic data
A2. Physical charac-
teristics of settlements
Category Indicator of local Observations / facts from field data Lessons from impact of activi- Relevance to achieving UPRS
development ties objectives
A3. History of settle- V. Most people living in low-income settle- 6. Increasing access to work (iii) To successfully reach poor
ment's creation & ments came to the city first to find work and should be the priority of poverty families on a large scale, activities
development second to give their children access to a better reduction activities, along with must be based on the existing capa-
education. providing access to basic services. bilities of people so that project
VI. Housing quality or ownership is often not 7. The priority in housing is that goals are attainable with minimum
people's main immediate priority [although it people obtain some type of ten- external input.
is often a long-term dream]. Knowing for sure ure, which can range from tempo- (iv) To build on local capabilities,
how long they can stay in their current settle- rary occupation rights to full we must better understand the rea-
ments (i.e., having some security of tenure) is ownership. (See work by G. sons why people chose to live in
often more important than owning their shel- Payne and the draft housing pol- specific settlements (i.e., the history
ters. icy). of the settlement creation and de-
VII. Massive resettlement in unprepared loca- 8. Preparing relocation must in- velopment) and, as much as possi-
tion negatively affects the communities living volve the communities living ble, build on these to plan projects
in the surrounding, both environmentally (us- around the sites chosen to ensure and policies that are realizable and
ing water and wood; polluting), and economi- the feasibility and acceptance of can reach a significant number of
cally (draining the limited supply of jobs) the project. beneficiaries.
B. Organization, participation, and sense of community
B1. Organization of
people's participation
VIII. Since the fires of May 2001, the CBOs
have lost much of their weight in the local
planning debate. The MPP has not taken their
input into consideration during "emergency"
resettlements and has used the CBOs merely to
disseminate information to people on decisions
already taken rather than to obtain any input.
Corruption among some CBO leaders has fur-
ther allowed the Municipality to disregard their
opposition.
IX. Even within poor settlements, most fami-
lies do not understand the role of the CBOs, of
their leaders, and of how they can work to-
gether to improve their living conditions.
X. On the positive side, some organizations and
communities have started to adopt a Commu-
nity Action Planning process (CAP) that fo-
cuses on action as a way to unite people, rather
than merely on a prior formal organization
9. The focus of the NGOs and the
CBOs to "organize communities"
around saving groups is more
related to a donor-driven vision of
community self-help than to the
actual capacities and practices of
low-income families in Phnom
Penh.
10. Most savings are conducted
mainly to please donors. Mean-
while, compulsory saving ex-
cludes the poorest from the
planning process. Linking savings
to the hope of getting external
support also contributes to the
development of nepotism and
corruption.
11. There must be alternative
modes to organize families to
(v) The planning of emergency
resettlements went against the
UPRS objective of encouraging and
supporting participation and civic
engagement. Bringing people to
sites where they could not survive
on their own and handing over plots
of land and aid put people in situa-
tions of total dependency on donors
and the government.
(vi) Meanwhile, the lack of partici-
pation did not allow targeting the
proper beneficiaries. Because of
poor mechanisms of allocation and
participation, the process supported
clientelism and nepotism, in which
only the better-off and better-
connected members of poor com-
munities obtained the full services
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Category Indicator of local Observations / facts from field data Lessons from impact of activi- Relevance to achieving UPRS
development ties objectives
around saving groups. work for the improvement of their they were eligible to receive.
living conditions. Formal organi-
zation of communities should
build on existing informal mecha-
nisms of self-help rather than im-
pose the saving model.
12. Community representatives
and community leaders on a large
scale should be trained to skills
necessary to local development
work (e.g., organizing and run-
ning consultations, keeping ac-
counts, preparing proposals,
interfacing between community
members and officials).
XI. In the resettlement process, there has been
marked discrimination against several groups
of dwellers: renters, prostitutes, and the Viet-
namese. Most have not been allowed to obtain
a plot on resettlement sites, even when they had
long lived in the areas destroyed by fire.
XII. At the community level, there has been
little effort by the CBOs to include the poorest
in planning.
XIII. UN-Habitat has launched a large-scale
training of communities in CAP, to give a
voice to all in local planning. The URC is mak-
ing extensive use of this methodology, likely to
give community members a more equal voice
in local decision-making.
13. Overall, development organi-
zations still have a very limited
understanding of the existing
modes of social organization that
allow people in low-income set-
tlements to survive in the most
difficult circumstances. We need
to understand these mechanisms
and to build on them to design
adapted modes of support.
14. One must recognize that the
destitute are likely to be excluded
from most community-based
planning process. There must be
mechanisms to either include
them in local planning or to di-
rectly provide them with more
targeted social services.
(vii) An important role of the
UPRU is to determine how to pro-
tect the basic rights to equal service
and representation of all, with a
focus on the poorest and most vul-
nerable. To date, there has been
little long-term planning on how to
integrate minorities in the govern-
ance of poverty reduction. Yet, it is
one objective of the UPRS to so-
cially integrate the poorest, to pro-
vide them equal opportunities for a
healthy and safe life, to support
disadvantaged groups, and to sup-
port gender equality in human set-
tlement development. To date, most
of the activities conducted on be-
half of the bottom poor were in the
form of donations, but little has
been done to develop adapted so-
cial services.
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B2. Representation of
minority groups
Category Indicator of local Observations / facts from field data Lessons from impact of activi- Relevance to achieving UPRS
development ties objectives
XIV. The cohesion that had been built over the
years in the CBOs has been very seriously un-
dermined during the planning of the emergency
relocation following the fires in Phnom Penh.
Corruption and speculation have settled in as
"free plots" became a commodity on the land-
market. Local authorities contributed to the
breakdown of the communities by joining
community leaders to sell the "rights" to re-
ceive plots and aid provided by NGOs and in-
ternational agencies. Because of this and of
numerous failures of saving groups, many
families stopped trusting the CBOs. Mean-
while, the CBOs have lost much legitimacy in
the eyes of NGOs and international organiza-
tions as representatives of the people for policy
or project design.
B3. Social cohesion
XV. Corruption does not seem to have reduced
since the 1999 baseline, even if practices have
evolved. Because threats of eviction somehow
diminished with the Municipality announcing it
would grant temporary residency rights in
Phnom Penh, police and local authorities
shifted from requesting "protection money"
against eviction to selling proofs of residence
in the settlements in case of relocation or com-
pensation. Community leaders also started to
"sell" the saving books that showed member-
ship in communities; all sold the "right" to be
on the lists of fire victims or to be potential
beneficiaries for relocation.
18. Several reports and research
activities conducted by the PME
to clarify information provided by
the CBOs and authorities have led
to joint fact-finding missions with
NGOs, CBOs, UN agencies, and
the municipality. In turn, this has
led to thorough discussions on the
facts unveiled and on their dis-
crepancies with previous report-
ing by some agencies involved.
Despite the heated atmosphere of
some debates, this has contributed
to a more open dialogue on issues
(viii) To encourage and support
participation and civic engagement
and ensure transparent, accountable
and efficient use of public re-
sources, there should be continued
support to low-cost, accurate
documentation on living conditions
in low income settlements and on
the process of local planning. This
will continue to feed the discussion
on which policies and activities to
undertake based on the observed
impacts of similar activities. The
results could be important basis for
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15. The emergency planning
processes of the relocations had
extremely negative effects on the
organization of families into the
CBOs, especially due to corrup-
tion and a lack of transparency in
the planning process.
16. These relocations have been
undertaken without the participa-
tion of the people and, in most
cases, against their will. Planning
by authorities without participa-
tion rendered people dependent
on the goodwill of a few officials
and strengthened relations of cli-
entelism.
17. Despite the weakness of some
of the CBOs, there remains much
untapped capacity for self-help in
low-income communities, which
includes informal credit and sav-
ings.
B4. Weight of corrup-
tion
Category Indicator of local Observations / facts from field data Lessons from impact of activi- Relevance to achieving UPRS
development ties objectives
of corruption and to the interest of discussion in an urban forum. Such
most participants in better meth- monitoring should continue to be
ods to gather and cross-check conducted both by governmental
information. and non-governmental institutions,
potentially linking to university
programs in development planning.
C. Socioeconomic development
C1. Employment pat-
terns
XVI. Employment rates drastically diminished
once people were relocated outside the city.
Seven months after relocation in Anlong
Kngan, 21.6% of heads of household were still
out of work, while only 9% were unemployed
in their former settlements.
XVI. There are few opportunities to find em-
ployment in or nearby resettlement sites; two-
third of people with a job work in Phnom Penh,
13 to 20 km away.
XVII. Qualitatively, there has been a shift to-
ward jobs that make less use of productive
capital (e.g., a sewing machine or a motordup),
and provide lower incomes.
19. The lack of jobs and the in-
debtedness due to health expendi-
ture are the two main reasons why
people do not stay on the reset-
tlement sites.
20. Planning for economic devel-
opment in and around existing
and potential relocation sites
should be a priority to ensure the
success of any relocation pro-
gram.
21. The poor must be located near
or have easy access to the centre
of the city and the markets where
they find outlets for their products
and services.
22. The capacities and profes-
sional skills of settlement dwell-
ers are underused.
(ix) The main limitation of the cur-
rent resettlement projects is the lack
of recognition that employment
opportunities are a survival needs
for the urban poor and should be
considered as part of the basic ser-
vices to plan for prior to any reloca-
tion. The relocations did not
contribute to enhancing income
generation, encouraging public /
private sector partnerships, or
stimulating productive employment
opportunities some important aims
of the UPRS.
(x) The municipality and other
stakeholders could support small
business development by:
* Ensuring that zoning plans
allow small-scale business op-
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Category Indicator of local Observations / facts from field data Lessons from impact of activi- Relevance to achieving UPRS
development ties objectives
XVIII. Along with employment, income has
diminished. Meanwhile, transportation ex-
penses have soared.
XIX. In Anlong Kngan, the median income is
30,000 Riels per household per week; 50% of
the population lives with about 800 Riels per
day. In comparison, the official poverty line is
about 2,000 Riels per day and per person in
Phnom Penh, or 75,000 Riels per household per
week.
XX. After eight months on the relocation site,
88% of the population was under the urban
poverty line.
XXI. Many families have had to take their chil-
dren out of school to work and financially sup-
port the family.
XXII. To date, the outreach of formal financial
services to the poor is extremely limited. Most
rely on loans from friends, family, or private
money lenders. The very high cost of private
sources often runs people into debt traps and
contributes to impoverishing them further.
XXIII. In Anlong Kngan, 46.5% of families
were indebted eight months after relocation.
Most borrowing was for consumption purpose,
not for investment that could help repay the
loans. Fifty percent of families borrowed more
than 100,000 Riels, and the average amount of
indebtedness equaled three months of average
income.
C2. Income genera-
tion and expenses
erations in low-income com-
munities, while restricting the
development of polluting or
dangerous activities.
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23. The low and volatile income
of most people only allows fami-
lies with at least two workers to
meet minimum needs. Families
with a single income earner can-
not meet daily survival needs of
food and water. Even the average
income of a family with two per-
sons working is below the official
urban poverty line.
24. Because of low-income, when
facing emergency spending needs
(for health), families must bor-
row.
25. There must be organized sup-
port to limit expenses on transpor-
tation and health cost.
There must be incentives to keep
children in school.
26. There is a need for organized
credit and savings on the sites, but
the current type of indebtedness
leads families into debt traps.
They borrow to meet basic needs
rather than for investment and
cannot therefore generate any
surplus to repay their debts. In-
debtedness then forces many
families to sell their plots (often
to money lenders), and to come
back to squat in the city.
27. Credit can only be extended
along with the provision of basic
health services, and with some
programs to ensure food security.
C3. Access to finan-
cial services; indebt-
edness
, Supporting the development of
infrastructure networks such as
water, communication, elec-
tricity, and sanitation to help
improve the efficiency and
productivity of the activities.
, Supporting the development of
access to marketing informa-
tion and to micro-financial ser-
vices (saving, credit, leasing,
insurance).
* Providing information on
safety measures, and health
care in work.
* Providing information on labor
standards and rights to avoid
the potential exploitation by
middlemen.
Category Indicator of local
development
C4. Health problems,
access to care, cost,
financing
C5. Education levels,
cost, barriers
Observations / facts from field data
XXIV. Overall, health conditions on relocation
sites seem better than in many low-income
settlements on Phnom Penh.
XXV. People still suffer from diarrhea, fevers,
and colds, all mostly related to the insufficient
quality and quantity of water, and to the lack of
proper sanitation.
XXVI. Any event of sickness can have a dis-
proportionate impact on people as they have no
savings to pay for health cost and 85% of them
must go into debts to pay for health expenses.
XXVII. One fifth of the population can only
afford to eat twice a day.
XXVIII. Schools are one of the first services
available in the relocation sites and the level of
attendance of children of school age (61.5%) is
similar to that in Phnom Penh.
XXIX. Over time, the lack of income forces
poorer families to take their children out of
school, either because they cannot afford the
daily cost or because they need the children to
work and provide supplementary income to the
family.
Lessons from impact of activi-
ties
28. As people cannot obtain qual-
ity medical care close by, many
only go to the hospital (in Phnom
Penh) when their condition is very
serious. Benign illnesses can thus
become major problems that run
families into debts.
29. Indebtedness for health costs
is one of the first reasons why
people sell their plots and return
to live in squatter settlements in
Phnom Penh.
30. The provision of low-cost,
quality health care is necessary to
limit indebtedness and ensure that
people are physically fit to work.
31. School services are available
and not more expensive than in
Phnom Penh, but they represent a
higher proportion of families'
spending as revenues are lower.
Relevance to achieving UPRS
objectives
(xii) Although many services are
available on the private market,
they are often of low quality and
unaffordable for poor families.
Poor families can only pay for them
with money they borrow, under-
mining their capacities to save or
invest in any productive invest-
ment.
(xiii) For the UPRS to have long
term positive impacts reducing
poverty it must help working age
individuals and their children ac-
quire the education and skills nec-
essary to improve their incomes in
the long term. Currently, levels of
income after relocation are lower
than before and do not allow fami-
lies either to cover their basic needs
or to invest in the education of their
children, the most valuable invest-
ment they could make to secure
their future.
C6. Physical safety
and criminality
XXX. Physical safety due to criminality is not
a major issue on the resettlement sites. Crime
mostly takes the form of corruption in the allo-
cation of the resettlement plots and the benefits
associated to them.
32. The main issues of physical
safety on resettlement sites are
related to the lack of sanitation,
waste management, and disaster
prevention or management
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Category Indicator of local Observations / facts from field data Lessons from impact of activi- Relevance to achieving UPRS
development ties objectives
D. Housing
D1. Housing types,
household equipment,
cost, quality, financ-
ing
XXXI. Almost 80% of families still lived in
very low quality housing six to eight months
after relocation with almost a third still under
rudimentary tents.
XXXII. During the rainy season, many families
had to abandon their plots because they just
could not live in the mud or with water knee-
deep in their tents.
Female-headed households live in more pre-
carious dwellings than male-headed house-
holds.
33. Lasting substandard housing
conditions have strong negative
impact on people's health, ability
to work, and sense of dignity.
34. The provision of core housing
kits has proved to be a low-cost
solution that gives families physi-
cal protection from the elements
and allows them to gradually con-
solidate their housing.
35. Housing loans are not adapted
for most of the poor as they can-
not commit to long term repay-
ment and must use the funds for
emergency consumption needs
instead.
(xiv) Housing problems cannot be
solved on a large-scale by the Mu-
nicipality alone and require the
participation of private providers
under the facilitation and regulation
of the government. While the pri-
vate sector can provide construction
and financing, it is up to the mu-
nicipality to set the laws to secure
tenure and to monitor that all can
have access to credit, to basic ser-
vices, and to decent housing. To
ensure that low-income housing
reaches its beneficiaries, it is im-
portant that housing for the poor
should not be treated separately
from housing for the middle class.
There should be provision of varied
types of housing to meet all needs.
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Category Indicator of local Observations / facts from field data Lessons from impact of activi- Relevance to achieving UPRS
development ties objectives
XXXIII. The impact of relocation on security
of tenure is mixed. Nine point five percent of
families currently living on resettlement sites
claim to have legal titles that ensure their own-
ership and tenure on the plots. Yet a large pro-
portion of actual victims of the fires were never
able to relocate or to obtain a plot. Along with
the families that had to abandon or resell their
plots because they could not survive on the site,
we estimate that eight to twelve months after
relocation, between 50 and 80% of the families
who were victims of the fires either never re-
ceived a plot or could not keep it and left the
sites.
36. As soon as programs involve
displacement, people who are not
intended beneficiaries become
involved and receive the benefits.
Many of the families currently
living on the resettlement sites
and receiving support from devel-
opment agencies were not victims
of the fires and/or not the initial
beneficiaries of the resettlement
programs.
37. The poorer did not benefit
from the projects and many had to
come back to the city.
D2. Security of ten-
ure, threat of eviction
XXXIV. Many of the poorest families were not
included in the relocation process. They were
renters in the original communities and were
not allowed to receive benefits. The owners of
their houses instead received plots (when many
such owners did not even live in the communi-
ties).
XXXV. Many of the poorest were also de-
ceived by leaders (of community or Sangkat)
who promised them a plot, only to announce
later that they would not be eligible for one.
38. If relocations are to reach the
poor, there must a mechanism put
in place to ensure that the reset-
tlement guidelines are followed.
39. Most likely though, the poor-
est will never benefit from reloca-
tions as they cannot survive on
the sites.
XXXVI. Hundreds of families have waited in
vain for up to a year for a plot, which they were
entitled to according to the 2001 relocation
guidelines.
(xvi) To achieve the goal of provid-
ing adequate housing to all, the
UPRU must develop long-term
planning in collaboration with other
municipal department (for master
planning of infrastructure, for land
registration, for municipal financ-
ing). It should also enable the mar-
ket to provide housing while setting
aside suitable land and regulating
the installation of proper services.
Lastly, it should link closely to the
agencies in charge of land use
planning and housing policy.
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(xv) It is important to develop some
land and housing policies for
Phnom Penh that fit within the na-
tional draft policies. Among other
things, these would establish crite-
ria to assess whether communities
can stay in their current locations or
whether settlements must be regu-
larized or relocated. It should result
in clear plans indicating whether,
and for how long, people can stay
in their current settlements in the
city. In turn, this will help commu-
nities plan for their own improve-
ment process if they know they are
allowed to stay for the long term
and signal to communities who can
only stay temporarily in a specific
site that they have to plan for a fu-
ture relocation and should obtain
the relevant support.
D3. Housing for the
poorest
Category Indicator of local Observations / facts from field data Lessons from impact of activi- Relevance to achieving UPRS
development ties objectives
E. Infrastructure
El. Water supply,
access and afforda-
bility
E2. Electricity
E3. Drainage and
sewerage
XXXVII. Families on the relocation sites have
less access to water than in their previous
communities. After three to eight months on
the sites, half the households used less than 8.7
liters of clean water per day per person.
XXXVIII. Obtaining quality ground water is
not possible on most sites
XXXIX. People have to buy bottled water at an
average cost of 500 Riels per 25 liter bottle, or
20,000 Riels per cubic meter.
IL. Because of the cost, most families cannot
use enough quality water to drink and to keep
hygienic living conditions.
ILI. Only 42.9% of the shelters received elec-
tricity eight months after relocation: 11.4%
from the public electrical network, 7.1% from
private sellers, 15.7% from their own genera-
tors, and 8.6% from batteries. The majority of
families (55.7%) only use oil lamps or candles
for light. Electricity from networks is mostly
available a few hours in the evening. The aver-
age cost of a kilowatt of electricity is 1,400
Riels (against 350 Riels in the city).
ILII. There is very limited drainage system on
any resettlement site. Most are not efficient
because the land is situated in floodable areas.
ILIII. There is no sewer system on any site, and
people throw waste water in public space.
40. The low quality of the ground
water caused many people to be
sick (diarrhea, skin rashes) and
forced them to supplement the
insufficient delivery of water by
the municipality with bottled wa-
ter.
41. The lack of electricity pre-
vents the creation of home-based
enterprises (e.g., to use speed
sewing machines). It also limits
activity in the community after
night fall.
42. Lack of light contributes to a
feeling of insecurity and to diffi-
culty in reaching or moving
around the settlement at night.
43. The lack of drainage is a ma-
jor problem during the rain season
as many houses get flooded and
many families have to leave the
sites.
44. In the long term, the lack of
sewerage can have a very nega-
tive impact on the quality of the
environment, and on the health of
inhabitants.
(xvii) The objective of providing
access to basic services on a large
scale requires long term develop-
ment planning. It cannot be treated
on an ad hoc basis only. Although it
is the responsibility of the munici-
pality to ensure that all citizens
have the same right to access basic
services, the implementation cannot
be assumed solely by the govern-
ment. The government should en-
able private investors to provide
services and ensure a proper moni-
toring of outreach and impact upon
the poor. When feasible, commu-
nity contracts should be used to
develop local infrastructure - they
would likely cost less, not more,
than a contract conducted by exter-
nal contractor and would provide
local employment while federating
communities around common ac-
tivities.
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Category Indicator of local Observations / facts from field data Lessons from impact of activi- Relevance to achieving UPRS
development ties objectives
E4. Sanitation and ILIV. Access to sanitation remains insufficient, 45. Along with the lack of organi-
health with 50% of the population still having no ac- zation for solid waste manage-
cess to toilets eight months after relocation and ment and the lack of drainage
using open spaces in the settlement instead. networks, this poses a public
health hazard as, after rain, human
waste floats along with household
waste.
F. Transportation
ILV. Transportation is the main issue that af-
fects the possibility of remaining on the reloca-
tion sites. Even when people would like to stay
on the sites, they need to find work where it is
available, i.e., in Phnom Penh. Two thirds of
the working population thus commute 26 to 40
km per day.
ILVI. Distance negatively impacts access to
affordable health services as the two main pro-
viders of free, quality health care (Kuntha Bo-
pha and Sihanouk hospitals) are located in
Phnom Penh.
46. Location and lack of low-cost
transportation have serious cost
both in time (with 85 minutes of
average transportation) and in
cost (with an average of 2,438
Riels per day), which represent
33.9% of the daily expenses of a
family with one person working
and 19% for a family with two
income earners.
(xviii) If further use of relocation
involves the development of site
and service projects, the develop-
ment of adapted transportation sys-
tems should be planned ahead of
time, on a large-scale, even if the
implementation is given to small
scale contractors, who should
mostly be from the relocated com-
munities. This would provide ac-
cess to work and employment to
local dwellers.
F2. Usage Pattern
F3. Road access
ILVII. Although almost half the population has
a motorcycle, over a third do not own any
means of transportation. They must pay full
price to travel outside the settlement and have
limited job opportunities as they cannot even
work as motordup drivers.
ILVIII. Eighty one percent of the population
living on emergency resettlement sites consider
the road as unsafe, either because of its poor
quality (68.6%) or because of the lack of lights
(12.9%).
161
Fl. Transport avail-
ability
Category Indicator of local Observations / facts from field data Lessons from impact of activi- Relevance to achieving UPRS
development ties objectives
G. Environmental management
G1. Air and water
quality
ILIX. Almost all families on relocation sites
(93%) agree that their living environment is
more pleasant than in their previous commu-
nity.
L. There is usually no air pollution on the reset-
tlement sites when families first settle there.
LI. The quality and quantity of water available
are insufficient to meet needs.
47. There is an urgent need to
plan for waste management, sew-
erage, and sanitation to avoid the
long term degradation of the envi-
ronment.
G2. Solid waste man- LII. Waste is only removed by truck before the 48. There is no organized waste
agement visits of important officials. management on resettlement sites.
LIII. Families manage their waste on their own,
with about half burning their solid waste and
the other half merely throwing them in open
space.
G3. Disaster risk and LIV. The three main risks are flood, fire, and 49. To date, very little attention
management pest. has been paid by the CBOs, the
NGOs, or the municipality to pre-
vent or manage disaster.
G4 Green spaces LV. Most emergency resettlement sites have no
green space. When their initial designs in-
cluded public gardens, these gardens were
quickly turned into plots to accommodate new-
comers.
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